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In Spanish 
Hace ya algo más de cuatro años que empecé esta tesis (como cierta persona a la que 
adoro me recuerda a menudo). Han sido años intensos, de cambios, pero sobre todo han 
sido años emocionantes y estimulantes. A lo largo de este camino, he tenido la 
oportunidad de conocer y trabajar con varias personas que me han aportado mucho a 
nivel académico y personal. Esta tesis se la debo en gran medida a esas personas. 
También quisiera agradecer la financiación recibida a través del programa predoctoral 
María Barbeito de la Xunta de Galicia, y a la Asociación de Economía de la Salud 
(AES) por su apoyo a través de la XXII Beca de Investigación en Economía de la Salud 
y Servicios Sanitarios para el cuarto capítulo de esta tesis. 
Si nos remontamos al comienzo de este proceso, la primera persona a la que me toca 
darle las gracias es a Melchor Fernández. Melchor fue quien me introdujo en la 
investigación científica y quien guio mis primeros pasos haciendo análisis económico. 
También fue él quien me sugirió que hiciese un máster en Economía en la Pompeu 
Fabra (que resultó ser un punto de inflexión para mí), y más tarde que iniciase un 
doctorado en Economía en Santiago…"grandes expectativas" para un “aspirante a 
economista”. Y así empecé el camino en el que también decidió acompañarme Alberto 
Meixide. Ambos me habéis apoyado desde el inicio, dándome siempre toda vuestra 
confianza y libertad para hacer y deshacer mi propio camino, facilitándome aquello que 
estuviera en vuestra mano. 
Pese a la distancia, la persona que he sentido más “cercana” durante esta etapa es 
Adriaan Kalwij. Nuestra colaboración (plasmada en tres capítulos de esta tesis) empezó 
con mi primer visiting a la Utrecht University School of Economics. Tres meses “puerta 
con puerta” bastaron para sentar las bases de esta tesis y transformar mi manera de 
entender la (micro)economía. Me resulta muy difícil darte las gracias en unas pocas 
líneas por todo lo que has hecho por mí. Aprecio profundamente no sólo tus esfuerzos a 
través de todos nuestros encuentros, llamadas telefónicas y mails casi diarios, sino 
también tu hospitalidad, que me hizo sentir como en casa cuando ésta estaba a miles de 
kilómetros. Me siento en deuda contigo, por lo que me alegra que hayamos empezado a 
recoger los primeros frutos de nuestro trabajo, que espero no finalice con la última 
página de esta tesis. 
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Quien me iba a decir que en Rotterdam encontraría a mi coautora del cuarto capítulo de 
esta tesis: Pilar García-Gómez. Pilar es una excelente investigadora y el ejemplo más 
palpable de la valía de los jóvenes investigadores que emigran a un lugar donde se 
reconozca su trabajo. Su ayuda durante la última etapa ha sido inestimable. Ha sido un 
placer trabajar y compartir tiempo contigo, ¡que dure mucho! 
En ningún sitio se está como en casa, y en casa (en el IDEGA) está Yolanda Pena-
Boquete. “Yoli” es coautora del segundo capítulo, junto a Melchor. Sólo puedo 
agradecerte el regalo de tu tiempo, especialmente al inicio, que es cuando más 
desorientado me encontraba. ¡Espero que esta colaboración sea la primera de muchas! 
Como decía al principio, durante estos años he recibido el afecto y apoyo de mucha 
gente. Las conversaciones con Rob Alessie siempre me han resultado muy reveladoras. 
Rob es un tipo genial (en todos los sentidos) y junto con Adriaan forman un tándem 
perfecto, que como un imán al hierro atrae a la buena gente. Michele, Viola, Vesile, 
Peter y Giacomo: gracias a vosotros también por los buenos momentos y vuestras 
aportaciones. Quiero hacer mención especial a Peter van Santen, quien 
desinteresadamente compartió conmigo sus meses de trabajo (es decir, sus Stata do-
files) que fueron decisivos en el cuarto capítulo de esta tesis. También quiero acordarme 
de mis compañer@s de EvaluAES con l@s que he pasado muchos buenos ratos, y en es 
especial de Patri, por entretenerme con esas listas los lunes por la mañana. 
Volviendo a casa, quiero agradecer a todo el grupo GAME su apoyo e interés a lo largo 
de estos años: Aishan, Nataly, Nando, Diana, Lola y en especial a Manuel Fernández 
Grela por enviarme todos esos papers y por esas comidas a la holandesa (de bocadillo) 
cuando daba clases en la facultad. A Loli y a Maribel por hacer más fáciles nuestras 
vidas dedicándonos una sonrisa cada mañana. Y a María Loureiro, Ángela Troitiño y 
Nélida Lamelas por su disponibilidad e interés en estos años. Por último, pero no menos 
importante, a mi compañero de despacho y amigo André. Gracias por las horas de 
conversación (que nunca acababan) y por tu apoyo a lo largo de esta etapa.  
Durante estos años he descuidado a las personas que más me quieren y que más quiero 
(para mí, esta es la otra cara de la moneda). Gracias a mis padres, Enrique y Ana, por 
invertir tanto tiempo y amor en mí (sobre todo durante mi infancia) y por educarme de 
esa forma, para que crea en mí y no me rinda nunca. Me siento muy afortunado a la par 
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de orgulloso de tener el hermano que tengo. Con Dani además he podido compartir 
muchas de estas vivencias a lo largo de estos años. Y también quiero acordarme de mis 
amigos Marco y Selu, y de mi otra familia (Andrés, “Carmiña”, Elena y Laura), por 
todos los buenos momentos que me han regalado. Y con esto, y por último, quiero 
llegar a la persona clave (la que mencioné al inicio) y sin la cual mi vida tendría mucho 
menos sentido (además de ser seguramente mucho más aburrida). Mi Zahir es a quien 
más momentos le he robado durante estos años y en cambio ella es la que más alegrías 
me ha dado. Es a ti a quien más le tengo que dar las gracias, por estar a mi lado desde el 
momento cero y por apoyarme hasta el día de hoy. Empezamos una nueva etapa “al otro 
lado del río”. 
 
Manuel Flores 
Santiago de Compostela, Mayo 2014 
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and work with people who enriched me both academically and at a personal level. This 
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expectations” for someone who just wanted to enjoy economics. I am also thankful to 
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was necessary.  
Despite the distance, the person to whom I have felt the “closest” during these years is 
Adriaan Kalwij. We are co-authors on three chapters. Our joint work started during my 
first visiting at the Utrecht University School of Economics. Three months of “door-to-
door” work were enough to set the grounds of this thesis and to transform my way of 
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all our face-to-face meetings, phone calls, and almost daily emails, but also your 
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thank you for offering your time to me, and especially at the very beginning when this 
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As I said at the beginning, over these years, I have received the esteem and support of 
many persons. My conversations with Rob Alessie have always been real eye-openers 
to me. Rob is a brilliant person (in many ways) and together with Adriaan, they form a 
perfect tandem, which like a magnet to iron attracts the right people. Michele, Viola, 
Vesile, Peter, and Giacomo: thanks for all the good times and for your contributions. 
Special thanks go to Peter van Santen for sharing, very generously, his months of work 
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and Ana, for investing so much time and love in me (especially during my childhood) 
and for showing me how important it is to believe in oneself and to not give up. I feel 
very lucky and proud about having a brother like Dani, with whom I could also share 
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This thesis investigates the widely documented positive association between health and 
socioeconomic status (SES) in adulthood, often referred to as the SES-health gradient in 
the literature (Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999; Smith, 1999), and it does so in two ways. 
First, as discussed in Currie and Madrian’s (1999) survey in the Handbook of Labor 
Economics, (adult) health is a major determinant of (adult) labor market outcomes such 
as wages, hours and labor force participation, which themselves are key components of 
an individual’s (adult) SES. Chapter 1, “What do wages add to the health-
employment nexus? Evidence from older European workers”, adds to this research 
by quantifying the role of individual wage rates in the health-employment nexus, an 
issue that, although previously highlighted by Cai (2009, 2010), has received no 
attention in the empirical literature with the possible exception of Haveman et al. 
(1994). In particular, I measure the direct effect of health and the indirect effect of 
health through wages on employment. Chapter 2, “The impact of health on wages: 
Evidence from Europe before and during the Great Recession”, focuses more 
closely on the direct effect of health on wages by implementing a recent estimation 
method proposed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) which addresses the problems 
unobserved heterogeneity, nonrandom sample selection and measurement error (in the 
self-reported health variable) in one comprehensive framework. Moreover, by using 
data from before and during the Great Recession—which started in Europe in 2008 
(Arpaia and Curci, 2010)—I gain insights into how the current crisis has altered the 
relationship between health and wages. Still, and more generally, an understanding of 
the effects of health on labor market outcomes is especially important in regions with 
aging populations, as is the case across Europe (United Nations, 2009), something that 
will only become more pressing over time as more individuals reach the age where 
health has the greatest impact on labor market outcomes (Currie and Madrian, 1999). 
Chapter 1 uses individual-level panel data on older workers from the Survey of Health, 
Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Chapter 2 explores the impact of health 
on wages in the working-age population by using individual-level panel data from the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), but also 
investigates if these effects differ between age groups. 
Second, there is a growing literature that demonstrates that the SES-health gradient in 
adulthood has its origins in an individual’s early life (Case et al., 2002; Currie and 
Stabile, 2003). Two chapters of the most recent volumes of the Handbook of Labor 
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Economics (Almond and Currie, 2011b; Black and Devereux, 2011), for instance, show 
that adverse health events in early life and parental SES have long-lasting effects on 
later life health and SES-related outcomes such as earnings and work effort. The last 
two chapters of this thesis use individual-level data from SHARE, and in particular 
from its third wave called SHARELIFE, to explore the relationship between early life 
circumstances and later life outcomes. Chapter 3, “The associations between early life 
circumstances and later life health and employment in Europe”, provides estimates 
on the associations of early life circumstances—measured by childhood health and 
socioeconomic SES—with educational attainment, and later life health and employment 
(at ages 50–64). Apart from presenting new empirical evidence for thirteen European 
countries on the extent to which an individual’s early life circumstances are associated 
with educational attainment and, once this latter is controlled for, with their later life 
health (at ages 50–64), this chapter examines the associations between early life 
circumstances and later life employment (at ages 50–64) once we control for education 
and later life health, which can be potential mediators of the associations between early 
life circumstances and later life employment. Finally, Chapter 4, “Early life 
circumstances and life-cycle labor market outcomes”, investigates how early life 
circumstances—as measured by two indices of childhood health and SES—are 
associated with labor market outcomes over an individual’s entire life-cycle. By taking 
such a life-cycle approach one gains insights not only into which labor market outcomes 
are associated with adverse childhood events but also into if these associations are 
already present early or appear only later in adult life and if these are reduced or 
reinforced with age.  
The findings and policy implications from each chapter are as follows. Chapter 1 finds 
that men (women) who are in relatively better health (measured by a one-unit or a 0.8 
standard deviation increase in a health index) have, on average, an 8 percent higher 
hourly wage rate, which results in a 2 (4) percentage point higher employment 
probability. I also show a direct impact of health on employment: men (women) in 
relatively better health have a 16 (12) percentage points higher employment probability. 
As regards differences between European countries, the findings from this chapter 
indicate that for all country groups, the mediating role of wages in the health-
employment nexus is relatively small while the direct impact of health on employment 
is relatively large and rather similar. Overall, these findings suggest only a minor role 
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for disability income policies likes wage subsidies to encourage the employment of 
(older) workers with health limitations, but an instrumental role for policy aimed at 
helping employers accommodate these workers on the job and keep them employed at 
older ages. 
Chapter 2 shows that in the period prior to the Great Recession, working-age men (20–
64 years old) who are in relatively better health (measured by a one-unit increase in a 
health index) have, on average, a 9 percent higher hourly wage rate. This effect is 
concentrated (and largest) among older workers (50–64 years old). Instead, during the 
Great Recession the positive impact of health on wages disappears. One possible 
explanation for these findings is that presenteeism (i.e. attending work even though 
being sick) has become more common during the current crisis and may at least in the 
short run reduce the impact of (poor) health on wages. For working-age women (20–59 
years old), there is no evidence of an effect of health on wages, both before and during 
the Great Recession. 
These two chapters also provide strong empirical evidence that it is indeed important to 
control for measurement error in the self-reported health variable when estimating its 
impact on employment and wages, and to take selectivity bias in wages into account. 
Chapter 3 shows that for men and women in thirteen European countries favorable early 
life circumstances, and in particular a higher childhood SES, are associated with a 
higher level of education. In most of these countries and in particular for women, 
favorable early life circumstances are associated with better later life health, also when 
education is controlled for. Although for some countries, and mainly for men, there is 
evidence of significant associations between early life circumstances and later life 
employment when later life health is controlled for, most of the association between 
early life circumstances and later life employment appears to be transmitted through 
education and later life health. 
Finally, the results in Chapter 4 show that following a life-cycle approach is important 
because, as some theoretical models stipulate and the results in this chapter confirm, 
some consequences of adverse (health) events early in life may not become apparent 
until later in adult life and because some of their impacts, in particular those related to 
childhood SES, may change and accumulate over the life cycle. For instance, for both 
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men and women in Europe there is strong evidence of a cumulative impact of childhood 
SES on lifetime earnings over the life cycle which operates through both working years 
and annual earnings. Moreover, for men this association reverses sign from negative to 
positive over the working career. There is also evidence of a smaller, rather persistent 
and positive long-term association between childhood health and lifetime earnings that 
operates mainly through annual earnings and only to a lesser extent through working 
years. 
The empirical findings from Chapters 3 and 4 may suggest that public policies which 
invest in children’s health and parents’ SES can benefit children in terms of better 
education, (later life) health and employment opportunities over an individual’s entire 
life cycle. Examples of such policies are free health care for children and (means tested) 
income and in-kind support programs which cover the domains of parent’s SES and 
children’s health (e.g., Marmot et al. 2012, pp 1016–7). 
 

 
Chapter 1:  
What do wages add to the 
health-employment nexus? 
Evidence from older 
European workers* 

*This chapter is based on Flores and Kalwij (2013). 
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Introduction 1.1.
The fact that employed men and women aged 50 to 64 in 15 European countries report 
better health than their nonemployed peers (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2) suggests that, as 
empirically supported in the literature (see, e.g., Currie and Madrian, 1999; Kalwij and 
Vermeulen, 2008), health plays an important role in explaining employment at older 
ages.2 In this paper, we add to this research by quantifying the role of individual wage 
rates in the health-employment nexus, an issue that, although previously highlighted by 
Cai (2009, 2010), has received no attention in the empirical literature with the possible 
exception of Haveman et al. (1994). Yet quantifying the mediating role of wages in the 
health-employment nexus is important for both understanding individuals’ labor market 
behavior and designing policies aimed at keeping older workers with health limitations 
employed. The direct impact of health on employment is related to the ability to work, 
which can be affected, for example, by better accommodating workers with health 
impairments through reduced job demands or a change of tasks (Autor and Duggan, 
2010; Burkhauser and Daly, 2011; Currie and Madrian, 1999; Daly and Bound, 1996). 
Its indirect impact through wages, in contrast, indicates the degree to which it is 
financially worthwhile to remain employed, a decision that can be influenced by such 
initiatives as wage subsidies for workers with health impairments (see, e.g., Burkhauser 
et al., 1997).  

2 The main theoretical economic argument for this empirical finding is Grossman’s 1972 model of health 
demand, which treats health as an endogenous capital stock that determines the amount of time an 
individual can spend in the labor market (Grossman, 2001). See also Lazear (1986), for a theoretical 
model on the retirement-health nexus. 
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of self-reported health by employment status for men aged 50–64 years in 
Europe 
 
Source: Author calculations based on SHARE (waves 1, 2, and 4). The figure shows the distribution of self-reported 
health (SRH) by employment status for men aged 50–64 years in 15 European countries. SRH is measured on a 5-
point scale from poor to excellent health.  
Figure 1.2: Distribution of self-reported health by employment status for women aged 50–64 years 
in Europe 
 
Source: Author calculations based on SHARE (waves 1, 2, and 4). The figure shows the distribution of SRH by 
employment status for women aged 50–64 years in 15 European countries. SRH is measured on a 5-point scale from 
poor to excellent health.  
According to economic theoretical models, health, as a component of human capital, 
affects employment not only directly but also indirectly through wages. Hence, an 
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individual in bad health is assumed to have not only a lower productivity—and thus a 
lower wage rate (see, e.g., Becker, 1964)—but also, and perhaps more important, a 
higher reservation wage. This latter effect may result from such factors as an increase in 
the value of leisure time in which to attend to health (Brown et al., 2010; Cai, 2009), 
eligibility for disability insurance benefits (Layard et al., 1994), or an increase in the 
disutility of work (Gordon and Blinder, 1980). If the wage rate falls below the 
reservation wage because worsening health reduces productivity and/or increases the 
reservation wage, the result is withdrawal from the labor market.3  
Nevertheless, although health, wages, and employment are interrelated, most previous 
studies have analyzed health-employment and health-wage relations separately. As 
regards the first, previous studies have usually identified a positive effect of health on 
employment (see, e.g., Bound et al., 1999, and Disney et al., 2006, for the U.S. and 
Great Britain, respectively). Yet, as Cai (2009, 2010) argues and Bound’s (1991) model 
suggests, labor force equations that do not consider the wage rate should be interpreted 
as reduced forms. Moreover, because wages may also be affected directly by health, the 
estimate on the health variable in such equations should be interpreted as the sum of a 
direct effect of health on labor supply and an indirect effect operating through wages. 
The evidence on the health-wage relation, on the other hand, is mixed. Brown et al. 
(2010), for example, find no effect of health on men’s (reservation) wages in Britain, 
but Jäckle and Himmler (2010), using data for Germany, find a positive effect of health 
on wages for men but not for women. The only study we know of that simultaneously 
analyzes work-time, wages, and health is Haveman et al. (1994). Based on data for U.S. 
men, this study reports that poor health does affect both wages and work-time 
negatively, but also that wages have no impact on work-time which, in turn, suggests an 
insignificant indirect effect of health on work-time through wages. 
In this study, we analyze the relations between health, wages, and employment using 
individual-level panel data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE). Our main contribution to the literature is to estimate for men and women in 
Europe, both health’s direct effect on employment and its indirect effect through wages. 

3 Alternatively, Contoyannis and Rice (2001) argue that the (positive) relation between poor health and 
low wages may stem from employer beliefs that poor health correlates with unobserved characteristics 
that are negatively associated with productivity or from discrimination against individuals perceived to be 
in poor health (see also Currie and Madrian, 1999, pp. 3332–3, and references therein). 
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At the same time, by categorizing the sample into country groups, we assess whether 
these relations are affected by institutional differences like degree of labor market 
flexibility. The adopted empirical framework is a system of equations and is similar to 
the one of Haveman et al. (1994).4 We extend Haveman et al.’s (1994) model by 
accounting for the potential of measurement error in the health variable, which is 
measured, as in most of the above-mentioned studies, by self-reported health (SRH).5 
SRH, however, is likely to be an endogenous explanatory variable because it is subject 
to, e.g., justification bias (i.e., those not employed may report worse than actual health 
to justify not working) and measurement error (Bound, 1991). Empirical evidence for 
the justification bias is provided by Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2009), whose study of 
older Dutch men shows that failing to account for it leads to overestimation of health’s 
impact for disability recipients. Cai (2010), however, using Australian data, concludes 
that there may be a justification bias for women but not for men. The likelihood that 
SRH is also subject to a dominant measurement error is indicated by both Crossley and 
Kennedy (2002) and Jäckle and Himmler (2010) based on the finding that there is an 
attenuation bias in health’s impact on employment and wages when SRH is treated as 
an exogenous regressor. In this paper, we follow Bound et al. (1999) and correct for 
measurement error in SRH by using a Health Index (HI) based on both self-assessed 
objective and doctor diagnosed health indicators. Finally, and also as an extension of 
Haveman et al.’s (1994) model, we take selectivity into account when estimating the 
wage equation.6 
Our primary empirical findings for Europe support the theoretical prediction of health’s 
impact on employment through wages; that is, we show that individuals in better health 
have a higher wage rate, which results in a higher incidence of employment. This 
finding holds even after health is controlled for in the employment equation. Our results 
also indicate cross-country differences; for instance, the mediating role of wages for the 

4 A result of Haveman et al. (1994) is an insignificant effect of work-time on health. Although in line with 
this finding, we, however, do not model the impact of employment on health for reasons of identification 
and we discuss this in section 3. 
5 Haveman et al. (1994) use a subjective health variable which is constructed from two questions on 
whether the individual is work limited by health, and by how much. They treat this measure of health as a 
continuous variable and not, as we do in this paper, as a categorical variable.  
6 Bound (1991) also considers a labor supply model of older men that includes both health and annual 
earnings and, using a similar approach to Stern (1989), uses mortality information to instrument two 
different self-reported health measures. Nevertheless, the earnings variable is taken as exogenous, and no 
estimation is made of the indirect impact of health on employment mediated through earnings. 
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health-employment nexus, albeit small, is strongest in Nordic and Continental countries 
for men and in Continental and Transitional countries for women but is virtually absent 
in Mediterranean countries, as well as for men from Transitional countries. These latter 
findings are consistent with the less flexible labor markets in these groups of countries, 
which results from such factors as stricter employment protection regulations (OECD, 
2012; Sapir, 2006). Most interesting is the finding that despite institutional differences, 
for the most part, health appears to have a rather similar positive impact on employment 
across all country groups, which suggests that these countries may all have schemes in 
place that allow unhealthy workers to exit the labor force (Wise, 2012). Finally, we 
provide strong empirical evidence that it is indeed important to control for measurement 
error in the SRH variable when estimating its impact on employment and wages. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and 
the main analytical variables. Section 1.3 outlines the empirical model and discusses a 
number of related econometric issues. Section 1.4 reports the estimation results and 
analyzes their robustness. Section 1.5 summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
Data and descriptive statistics 1.2.
Our data set comprises individual-level data from the first, second, and fourth waves of 
the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a multidisciplinary 
and representative cross-national panel of the European population aged 50 and over. 
These three waves, conducted in 2004/2005, 2006/2007, and 2010/2012,7 respectively, 
include information on socioeconomic status (e.g., employment, income, and 
education), health (e.g., self-reported subjective health and doctor diagnosed conditions, 
physical and cognitive functioning, and health behaviors), psychological conditions 
(e.g., mental health, well-being, and life satisfaction), and social support (e.g., social 
networks and volunteer activities). Panel attrition in SHARE is high—about 34 percent 
between the first and second waves, and about 39 percent between the second and 
fourth waves—and the country samples have been refreshed in the 2006/2007 and 
2010/2012 waves to remain representative for the population aged 50 and over. We 
have tested for possible selectivity bias in our empirical model (see section 3) due to 
panel attrition using a test proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992). The test results 

7 Almost 96 percent of the respondents in the 2010/12 wave were interviewed in 2011. 
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show no significant sample selection effects due to attrition in the health and wage 
equations, and only at about a 5 percent significance level for the employment equation 
for men but not for women (results available upon request). 
Our empirical analysis is based on data for respondents aged 50–64 from countries who 
participated in at least one of the first two waves. We impose this latter restriction 
because one of our main dependent variables, the (log) hourly net wage rate, is only 
available in waves 1 and 2. This selection yields 52,081 observations for 37,085 
respondents from the following countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Ireland. Missing values force an 18 percent reduction in sample size. The 
result is an unbalanced panel comprising 42,883 total observations for 14,058 male and 
17,928 female European respondents. 
Self-reported health (SRH) status is rated on a five-point scale (from 1 to 5: poor, fair, 
good, very good, and excellent). Employment, which includes self-employment, is 
defined as working a positive number of hours per week. The (log) hourly net wage 
rateʊmeasured in PPP-adjusted 2005 US$ʊis obtained by dividing the amount of net 
wages by the number of hours worked and defined for employees only.8 Detailed 
information on health limitations for both men and women is reported in Table 1.1 
together with the summary statistics for other demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics used in the empirical analysis. The definitions of all variables are 
provided in appendix Table A1.1. 
  

8 For the self-employed, earnings and working hours are considered a poor proxy for their wage rates 
(Jäckle and Himmler, 2010). An alternative is to exclude the self-employed from our empirical model 
(see Section 1.3). This exclusion, however, does not affect the main findings and conclusions of the paper 
(results available upon request). 
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
  Men   Women   
  Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Dependent variables     
Self-reported health (1-5) 3.21 1.08 3.14 1.06 
Hourly net wage ratea 15.03 16.92 12.5 13.05 
Employment 0.62  0.47  
Health limitations     
1+ severe chronic diseases 0.17  0.14  
1+ mild chronic diseases 0.59  0.63  
1+ limitations with ADL 0.06  0.06  
1+ limitations with IADL 0.07  0.11  
1+ limitations with mobility, arm function, and 
fine motor skills 0.30  0.43  
4+ mental problems 0.16  0.29  
Limited with GALI 0.34  0.38  
Missing/underweight (BMI<18.5) 0.01  0.03  
Normal weight (BMI 18.5–24.9) 0.31  0.44  
Overweight (BMI 25–29.9) 0.49  0.34  
Obese (BMI 30+) 0.19  0.19  
Grip strength (0–100) 45.33 13.65 27.82 9.36 
Missing grip strength 0.05  0.05  
Socioeconomic characteristics     
Age (50-64) 57.79 3.94 57.51 4.09 
Educational attainment     
ISCED 0–2 0.34  0.4  
ISCED 3-4 0.41  0.38  
ISCED 5-6 0.25  0.22  
Living with spouse/partner 0.86  0.8  
Household size 2.57 1.15 2.39 1.05 
Number of grandchildren 1.28 2.10 1.72 2.44 
Monthly income from nonemployment (wave 1)b 2776 3189 3252 3848 
Monthly income from nonemployment (waves 2 
and 4)b 5748 22590 5081 16909 
Homeownership 0.79  0.78  
Country representation     
Austria 0.07  0.08  
Germany 0.06  0.06  
Sweden 0.07  0.07  
Netherlands 0.08  0.09  
Spain 0.06  0.06  
Italy 0.08  0.09  
France 0.11  0.11  
Denmark 0.08  0.07  
Greece 0.05  0.05  
Switzerland 0.05  0.05  
Belgium 0.13  0.12  
Israel 0.03  0.03  
Czech Republic 0.08  0.08  
Poland 0.04  0.04  
Ireland 0.01  0.01  
Observations (N) 18675   24208   
a Defined for waves 1 and 2 and for wage-earners only. In PPP-adjusted 2005 US$. N = 5562 for men and N = 5689 
for women. 
b The amounts are in nominal € and in gross terms in wave 1, and in net terms in waves 2 and 4. For the best possible 
comparability across waves, in the empirical analysis, we use quintile dummies (see table A1.1 for more 
information). 
  
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The empirical model 1.3.
We use the following model to estimate the effects of health on wages and employment: 
* * *
0 1 2 3
E
it it it it itE H w ZJ J J J Xc     ,      (1.1) 
* *
0 1 2 3
W
it it i it itw H Educ XE E E E Xc     .     (1.2) 
Equation (1.1) is an employment equation, and Equation (1.2) is a Mincerian type wage 
equation (Mincer, 1974). All variables superscripted with an asterisk are latent 
variables. *itE  represents an individual i’s propensity to be employed at time t and we 
observe whether or not an individual is employed, *1 0it itE Eª º ¬ ¼ , *itw  is the logarithm 
of individual i’s hourly net market wage at time t and we only observe it for wage 
earners, and *itH  is individual i’s health at time t which is measured by the ordered 
categorical variable itSRH  (Self-Reported Health).  
itX  is a vector containing socioeconomic characteristics that affect employment and 
wages (e.g., age), and itZ  contains the variables included in itX , as well as variables 
such as nonlabor income and other household composition variables (e.g., log 
household size and number of grandchildren) that are assumed to affect employment but 
not wages.9 iEduc  is an individual’s educational attainment,
10 and EitX  and WitX  are error 
terms that are allowed to be correlated. As discussed in section 1, we are especially 
interested in the direct impact of health on employment, determined here by coefficient 
1J , and the indirect impact of health on employment through wages, determined here by 
coefficients 2J and 1E .  

9 The exclusion restriction of nonlabor income in the wage equation would not hold if, for instance, 
individuals with low nonlabor income have more incentives to find a high wage job than individuals with 
high nonlabor income. Or likewise for the household variables, if more family-oriented individuals accept 
a lower wage but with more flexibility in order to better accommodate family life. Empirical support for 
our assumptions can be found in Mroz (1987), who provides compelling lack of evidence for the rejection 
of the exogeneity assumption on the nonlabor income and children variables in a (wife’s) labor supply 
equation that includes the wage rate as and additional regressor. 
10 In line with Grossman’s 1972 model, we use educational attainment (Educ) as a proxy for an 
individual’s stock of knowledge or human capital exclusive of health capital (see also, Currie and 
Madrian, 1999, p. 3312; Jäckle and Himmler, 2010). Since we examine individual behavior after 
completion of schooling, Educ is taken as a predetermined variable throughout the analysis. 
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In estimating the model, we must deal with two econometric issues: sample selection 
and potential measurement error in the SRH variable. To address the first, like Brown et 
al. (2010) and Jäckle and Himmler (2010), we adopt the procedure proposed by 
Heckman (1979), which is detailed in Appendix A1.1. When identifying the Heckman 
model, and as mentioned above, we exclude from the wage equation any nonlabor 
income and other household composition variables (which are included in itZ  but not in
itX ). Potential measurement error in the SRH variable may stem from three sources: 
pure measurement error (see Bound et al., 2001; Crossley and Kennedy, 2002), the 
justification bias (see Bound, 1991; Stern, 1989), or the basing of SRH on subjective 
judgment, which may hinder comparison across individuals (Kapteyn et al., 2007; 
Meijer et al., 2011).11 It is also worth noting that the pure measurement error and the 
reporting differences are likely to attenuate the impact of SRH on employment and 
wages, whereas the justification bias will most probably exaggerate its impact (Bound, 
1991; Brown et al., 2010). Nevertheless, all these issues require that SRH be 
instrumented during estimation of the employment and wage equations. Our model thus 
includes not only educational attainment iEduc  and a vector itZ  containing other 
assumed exogenous socioeconomic characteristics, but also a set of objective (self-
reported) health limitations ( itHL ) as predictors of *itH . We implement this Health 
Index (HI) approach by estimating the following health equation simultaneously with 
Equations (1.1) and (1.2): 
*
0 1 2 3
H
it it i it itH HL Educ ZD D D D Xc c     ,    (1.3) 
where HitX  is an error term. As mentioned above, the health index is based on SRH. The 
health limitations are assumed to be contemporaneous exogenous instruments for SRH, 
meaning that we assume no systematic differences in reporting on these health 
limitations across countries. Empirical support for this assumption can be found in 
Kapteyn et al. (2007, p. 471, Table 5). The health limitations included are mild or 
severe chronic diseases, limitations in (instrumental) activities of daily living, mobility 
limitations, body mass index (BMI), and grip strength (GS) (see appendix Table A1.1 

11 In addition to reporting bias and justification bias, Bound (1991) and Bound et al. (1999) identify one 
problem of state-dependence in self-reported subjective health answers to labor market outcomes and a 
second one of financial incentives for individuals to identify themselves as disabled (see also Stern, 
1989).  
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for details). We do not use the health limitations of depression (or mental health) and 
the Global Activity Limitation Indicator (GALI) because they are likely to be correlated 
with the SRH measurement error (Meijer et al., 2011).  
The assumed contemporaneous exogeneity of health limitations also implies that these 
limitations are not directly affected by current employment and wages.12 The empirical 
evidence on this reverse causality issue is rather mixed, and the models used often 
require additional assumptions for identification. Stern (1989) and Cai (2010), for 
instance, find a negative effect of employment on health, but Snyder and Evans (2006), 
using U.S. data, suggest that post-retirement (part-time) work may have a health-
preserving effect, one not found by Coe and Zamarro (2008) for nonemployment in 
Europe at ages 50–64. Lee (1982) and Cai (2009), for their part, report a positive effect 
of wages on health for men in the U.S. but no effect for men in Australia.  
Recent work by Westerlund et al. (2010), on the other hand, provides support for two of 
our methodological choices. First, it shows that in France, retirement does not change 
the risk of major chronic diseases, which supports the inclusion of both mild and severe 
chronic diseases in Equation (1.3). Second, it demonstrates that retirement is associated 
with a reduction in mental and physical fatigue and depression symptoms, which 
justifies the omission of depression and GALI from the health equation. The belief that 
including such health variables in the health equation would violate the exogeneity 
assumption is also supported by Bonsang et al. (2012), Rohwedder and Willis (2010), 
and Llena-Nozal et al. (2004), who all find that nonemployment has an impact on 
mental health. To find further validation for our choice of health limitations that 
correlate with SRH, we perform a sensitivity test in Section 1.4.2 by restricting the 
number of health limitations to only severe chronic conditions, grip strength (GS), and 
BMI. Nevertheless, as in most previous studies discussed in the introduction, we refrain 
from drawing strong causal conclusions.13  
The three error terms in Equations (1.1) to (1.3) are assumed to follow a multivariate 
normal distribution. Identification of the effects of health on employment and wages is 

12 Currie and Madrian (1999) and Grossman (2001) discuss a theoretical model on the related issue of 
reverse causality of employment and wages on health. 
13 A further reason to be cautious in this respect is that the health impacts cannot be pinpointed to one 
specific explanation. For instance, an adverse health shock may cause not only a productivity loss but also 
a change in time preferences and risk attitudes. 
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guaranteed by excluding the objective (self-reported) health limitations ( itHL ) from the 
wage and employment equations. Hence, the model in Equations (1.1) to (1.3) can be 
written as a triangular system of equations for health, wages, and employment, which 
we estimate jointly using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with freely 
correlated error terms. We then use a minimum distance estimator (MDE) to obtain the 
parameter estimates corresponding to the direct and indirect effects of health on 
employment. The estimation procedure is detailed in Appendix A1.1. Finally, as 
nonemployed women are often homemakers, while nonemployed men are often retirees, 
we estimate the model outlined above separately for men and women. 
Estimation results 1.4.
Table 1.2 reports the coefficient estimates of the objective (self-reported) health 
limitations with dependent variable SRH, ranging from 1 (poor health) to 5 (excellent 
health). For both men and women in Europe, we find that all the objective (self-
reported) health limitations significantly affect SRH (see Columns (1)). As might be 
expected, those with health limitations are more likely to be in poor health, and the 
presence of severe chronic conditions has the largest impact on an individual’s health 
status. Except for the Body Mass Index (BMI) categories, which show a larger impact 
on health for women, the health limitations have rather similar effects on SRH across 
genders.
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Columns (1) in Table 1.3 contain the estimation results of the wage equation for men 
and women. Like Cai (2009) for Australian men, Haveman et al. (1994) for U.S. men, 
and Jäckle and Himmler (2010) for Germany, we find that older male workers in 
Europe who are in better health have a higher wage compared to those in worse health. 
However, in contrast to Jäckle and Himmler (2010), we also find a significant effect of 
health on wages for older female workers, one that is, moreover, similar to the effect of 
health on wages for men. For instance, older male or female workers with a one-unit 
larger health stock (approximately equivalent to a 0.8 standard deviation of HI) have on 
average an 8 percent higher hourly wage rate. In addition, in line with human capital 
theory and previous empirical studies, education contributes positively to an 
individual’s hourly wage rate: compared to an individual with the lowest level of 
education, an older male and female worker with the highest level has on average, 
respectively, a 45 (exp(0.372) í 1) and 48 percent higher hourly wage rate. 
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Columns (1) in Table 1.4 show that for both men and women in Europe, health and 
wages have positive impacts on employment, a finding that contrasts with Haveman et 
al.’s (1994) result of an insignificant effect of wages on employment for men. The 
bottom part of Table 1.4 (see Columns (1)) reports the estimates of the correlation 
coefficients between the error terms in Equations (1.1) to (1.3). The correlation 
coefficients between the error terms of the health equation and those of the equations for 
wages and employment are negative and statistically significant for both men and 
women. Like Cai (2009), we find no evidence of endogenous selection into (wage-
earning) jobs for either men or women in Europe: the correlation coefficient between 
the error terms of the selection and wage equations are not statistically significant. It 
should be noted, however, that if we exclude the health variable, the correlation 
coefficient becomes statistically significant for both men and women (results available 
upon request), implying that health may be the factor determining selection into 
employment at older ages (once educational attainment and age are controlled for).  
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Table 1.4: Estimation results of the employment equation and errors correlation matrix from a 
system of equations for health, wages, and employmenta
  Men       Women       
  HI HI  SRH Restricted HI HI HI  SRH 
Restricted 
HI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Healthb 0.426***  0.247*** 0.399*** 0.309***  0.220*** 0.264*** 
 (0.026)  (0.015) (0.042) (0.030)  (0.016) (0.045) 
Ln(hourly wage 
rate)c 0.076***  0.103*** 0.080*** 0.124***  0.151*** 0.133*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.016) 
Health Nordicb  0.409***    0.306***   
  (0.044)    (0.049)   
Health 
Continentalb  0.377***    0.234***   
  (0.036)    (0.057)   
Health 
Mediterraneanb  0.434***    0.291***   
  (0.032)    (0.028)   
Health 
Transitionalb  0.527***    0.282***   
  (0.045)    (0.062)   
Ln(hourly wage 
rate) Nordicc  0.120***    0.202***   
  (0.032)    (0.039)   
Ln(hourly wage 
rate) Continentalc  0.104***    0.145***   
  (0.025)    (0.039)   
Ln(hourly wage 
rate) 
Mediterraneanc 
 
0.026* 
   
0.066*** 
  
  (0.013)    (0.010)   
Ln(hourly wage 
rate) Transitionalc  0.078***    0.104***   
  (0.026)    (0.022)   
System errors correlation matrix  
SRH/Ln(hourly 
wage rate) -0.076** -0.080**   -0.188*** -0.112*** -0.109***   -0.165***
 (0.033) (0.033)  (0.043) (0.029) (0.031)  (0.041) 
SRH/employment -0.268*** -0.268***  -0.261*** -0.237*** -0.219***  -0.202***
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.030) (0.017) (0.016)  (0.022) 
Ln(hourly wage 
rate)/employment -0.036 -0.021 -0.102 0.027 -0.020 -0.036 -0.044 -0.012 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.084) (0.081) (0.034) (0.052) (0.048) (0.045) 
Log lik. -39787 -39753 -17207 -41750 -48437 -48590 -19544 -51400 
Observations 18675 18675 18675 18675 24208 24208 24208 24208 
a Probit coefficient estimates (top panel). HI stands for Health Index. The dependent variable is employment (1 = 
employed, 0 = not employed). All estimates include the log household size, the number of grandchildren, a linear 
trend for survey year, and dummy variables for educational levels, age years, nonlabor income quintiles, 
homeownership, marital status, and country. Columns (2) show the interaction terms between the education and 
health variables and country group dummies. The estimates in Columns (3) correspond to a model that treats SRH as 
exogenous; the estimates in Columns (4) correspond to a model in which only the more objective HL are included in 
the HI. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b The coefficient of health corresponds to a one-unit increase that is approximately equivalent to a 0.8 standard 
deviation of HI. 
c The coefficient of the hourly wage rate corresponds to a 10% increase.
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Finally, and in line with the theoretical predictions, the results in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 
support the existence of an indirect impact of health on employment through wages. 
This indirect effect, together with the direct effects of health and wages on employment, 
is illustrated by Table 1.5. As the top part of the table shows, employment is about 
equally sensitive to health across genders but somewhat more sensitive to wages for 
women. For example, older male (female) workers with a one-unit larger health stock 
have on average a 16 (12) percentage points higher employment probability, while a 10 
percent increase in their hourly wage rate leads to a 3 (5) percentage point higher 
employment probability. Moreover, the indirect effects of health on employment, 
although relatively small, are statistically significant and essentially twice as large for 
women. That is, for an older female (male) worker with a one-unit larger health stock, 
its 8 percent higher hourly wage rate (see Columns (1), Table 1.3) results in a 4 (2) 
percentage points higher employment probability.   
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Table 1.5: The direct effects and indirect effects through wages of health on employment. The 
reported effects are percentage point increases in employment probability.a
Europe Men Women 
Ln(hourly wage)b 0.028*** 0.049*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Healthc 0.158*** 0.123*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
Indirect healthd 0.022*** 0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
Country groups   
Ln(hourly wage rate) Nordicb 0.045*** 0.080*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
Ln(hourly wage rate) Continentalb 0.039*** 0.058*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) 
Ln(hourly wage rate) Mediterraneanb 0.010* 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Ln(hourly wage rate) Transitionalb 0.029*** 0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Testing for homogeneity in the effect of the ln(hourly wage rate)e  
Chi2 (3) 14.27 16.47 
p-value 0.0026 0.0009 
Health Nordicc 0.152*** 0.122*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
Health Continentalc 0.140*** 0.093*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) 
Health Mediterraneanc 0.161*** 0.116*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Health Transitionalc 0.195*** 0.112*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) 
Testing for homogeneity in the effect of healthe  
Chi2 (3) 9.84 1.57 
p-value 0.0200 0.6662 
Indirect health Nordicd 0.038*** 0.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) 
Indirect health Continentald 0.030*** 0.060*** 
 (0.011) (0.021) 
Indirect health Mediterraneand 0.006 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
Indirect health Transitionald 0.020 0.074*** 
 (0.012) (0.022) 
Testing for homogeneity in the indirect effecte  
Chi2 (3) 9.27 9.86 
p-value 0.0259 0.0198 
a Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (see Appendix A1.1 for more details). Significance levels: *** p < 
0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b Measures the increase in employment probability corresponding to a 10% increase in the hourly net wage rate. 
c Measures the increase in employment probability corresponding to a one-unit increase that is approximately 
equivalent to a 0.8 standard deviation of HI. 
d Measures the increase in employment probability corresponding to the indirect effect of a one-unit increase in health 
on employment through wages. 
e We test the null hypothesis of equality of the, respectively, direct wage and health effects and of the indirect health 
effects on employment across the different country groups and report the test statistic with corresponding p-values 
and degrees of freedom (in parentheses).
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1.4.1. Heterogeneous responses 
Up to this point in the discussion, labor market responses to health have been assumed 
to be homogeneous across our sample of European countries. It is plausible, however, to 
expect that the different institutional settings among countries may imply different 
relations between health, wages, and employment. Employment, for instance, may be 
more (less) responsive to wages in more (less) flexible or efficient labor markets. To 
explore this conjecture, we follow previous studies and classify the countries in our 
sample into different “social models” (Sapir, 2006); namely, Nordic, Continental, 
Mediterranean, and Transitional. These four models differ in terms of labor market 
efficiency, income redistribution and health care facilities as measured by the 
employment rate, Gini coefficient and per capita expenditures on health care, 
respectively (see Appendix A1.2 for further details). Because the small sample sizes in 
some country groups preclude us from splitting the sample to estimate separate 
empirical models, we investigate this conjecture by extending the model in Equations 
(1.1) to (1.3) with interaction terms between the health and wage variables and country 
group dummies. The results are reported in Columns (2) of Tables 1.2 to 1.4 and in the 
bottom part of Table 1.5. We do not discuss the health equation results and system 
errors correlation matrix in, respectively, Columns (2) of Tables 1.2 and 1.4 because 
they remain virtually the same as those in Columns (1). 
Columns (2) of Table 1.3 reveal possible heterogeneous responses on wages across the 
different country groups. First, although the educational effects on wages are positive 
and statistically significant in all country groups, they are larger in the Mediterranean 
and Transitional countries for both men and women. The coefficients of educational 
attainment in Transitional countries are, however, less precisely estimated. Health also 
has a significant effect on wages for all country groups and for both men and women, 
but we do identify marked differences based on gender. First, we find evidence of 
heterogeneous health effects on wages for women but not for men. In particular, 
whereas we reject the null hypothesis of equal effects across country groups at a 1 
percent significance level for women, we do not reject the null for men. It is also 
women from Transitional (Nordic) countries with a one-unit larger health stock that 
show the largest (smallest) percentage difference in the hourly wage rate (20 and 6 
percent, respectively). Columns (2) of Table 1.4, on the other hand, show possible 
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significant heterogeneous effects of wages and health on employment across the 
different country groups for both men and women.  
Table 1.5 summarizes the main results. The bottom part of the table outlines the direct 
effects of health and wages on employment, together with the indirect health effects that 
operate through wages for the different country groups. Our test of equality for all these 
wage effects across the different country groups shows heterogeneous effects of wages 
on employment. The null hypothesis of equal effects is rejected at a 1 percent 
significance level for both women and men. Only for men, however, do we find 
heterogeneous effects of health on employment (at a 5 percent significance level), due 
primarily to the relatively large effect of health on employment in the Transitional 
countries.  
In general, employment is more sensitive to wages for women than for men, and more 
in the Nordic and Continental countries than in the Mediterranean and Transitional 
countries. For instance, for an older male (female) worker, a 10 percent increase in the 
hourly wage rate leads to a 5 (8) percentage points higher employment probability in the 
Nordic countries that reduces to a 1 (3) percentage point increase in the Mediterranean 
countries. The profile for health is slightly different. Employment is about equally 
sensitive to health for both women and men, except in the Transitional countries, where 
it is greatest for men. Specifically, a male older worker with a one-unit larger health 
stock has an average 20 percentage points higher employment probability, but this 
increase reduces to 14 percentage points in Continental countries. Finally, we find that 
the indirect effects of health on employment through wages are positive and 
heterogeneous across country groups (at a 5 percent significance level), and larger for 
women than for men.  
Overall, the mediating role of wages for the health-employment nexus is weakest for 
men in the Mediterranean and Transitional countries—even to the point of being 
statistically insignificant—and strongest in the Nordic and Continental countries for 
men and in the Continental and Transitional countries for women. Both the absence of 
an indirect effect of health on employment and the lower responsiveness of wages to 
employment in the Mediterranean and Transitional countries for men (and to some 
extent also for Mediterranean women) is consistent with their relatively less flexible 
labor markets. 
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1.4.2. Sensitivity analyses 
To throw light on the quantitative importance of taking measurement error in SRH into 
account, we estimate the employment and wage equations (Equations (1.1) and (1.2)) 
with SRH assumed to be an exogenous regressor having no measurement error. These 
results are given in Columns (3) of Tables 1.3 and 1.4 and in Table 1.6 for both men and 
women. As Table 1.3 shows, treating SRH as an exogenous regressor leads, as in Cai 
(2009) and Jäckle and Himmler (2010), to an attenuation bias in the impact of health on 
wages (see columns (3)). Similar results emerge for the employment equation: treating 
SRH as an exogenous regressor attenuates the impact of health and overestimates the 
impact of wages by about 40 percent for men and to a somewhat lesser extent for 
women (see Table 1.6). These findings can most probably be attributed to a standard 
errors-in-variables downward bias in the effect of SRH on employment and wages 
because of a dominating (pure and reporting) measurement error in SRH (see Bound, 
1991, p. 111; Bound et al., 1999).  
We then investigate our model assumption of no reverse impacts of current employment 
and wages on health limitations (i.e., the assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity of 
the health limitation variables) by re-estimating the model with health limitations 
restricted to only severe chronic conditions, grip strength (GS), and BMI. These 
limitations, as discussed in Section 1.3, are those unlikely to be directly affected by 
current employment and wages. The estimation results using this restricted HI are given 
for both men and women in Columns (3) of Table 1.2, in Columns (4) of Tables 1.3 and 
1.4, and in Table 1.6. These results show that using the restricted set of health 
limitations does not change our main empirical findings, lending support to the 
assumption of no reverse impacts of current employment and wages on health 
limitations. 
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Table 1.6: The direct effects and indirect effects through wages of health on employment when 
treating SRH as an exogenous regressor and when instrumenting SRH with a restricted set of 
health limitations (i.e. the restricted Health Index). The reported effects are percentage point 
increases in employment probability.a
  SRH   Restricted HI   
Europe Men Women Men Women 
Ln(hourly wage)b 0.038*** 0.060*** 0.030*** 0.053*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Healthc 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.148*** 0.105*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.018) 
Indirect healthd 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.058*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) 
a Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (see Appendix A1.1 for more details). Significance levels: *** p < 
0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b Measures the increase in employment probability corresponding to a 10% increase in the hourly net wage rate. 
c Measures the increase in employment probability corresponding to a one-unit increase that is approximately 
equivalent to a 0.8 standard deviation of HI. 
d Measures the increase in employment probability corresponding to the indirect effect of a one-unit increase in health 
on employment through wages. 
Finally, however, as Chung et al.’s (2009) study finds that retirement increases the BMI 
among individuals aged 62 to 71 in the U.S., we further re-estimated the model with 
health limitations restricted to only severe chronic conditions and GS. The estimation 
results when using this most restricted HI do again not change our main empirical 
results. For instance for men, all point estimates are in between the ones obtained when 
using the previous (extended) HI and the restricted HI. This finding could also be 
explained by the fact that Chung et al. (2009) find no evidence of an effect of retirement 
on BMI for individuals aged 51 to 61, which represent almost 80 percent of our sample. 
In sum, our sensitivity analyses suggest that the endogeneity of health, as a result of 
various sources of measurement errors, is in our model mainly due to the dominating 
effect of pure and/or reporting measurement error. This assumption is supported by 
Bound (1991), who argues that the endogeneity of subjective health measures likely to 
exaggerate the impact of health on employment (i.e., justification bias, state-
dependence, and financial incentives) is more of a problem for health questions on work 
capacity than for more general questions such as SRH status. 
Conclusions 1.5.
Theoretical economic models, based on productivity and reservation wage arguments, 
predict that an individual’s health affects his or her wage rate and that health and wages 
affect the employment decision. In fact, the major role of health in determining 
employment among workers aged 50–64 years is already well documented in the 
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literature on the health-employment nexus (see, e.g., Currie and Madrian, 1999, and 
references therein). However, with the possible exception of Haveman et al. (1994), the 
extant empirical literature does not disentangle health’s direct effect on employment 
from its indirect effect through wages (Cai, 2009, 2010). 
We therefore estimate a system of equations for health, wages, and employment that 
enables a quantification of both the direct and indirect effect (through wages) of health 
on employment. Our model also takes into account the potential for measurement error 
in the self-reported health measure, ignoring which, our results confirm, would 
attenuate the impact of health on both wages and employment. Our main contribution to 
the empirical literature relates to the role of individual wage rates in the health-
employment nexus. For Europe at least, we find that, as predicted by the theoretical 
economic models, an older male (female) worker with a one-unit (or 0.8 standard 
deviation) larger health stock has, on average, an 8 percent higher hourly wage rate, 
which results in a 2 (4) percentage point higher employment probability. We also 
identify a direct impact of health on employment: a similar increase in health raises an 
older male (female) worker’s employment probability by 16 (12) percentage points. As 
regards cross-country differences, our findings suggest that the mediating role of wages 
for the health-employment nexus is weakest in the Mediterranean countries and for men 
from Transitional countries, and strongest in the Nordic and Continental countries for 
men and in the Continental and Transitional countries for women. Labor market 
flexibility may explain such variation. We also find that despite institutional differences, 
health appears to have a rather similar positive impact on employment across our social 
models (except for the somewhat larger effect for men from Transitional countries). 
This similarity may imply the existence of comparable schemes across these country 
groups that allow unhealthy workers to exit the labor market (Wise, 2012). 
Finally, from a policy perspective, the relatively small indirect effects of health on 
employment through wages suggest a minor role for disability income policies such as 
wage subsidization aimed at encouraging the employment of workers with health 
impairments. In fact, our findings support Autor and Duggan’s (2007) conclusion that, 
as exemplified by the U.S. Ticket to Work program, there is limited scope for public 
policy to increase a return to work among nonelderly disability recipients by reducing 
the implicit tax on labor income. Rather, the relatively large direct impact of health on 
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employment implies an instrumental role for policy aimed at helping employers 
accommodate workers with health limitations so as to keep them on the job at older 
ages. Such an inference is very much in line with recent calls by Autor and Duggan 
(2010) and Burkhauser and Daly (2011) for supported work over cash benefits for 
people with disabilities and, in particular, increased employer incentives to 
accommodate work-limited employees (Burkhauser and Daly, 2012).  
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Appendices to Chapter 1 
A1.1. Estimation procedure  
Our empirical model, given by Equations (1.1) to (1.3), is estimated in two stages. In 
the first stage we estimate a reduced form triangular system using full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) and in the second stage we employ a minimum distance 
estimator to obtain the estimates of all parameters of interest.  
In the first stage, the equation for health (SRH) is an ordered probit model. In the health 
equation (1.3), we do not observe *itH  but instead an ordered categorization variable 
itSRH  which takes the values j=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, representing poor, fair, good, very good, 
and excellent health, respectively. The latent counterpart to itSRH , denoted by 
*
it
SRH , is 
a function of true health *itH  and overall measurement error, including pure 
measurement error, justification bias, and reporting differences in our specification (see 
Section 1.3 for more details) 
* * H
it it itSRH H H  .        (A1.1) 
Substituting Equation (1.3) into Equation (A1.1) yields 
*
0 1 2 3
H H
it it i it it itSRH HL Educ ZD D D D X Hc c      .    (A1.2) 
itSRH  is related to its unobservable counterpart *itSRH  by assuming that itSRH j  if 
*
, 1 ,it j it it jSRHP P  d , with the thresholds ,0itP  f , , 1 ,it j it jP P  , and ,5itP  f . The 
composite error term H H Hit it itu X H   is assumed to be standard normally distributed.  
Next, to obtain a triangular system of equations we substitute the wage equation (1.2) 
into the employment equation (1.1), which gives 
* *
0 1 2 3 3
E
it it i it it itE H Educ X Z uS S S S Jc c           (A1.3) 
where 0 0 2 0S J J E  , 1 1 2 1S J J E  , 2 2 2S J E , 2E E Wit it itu X J X  , and the parameter 
vector 3 2 3 3  S J E J  with 3J  being a subset of 3J corresponding to the variables in itZ  
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that are in itX . itZ includes the variables in itZ  that are not in itX , and with parameter 
vector 3J  being the corresponding subset of 3J . The employment equation (A1.3) is a 
probit model in which *1 0it itE Eª º ¬ ¼ , and the error term Eitu  in Equation (A1.3) is 
assumed to be standard normally distributed.  
The wage rate is only observed for wage-earners (and only in waves 1 and 2, see section 
2). In addition, we do not observe the wage rate for self-employed individuals. To avoid 
estimating a wage equation on a nonrandomly selected sample of individuals for whom 
we observe a wage rate, we employ the procedure proposed by Heckman (1979), hence 
use the whole sample to avoid sample selection, and add to our model (Equations 
(A1.3), (1.2) and (A1.2)) a selection equation for wages, where *it itw w  if 1itS   
(unobserved otherwise) and 
* *
4 5 6 7
S
it it i it itS H Educ ZS S S S Xc     ; *1 0it itS Sª º ¬ ¼ .  (A1.4) 
Here, itS  denotes observability of the (net) wages and takes the value 1 if the individual 
works in a wage-earning job. We assume that SitX  is a standard normally distributed 
error term, and all assumed exogenous variables enter the selection equation. As 
explained in section 1.3, the vector itZ  contains exclusion restrictions that drive 
selection but can at the same time be omitted from the wage equation (1.2) (i.e., 
excluded from itX ). Because Equation (A1.4) does not contain parameters of interest 
but is only needed to account for sample selection, the parameter estimates of this 
equation are not reported in this paper but are available upon request. 
The error terms Hitu , 
W
itX , SitX , and Eitu  are freely correlated and are assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution. We estimate Equations (A1.2), (A1.3), (A1.4) and 
(1.2) using full information maximum likelihood (FIML). Because estimation of this 
system requires computation of multidimensional integrals, we implement a maximum 
simulated likelihood procedure referred to as the GewekeíHajivassiliouíKeane (GHK) 
simulator. The practical implementation is carried out using the Stata CMP module (see 
Roodman, 2009). 
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In the second stage, we retrieve the coefficients of the employment equation (1.1), 1J  
and 2J , using nonlinear combinations of coefficients of Equations (1.2) and (A1.3) as 
defined below Equation (A1.3). Basically, we impose parameter restrictions on the 
triangular system that are the identifying restrictions. For instance, as in Haveman et 
al.’s (1994) study, education only affects employment through wages (and health). 
Because iEduc  in Equations (1.2) and (A1.3) contains two dummies, we first use 
equally weighted minimum distance to estimate 2J , allowing us to then estimate 1J  
using the nonlinear combination 1 1 2 1J S J E  . The Delta method is used for computing 
standard errors. 
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Table A1.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
Self-reported health (SRH) Includes five SRH categories, from 1 to 5: poor, fair, good, very 
good, and excellent. 
Log hourly (net) wage  Hourly net wages are measured in PPP-adjusted 2005 US$. They 
are defined for paid workers and obtained by dividing the amount of 
net wage earnings by the number of hours worked. Both variables 
are available for the primary job in waves 1 and 2. In wave 4 there 
is no similar information about wages (net or gross). Similarly to 
Jäckle and Himmler’s (2010) study on wages, we do not compute 
the hourly net wage for the self-employed since their reported 
earnings and hours are a poor proxy for their wage rate. In addition, 
for the self-employed, it is only possible to compute an hourly net 
wage in wave 2. We use unfolding bracket values for net wages to 
reduce the number of missing values, and treat extreme values in 
hourly net wages (e.g., those below 1 and above 300 PPP-US$) as 
missing.  
Employment status Employment status is equal to 1 if a respondent reports working a 
positive number of hours per week in his/her main job, 0 otherwise. 
Respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics  
Nonlabor income quintiles Includes dummies for the quintiles of the rank of monthly nonlabor 
income, which is defined as (average) monthly total income 
received by all household members in the previous year minus 
(average) individual monthly income from employment in the 
previous year. The dummies are defined by wave and country. Since 
income from nonemployment is measured in gross terms in wave 1 
and in net terms in waves 2 and 4, we assume that workers do not 
switch rank in the nonemployment income distribution because of 
the tax system. We use unfolding bracket values to reduce the 
number of missing values, except for total income received by all 
household members in wave 1, which is an imputed variable. For 
this latter, like Meijer et al. (2010), we use the mean of the five 
multiple imputations as our income variable. We treat negative 
values in income from nonemployment as missing. 
Homeowner Homeowner is equal to 1 if a respondent and/or spouse lives as a 
homeowner or member of a cooperative, and 0 otherwise (tenants, 
subtenants, or rent free). A homeowner may have a mortgage, but 
for the largest fraction in our sample (about 60 percent) this is not 
the case. 
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Education Includes three levels of education defined from the ISCED Code 
1997: no education, primary education, or lower secondary 
education (ISCED 0–2), upper secondary and postsecondary 
nontertiary education (ISCED 3–4), and tertiary education (ISCED 
5–6). 
Marital status Marital status is equal to 1 if married or cohabiting, 0 otherwise 
(single or widowed). 
Log household size Includes the logarithm of the number of household members. 
Number of grandchildren In addition to the respondent’s own grandchildren, includes those of 
the spouse or partner from previous relationships.  
Age Includes dummy variables for each age year. The reference category 
is 50–51 years. 
Countries Country dummies. 
Time Survey year. 
Respondent’s health limitations  
MILD MILD refers to mild chronic diseases; it is equal to 1 if a respondent 
has one or more mild conditions, 0 if none. Mild conditions are 
hypertension, high blood cholesterol, diabetes, asthma, arthritis, 
osteoporosis, stomach condition, cataracts, and other conditions. 
SEVERE SEVERE refers to severe chronic diseases; it is equal to 1 if a 
respondent has one or more severe conditions, 0 if none. Severe 
conditions are cancer, heart condition, stroke, Parkinson’s disease, 
hip problems, and lung disease. 
ADL ADL refers to limitations in the activities of daily living; it is equal 
to 1 if the respondent suffers one or more limitations, 0 if none. 
ADL includes six activities: (i) dressing, including putting on shoes 
and socks; (ii) walking across a room; (iii) bathing or showering; 
(iv) eating, including cutting up food; (v) getting in and out of bed; 
and (vi) using the toilet, including getting up and down. 
IADL IADL refers to limitations in the instrumental activities of daily 
living; it is equal to 1 if the respondent has one or more limitations, 
0 if none. IADL includes seven activities: (i) using a map to figure 
out how to get around in a strange place; (ii) preparing a hot meal; 
(iii) shopping or buying groceries; (iv) making telephone calls; (v) 
taking medications; (vi) working around the house or garden; and 
(vii) managing money, such as paying bills and keeping track of 
expenses. 
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GALI GALI refers to the global activity limitation indicator; it is equal to 
1 if the respondent is limited, 0 if not. The question for this index is 
the following: “For the past six months at least, to what extent have 
you been limited because of a health problem in activities people 
usually do.” The possible response range is “severely limited,” 
“limited but not severely,” and “not limited.” 
MOBILITY MOBILITY is equal to 1 if the respondent has any mobility 
limitations, 0 if none. Assessment of these limitations is based on 
the following activities: (i) walking 100 meters; (ii) sitting for about 
2 hours; (iii) getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods; 
(iv) climbing one (several) flight(s) of stairs without resting; (v) 
stooping, kneeling, or crouching; (vi) reaching or extending one’s 
arms above shoulder level; (vii) pulling or pushing large objects like 
a living room chair; (viii) lifting or carrying weights over 5 kilos, 
like a heavy bag of groceries; and (ix) picking a small coin up off a 
table. 
DEPRESSION DEPRESSION is equal to 1 if the respondent suffers from more 
than three depression symptoms from the so-called EURO-D scale, 
0 otherwise. The EURO-D scale was specifically designed for 
measuring depression and has been validated for use in cross-
country analysis (see, e.g., Castro-Costa et al., 2008). The following 
12 variables make up the EURO-D scale: sadness or depression, 
pessimism, suicidal thoughts, guilt, sleep trouble, lack of interest, 
irritability, appetite, fatigue, concentration, enjoyment, and 
tearfulness. 
BMI BMI refers to Body Mass Index. The variable is reclassified into the 
standard categories: underweight (<18.5), normal (18.5–24.9), 
overweight (25–29.9), and obese (>30). Like Meijer et al. (2010), 
we also control for missing BMI.  
GS GS refers to grip strength, and is defined as the maximum grip 
strength measurement of both hands (if both are measured twice) or 
one hand (if only one is measured twice). We also control for 
missing GS. 
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A1.2. Social models  
Sapir (2006) identifies different European social models that perform differently in 
terms of efficiency and equity as measured, respectively, by the employment rate and 
Gini coefficient (see, e.g., Kalwij et al., 2010). Since our main focus in this paper is the 
effect of health on wages and employment, we add to these two indicators the per capita 
expenditures on health care as an overall measure for the health care system in one 
country. As shown in Table A1.2, based on these indicators, we classify Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland as Nordic. These countries are characterized 
by high employment rates and per capita expenditures on health care, and low income 
inequality.14 Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium are classified as Continental with, 
typically, low employment rates but also low income inequality and high per capita 
expenditures on health care. Spain, Italy, Greece, Israel, and Ireland are classified as 
Mediterranean, and the Czech Republic and Poland as Transitional countries. The latter 
two groups have both low employment rates and low per capita expenditures on health 
care, as well as high income inequality.15  
14 For the Netherlands, the preferred measure on health expendituresʊthe one provided by the 
governmentʊis unavailable, but as indicated by the other measure on total expenditures in health, these 
are among the highest in the sample, which justifies its inclusion as a Nordic country based on this 
criterion (see Table A1.2). 
15 The only two exceptions are the Czech Republic and Ireland, which deviate in one out of the three 
indicators from the classification rule and have, respectively, a low Gini coefficient and high per capita 
expenditures on health care. 
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Chapter 2:  
The impact of health on 
wages: Evidence from Europe 
before and during the Great 
Recession
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Introduction 2.1.
According to economic theoretical models, health, as a component of human capital, 
affects wages through productivity. An individual in bad health is assumed to have a 
lower productivity, and thus a lower wage rate (Becker, 1962; Mushkin, 1962). Hence, 
if workers are paid according to their marginal productivity, wages will be determined 
by firm-level supply and demand factors and by Mincerian-type employee-level human 
capital (i.e. education and experience) and health effects (cf. Jäckle and Himmler, 
2010).16 However, while there is a wide support in the empirical literature of the 
positive impact of experience and education on wages (see Card, 1999, for a survey), 
the relationship between wages and health is less clear-cut. 
Still, health, and in particular its possible endogeneity in wage equations, and labor 
market equations in general, has received a great deal of attention in the literature (see 
Currie and Madrian, 1999, for a survey). Common reasons for this endogeneity are 
nonrandom sample selection, because we only observe wages for those who choose to 
work, and because participation is possibly correlated with idiosyncratic changes in 
wages, and unobserved heterogeneity, as there may be unobserved characteristics, such 
as genetic endowment, that affect both health and wages. Another reason is the potential 
measurement error that arises in many studies which, like ours, use self-reported health 
(SRH) status as a measure for actual health. This potential measurement error may stem 
from three sources: pure measurement error (see Bound et al., 2001; Crossley and 
Kennedy, 2002), the justification bias (see Bound, 1991; Stern, 1989), or the basing of 
SRH on subjective judgment, which may hinder comparison across individuals 
(Kapteyn et al., 2007; Meijer et al., 2011).17  

16 Alternatively, Contoyannis and Rice (2001) argue that the (positive) relation between poor health and 
low wages may stem from employer beliefs that poor health correlates with unobserved characteristics 
that are negatively associated with productivity or from discrimination against individuals perceived to be 
in poor health (see also Currie and Madrian, 1999, pp. 3332–3, and references therein). 
17 There is some consensus in the literature that the pure measurement error and the reporting differences 
are likely to attenuate the impact of SRH on labor market outcomes (including wages), whereas the 
justification bias will most probably exaggerate its impact (Bound, 1991; Brown et al., 2010). The 
direction of the other biases due to unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection is, a priori, unclear 
and will depend, respectively, on the correlation between the unobserved characteristics and health, and 
on whether selection is positive or not, as well as on the correlation between participation (i.e. selection) 
and health.  
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Most previous studies that analyze the impact of health on wages have considered the 
aforementioned problems to different extents. For instance, Haveman et al. (1994) 
estimate a simultaneous equations model for work, wages and health. They use panel 
data for men with “histories of significant labor force attachment” and report that 
(lagged) poor health does affect both wages and work-time negatively. However, they 
do not consider the aforementioned endogeneity problems of unobserved heterogeneity, 
sample selection and measurement error (in their self-reported health variable). 
Contoyannis and Rice (2001) use data from employed British men and women and find 
that the significant effect of (excellent) SRH on wages in ordinary least squares (OLS) 
models becomes insignificant for men and remains only marginally significant for 
women when individual fixed effects (FE) are controlled for. However, reduced 
psychological health is found to reduce hourly wages for men. Using further Hausman-
Taylor type instrumental variables estimators leaves these results virtually unchanged. 
Brown et al. (2010) use a Health Index approach in a similar vein to Bound et al. (1999) 
to correct for measurement error in SRH, and additionally control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and sample selection bias. They do not find an effect of health on men’s 
(reservation) wages in Britain.18 Jäckle and Himmler (2010), on their side, use German 
data and compare different estimators that account for selectivity bias, unobserved 
heterogeneity and measurement error to assess the effect of health on wages. Their 
results suggest that health has in general a positive effect on wages for men but not for 
women. 
Some studies have also explored the reverse causality of wages on health.19 The 
empirical evidence on this issue is rather mixed and the models used often require 
additional assumptions for identification (see also Currie and Madrian, 1999, pp. 3320, 
3331). For instance, Lee (1982) and Cai (2009), report a positive and no effect of wages 
on health for U.S. and Australian men, respectively. Also Haveman et al. (1994) model 
the reverse impacts of work-time and wages on health, although they do not report the 
estimation results that include the reverse effect of wages on health. Finally, it is also 

18However, and as will be made clear in Section 2.3, one possible drawback within their approach is that 
they plug into the wage equation the fitted values of a health stock variable obtained from a first-stage 
health equation that is estimated to correct for measurement error before correcting for selectivity bias 
(Semykina and Wooldridge, 2008).  
19 Grossman (2001) discusses a theoretical model on this issue. 
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worth noting that all previous studies focus on working-age individuals, except Lee 
(1982) who uses data from older workers. 
Our contribution to the literature regarding the relationship between health and wages is 
twofold. First, we expand the findings of Jäckle and Himmler (2010) for Germany and 
use individual-level panel data from the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to assess the potential importance of unobserved 
heterogeneity, selection and measurement error when estimating the impact of health on 
wages for men and women in Europe, and by age groups. Second, we use data from 
before and during the Great Recession (GR), which started in Europe in 2008 (Arpaia 
and Curci, 2010), to gain insights into whether, and how, the current crisis has altered 
the relationship between health and wages, an issue not yet addressed in the literature. 
For instance, budget cuts during the GR have restricted (overall) access to health care 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013), which we would expect to result in an increase in the impact 
of health on wages, on average. On the other hand, the rise in uncertainty and 
unemployment (Leduc and Zheng, 2012) combined with decreases in (un) employment 
protection during the GR (OECD, 2013) may be pushing some workers to go to work 
when they are sick (CareerBuilder, 2011). This phenomenon is known as presenteeism, 
and may, at least in the short run, reduce the impact of (poor) health on wages. Also, 
during recent years, there is some evidence of a reduction in the variable component of 
wages (Vandekerckhove et al., 2012), the one that is likely to be more responsive to 
productivity-related components such as health, which might further reduce the impact 
of health on wages.  
Our primary empirical findings show that in the period prior to the GR, and similar to 
Jäckle and Himmler’s (2010) study for Germany, European working-age men (20–64 
years old) who are in relatively better health (measured by a one-unit increase in a 
health index) have, on average, a 9 percent higher hourly wage rate. But in addition to 
their study, we show that this effect is concentrated (and largest) among older workers 
(50–64 years old). However, during the GR the positive impact of health on wages 
disappears. Two possible explanations for these findings are the abovementioned 
increase in presenteeism (i.e. attending work even though being sick) and the reduction 
of the (more) productivity-related component of wages during the current crisis. With 
regard to working-age women (20–59 years old), we do not find evidence of an effect of 
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health on wages, neither before nor during the GR. Finally, and mainly for men, our 
results provide further empirical evidence of measurement error in the SRH variable 
when estimating its impact on wages, and of selectivity bias in wages. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and 
the main analytical variables. Section 2.3 outlines the empirical model and discusses a 
number of related econometric issues. Section 2.4 reports the estimation results and 
Section 2.5 analyzes their robustness. Section 2.6 summarizes the main findings and 
concludes. 
Data and descriptive statistics 2.2.
We use individual-level panel data from the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), a harmonized and representative cross-national panel of 
the European population aged 16 and over. EU-SILC contains household and 
individual-level information on various components, e.g., income, work, health, housing 
and other social indicators about living conditions. It is a four-year rotational panel 
except for France, where it is an eight-year panel, and Luxemburg, where it is a pure 
panel. Therefore, we use two different panels for analyzing the period before (2005–
2007) and during the GR (2008–2011), which correspond to release 2008 and 2011, 
respectively.20 
EU-SILC covers the 27 countries of the European Union (EU) plus Croatia, Iceland, 
Turkey, Norway and Switzerland. However, it was not implemented in all countries at 
the same time. On one hand, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Turkey and Switzerland took 
part in the EU-SILC project after 2005. On the other hand, at the time of writing (April 
2014), 2011 data were not available for countries such as Greece, France, Ireland, 
Sweden and Slovakia. In our analysis, we consider 15 countries that participate in the 
whole sample period (2005–2011) covering Northern (Denmark, Finland, and Norway), 
Central (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), Southern (Cyprus and 
Spain), and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
and Slovenia). 

20 The year 2008 is taken as the start of the GR in Europe (Arpaia and Curci, 2010) and, hence, is dropped 
from the release 2008. 
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Our empirical analysis is based on data for male (female) respondents aged 20–64 (20–
59).21 This selection yields 125,985 observations for 41,995 respondents for the period 
2005–2007, and 131,200 observations for 32,800 respondents during the period 2008–
2011. Panel attrition in EU-SILC is relatively low; about 14 (11) percent by wave in the 
period 2005–2007 (2008-2011). In our analysis, we exclude students, and in general 
individuals below age 20, as they may not have established work patterns (Haveman et 
al., 1994). Moreover, we leave out self-employed workers since their motives with 
respect to labor market participation are specific and their reported earnings and hours 
are a poor proxy for their hourly wage rate. Additionally, we do not consider individuals 
in compulsory military service or those in (early) retirement. We also exclude 
individuals that are permanently disabled (handicapped) because they are not likely to 
be paid according to their marginal productivity for reasons such as discrimination and 
due to the fact that most of them work at sheltered workshops with subsidized wages 
(Jäckle and Himmler, 2010). Missing values forces a 32 (34) percent reduction in 
sample size for the period 2005–2008 (2008–2011). The result is a balanced panel 
comprising 61,071 observations for 9,914 male and 10,443 female European 
respondents for the period 2005–2007, and 60,528 observations for 7,128 male and 
8,004 female European respondents for the period 2008–2011. 
Details on the definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis are given in 
appendix Table A2.1. The (log) hourly gross wage rateʊmeasured in PPP’s adjusted 
2005 €ʊis defined for employed individuals and is obtained from dividing the amount 
of gross wage earnings by the number of hours (usually) worked. Countries such as 
Greece, Italy, Latvia and Portugal report only net wage earnings in the first waves and 
were, therefore, excluded from the analysis.22 Self-reported health (SRH) status is rated 
on a five-point scale (from 1 to 5: very bad, bad, fair, good, and very good), and the 
variable determining selection, i.e. participation in the labor market, is defined as 1 if 
the individual works and 0 otherwise. Among our explanatory variables, experience 
refers to actual experience, hence avoiding additional measurement error in this 
variable.23 In order to capture differences in labor market institutions across the 

21 For women, mandatory retirement age in many of our sample countries (e.g., in the Eastern European 
countries) is age 60 (www.oecd.org/els/social/pensions/PAG). 
22 The reason for not considering net hourly wages is that they are likely to be affected by family 
conditions and tax legislation not related to an individual’s labor market productivity. 
23 We also had to exclude the UK from our analysis, as they do not report data on experience. 
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countries within our sample, we also include country- and gender-specific employment 
and unemployment rates in our empirical model in Section 2.3. This information is 
taken from the Labour Force Survey available from Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). Table 2.1 provides summary statistics on these and 
other health, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics used in the empirical 
analysis for both periods, before and during the GR, and for working-age employed and 
nonemployed men and women. Similar descriptive statistics by age groups are given in 
appendix Tables A2.2 to A2.4. 
As shown in Table 2.1, both before (2005௅2007) and during the GR (2008௅2011), men 
earn higher (real) hourly wages than women, and employed men and women report 
better health than their nonemployed peers. The most notable change, however, when 
comparing the two time periods is the increase in the probability of working in women, 
which increases from 0.73 to 0.79 (the “added-worker effect”). This increase, moreover, 
is largest among older women (see Tables A2.2௅A2.4 in the appendix). Instead for men, 
the probability of working in our sample remains about the same in both periods 
(between 0.92௅0.93). Furthermore, we do not find large changes in real hourly wages 
and SRH across time, with the possible exception of employed and nonemployed men 
for which real hourly wages and SRH increase slightly, respectively. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show kernel density estimates for the logarithm of (real) hourly 
wages before and during the GR for those who report good or very good health (Good 
(+) SRH) and fair or worse health (Fair (-) SRH), by age groups and for men and 
women, respectively. As the figures show, across age groups and gender, the main 
changes in the density of wages occur for those who report worse health, whose wage 
density shifts slightly to the right, mainly because of a reduction in the lower tail of the 
density. Thus, the difference in wage densities between those reporting good or very 
good and fair or worse health becomes smaller during the GR, which suggests a 
diminishing role of health on wages during this period. 
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Figure 2.1: Kernel density estimates for the logarithm of hourly wages before and during the Great 
Recession by levels of SRH and age groups (Men) 
 
Source: Author calculations based on EU-SILC (2005-2007, 2008-2011). The figures show kernel density estimates 
for the logarithm of real gross hourly wages before and during the Great Recession for men and by age groups for 
those who report good or very good (Good (+) SRH) and fair or worse health (Fair (-) SRH). 
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Figure 2.2: Kernel density estimates for the logarithm of hourly wages before and during the Great 
Recession by levels of SRH and age groups (Women) 
 
Source: Author calculations based on EU-SILC (2005-2007, 2008-2011). The figures show kernel density estimates 
for the logarithm of real gross hourly wages before and during the Great Recession for women and by age groups for 
those who report good or very good (Good (+) SRH) and fair or worse health (Fair (-) SRH)..  
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The empirical model 2.3.
Our aim in this paper is to estimate the impact of health on wages for the entire 
population (with panel data), but we only observe the wage rates for individuals who 
work. As previously mentioned in Section 2.1, this creates a selection problem as the 
decision to participate in the labor market is likely to be nonrandomly determined and 
this is unlikely to be fully covered by observable factors (Heckman, 1979). Moreover, 
exploiting the panel nature of our data using, e.g., a fixed effects approach will not solve 
this problem unless the selection process is time constant (Dustmann and Rochina-
Barrachina, 2007). If unobserved time-varying, e.g., lifestyle-related factors such as 
health determinants or motivation affect selection, this kind of selection will influence 
wages through the error term and lead to inconsistent estimation (Brown et al., 2010; 
Jäckle and Himmler, 2010). Therefore, to tackle this selection problem, we estimate the 
following system of equations that model the relationship between health and wages: 
0 1 1 1it it i itw x c uE E    ,       (2.1)  
*
0 1 2 2it it i itS z c uG G    , *1 0it itS Sª º ¬ ¼ .    (2.2) 
Equation (2.1) is a wage equation, and Equation (2.2) is a reduced-form equation that 
describes an individual’s decision to participate in the labor market. The subscripts i  
and t  index individuals and time periods, respectively. itw  is the logarithm of the hourly 
(gross) market wage and we only observe it when *itS , the latent propensity to work, is 
positive. itS  denotes actual labor market participation, and 1[.] is an indicator function 
which equals one if its argument is true. 
The system of equations comprises two sets of explanatory variables, itx  and itz . In the 
wage equation, itx  is a 1 x K vector of explanatory variables, with 1E  being the 
corresponding parameter (column) vector. The variables in itx  include SRH (which, as 
discussed below is not necessarily exogenous due to measurement error problems), as 
well as variables such as experience and macro-level labor market variables that affect 
both wages and labor market participation (Montuenga et al., 2003). In the participation 
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equation, itz  is a 1 x G vector of explanatory variables including all exogenous variables 
in itx  among others, with 1G  being the corresponding parameter (column) vector.  
Both the wage and participation equations include unobserved heterogeneity in the form 
of time-constant individual effects denoted by 1ic  and 2ic which are possibly correlated 
with itx  and itz , and two error terms 1itu  and 2itu , with 1itu  likely to have a non-zero 
conditional expectation due to selective sampling, i.e., wages being observed for labor 
market participants only. Hence, the model combines problems of (time-constant) 
unobserved heterogeneity, sample selectivity and possibly additional endogeneity in one 
explanatory variable due to measurement error. 
To deal with these issues, in this paper we use Semykina and Wooldridge’s (2010) 
framework, which basically extends Wooldridge’s (1995) method for correcting for 
sample selection in fixed effects models by allowing some variable(s) in the main 
equation (wage equation) to be correlated with the (idiosyncratic) error term. Therefore, 
itz  needs to include at least one variable that is correlated with the possibly endogenous 
explanatory variable in itx  (in our case, SRH) but is at the same time not correlated with 
the error term in the wage equation 1itu . More specifically, itz  is assumed to be strictly 
exogenous in Equation (2.1) conditional on 1ic . Here, we include two health limitation 
variables (chronic conditions and a Global Activity Limitations Indicator, GALI) that 
are assumed to be exogenous instruments for SRH. Although not strictly necessary, we 
also add exclusion restrictions to itz  such as nonlabor income and other household 
composition variables (household size and marital status) that drive selection but can be 
omitted from the wage equation. We also define 1itz  as a subset of itz  including all the 
exogenous variables in itx  (i.e., all variables except SRH) plus the two health 
limitations variables.  
To deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity, Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2010)—in a similar way to Wooldridge (1995)—use Mundlak’s (1978) device and 
write the unobserved individual effects as a linear projection onto the (individual) time 
averages of itz , denoted .iz , and an error term. This is particularly important for the 
participation equation (2.2), as it allows to circumvent the incidental parameters 
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problem in nonlinear models (Wooldridge, 2002). After introducing some self-
explanatory notation, we can rewrite Equations (2.1) and (2.2) in the following way: 
*
0 1 . 1 1it it i itw x zE E [ Q    ,       (2.3)  
> @0 1 . 2 21 0it it i itS z zG G [ Q     ,      (2.4) 
where the composite error terms , 1, 2itj ij itju jQ H    are likely to be correlated with 
each other due to sample selectivity. Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) (and 
Wooldridge, 1995) basically extend Heckman’s (1979) procedure to an unobserved 
effects framework, where 1itv  is a linear function of 2itv  and mean independent of iz  
conditional on 2itv :
24 
 1 2 1 2| , ,...,it it i iT itE z zQ Q JQ .       (2.5) 
While this is a formal assumption which keeps the model manageable, it still provides 
flexibility by allowing residual correlation to subsist even after the introduction of the 
Mundlak terms controlling for persistent individual features in Equations (2.3) and 
(2.4). If we substitute Equation (2.5) into (2.3), we get: 
*
0 1 . 1 1it it i it itw x z eE E [ JO     ,      (2.6) 
where 1ite  is an error term.  
Finally, the probit selection model requires the composite error term 2 2 2it i ituQ H   to 
be standard normally distributed. The participation equation (2.4) then forms a sequence 
of T standard probit models that are estimated to calculate the inverse Mills ratios 
(IMR), iˆtO . The final estimating equation is obtained by substituting iˆtO  for itO  in 
Equation (2.6).  
As summarized in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), a consistent way of estimating 
Equation (2.6) is to use, for the selected sample ( 1itS  ), pooled 2SLS using 1itz , iz , 

24 This corresponds to part (iv) of Assumption 4.1.1 in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). 
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and iˆtO  as instruments. iˆtO  can be interacted with time dummies to allow J  to be 
different across time periods. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity are calculated as suggested in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), and 
are adjusted for the additional variation introduced by the estimation of T probit models 
in the first step.25 
Estimation results 2.4.
As explained in Section 2.1, one of the aims of this study is to gain insights into whether 
the current crisis has altered the relationship between health and wages. We, therefore, 
use data from before (2005–2007) and during (2008–2010) the GR and discuss the 
estimation results in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, respectively. Moreover, because the effect 
of health on labor market outcomes is expected to increase with age (Currie and 
Madrian, 1999), we also explore if the impact of health differs across age groups (in 
addition to gender). Furthermore, in order to investigate the potential role of unobserved 
heterogeneity, selection and measurement error when estimating the impact of health on 
wages, we compare Semykina and Wooldridge’s (2010) estimator (SemWool10) to the 
one of Wooldridge (1995) (Wool95) and computationally undemanding pooled OLS, 
pooled two-stage least squares (2SLS), fixed effects (FE), and fixed effects two-stage 
least squares (FE-2SLS) estimators.26 This also enables us to compare our results with 
those obtained in some of the studies discussed in Section 2.1. For the sake of 
completeness, it is worth noting that we include dummies for every age year (OLS and 
2SLS models) and survey year (all models), and thereby control for (birth) cohort 
effects. In addition, in the OLS and 2SLS models we add dummies for medium and high 
educational attainment, and for country. 
The first step in the estimation procedures of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) and 
Wooldridge (1995) is to estimate the participation equation as a sequence of T standard 
cross-sectional probit models to calculate the selectivity correction terms, i.e., the 
inverse Mills ratios (IMR). These results are reported in appendix tables A2.5 to A2.8 

25 We, therefore, use the Stata do-files that are available in Semykina’s webpage 
(http://mailer.fsu.edu/~asemykina/). Instead of using the analytical formulae for the asymptotic variance 
one can also apply “panel bootstrap”. The bootstrap estimator will be consistent for N ĺ f  and T fixed 
(Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010). 
26 See Semykina and Wooldridge (2008) and Jäckle and Himmler (2010) for a similar analysis using U.S. 
and German data, respectively. 
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for men and women. In the wage equations, we tested for (contemporaneous) selection 
bias as proposed in Semykina and Wooldridge’s (2010) Procedure 3.1 which requires 
estimating for the selected sample ( 1itS  ) by FE-2SLS the equation 
0 1 1 1
ˆ
it it i t it itw x c eE E J O     , using 1itz  and iˆtO  as instruments. The resulting p-values 
from Wald tests to test 0 1: ... 0TH J J    are reported in Table 2.2 for both men and 
women, and by age groups. These indicate the presence of selection bias in the (main) 
wage equations for men although not for women when using the FE-2SLS estimator, 
which justifies (in part) the use of the SemWool10 estimator (see Columns 2).27 
Table 2.2: Tests for selection bias by gender and age groups. P-values from Wald tests on the joint 
significance of 3 (period 2005–2007) and 4 (period 2008–2011) IMR are provided.a
  2005–2007   2008–2011   
 FEb FE-2SLSc FEb FE-2SLSc
Men (1) (2) (1) (2) 
20–64 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
20–34 0.10 0.18 0.61 0.66 
35–49 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 
50–64 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.16 
Women (1) (2) (1) (2) 
20–59 0.75 0.71 0.61 0.75 
20–34 0.11 0.19 0.95 0.85 
35–49 0.43 0.59 0.76 0.79 
50–59 0.31 0.19 0.80 0.48 
a FE and FE-2SLS estimation. Robust p-values are reported. 
b Under the null hypothesis the FE estimators are valid. 
c Under the null hypothesis the FE-2SLS estimators are valid. 
Finally, in the 2SLS and FE-2SLS models, we provide two additional tests on the health 
limitations variables (chronic conditions and GALI) which are shown in the bottom 
parts of Tables 2.3 to 2.8. The first is an F-test that the coefficients on the health 
limitations in the first stage (population) health reduced-form regressions are all zero. 
The test statistics are always high and well over the rule-of-thumb of ten (Bound et al., 
1995). The second is an overidentification test where the null hypothesis is that the 
health limitations variables are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation. As 
shown by the p-values, in the FE-2SLS models we do not reject the null hypothesis at 
any sensible level for men and do so only for older female workers and in the 2005–
2007 period, where we reject it at a five percent significance level. This, however, is to 

27 We also tested for selection bias in the FE model using Wooldridge’s (1995) Procedure 3.2. As 
expected, the results from this test also indicate the presence of selection bias in the (main) wage 
equations for men but not for women (see Columns 1 in Table 2.2). However, it is worth mentioning that 
another condition required for consistency of, e.g., the FE-2SLS estimator (apart from no 
contemporaneous selection bias) is that selection in one time period is not correlated with the 
idiosyncratic errors in other time periods (Semykina and Wooldridge 2008, pp. 20). 
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be expected as overidentification tests that ignore selection (and/or unobserved 
heterogeneity) will tend to reject the validity of instruments too often (Semykina, 2012). 
2.4.1. Before the Great Recession (2005–2007) 
Wage equations 
The top and bottom panels in Table 2.3 contain the estimation results of the wage 
equation for the period prior to the GR for men and women, respectively. As shown in 
the top part, men in better health earn higher (hourly) wages, although the magnitude 
differs across models. For instance, in Column 1 the parameter of the health variable 
using the pooled OLS estimator (0.07) is higher than the coefficient in the FE model 
(0.012), which suggests a positive correlation between the individual FE and health, 
with those individuals that are more productive (and, hence, earn higher wages) having 
unobserved characteristics which lead to better health. Controlling furthermore for 
selection in the Wooldridge (1995) estimator leaves the coefficient (0.015) and 
significance level virtually unchanged. Turning to the 2SLS models, a comparison of 
the parameters shows that the coefficients of the health variable in columns 1, 2 and 3 
are smaller than their 2SLS counterparts in columns 4, 5 and 6, respectively, which is to 
be expected if SRH is error-ridden (see also Cai, 2009; Jäckle and Himmler, 2010).28 
Using the 2SLS estimator yields the highest parameter estimate of 0.106, whereas 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity (on top of measurement error) in the FE-2SLS 
estimator again scales the health coefficient down to 0.055. Controlling furthermore for 
nonrandom selection into the workforce increases the parameter to 0.085.  
The same six econometric models using the female sample are presented in the bottom 
panel of Table 2.3. The results, however, are much less intuitive than in the male 
sample. Throughout the specifications, only the pooled OLS and 2SLS estimators yield 
a significant and rather similar effect of health on wages, which is substantially smaller 
when using the Wooldridge (1995) estimator, and insignificant in the other 
specifications.  

28 As explained in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, such an attenuation bias in the impact of health on wages 
can most likely be attributed to a standard errors-in-variables downward bias in the effect of SRH on 
wages because of a dominating (pure and reporting) measurement error in SRH (see Bound, 1991, p. 111; 
Bound et al., 1999). 
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Table 2.3: Wage equations, 2005–2007a
 OLS FE Wool95 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10 
Men (20–64) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.070*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.106*** 0.055*** 0.085*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) 
Experience 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Experience2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.215***   0.211***   
 (0.012)   (0.012)   
ISCED 5-6 0.614***   0.605***   
 (0.014)   (0.014)   
Observations 27462 27462 27462 27462 27462 27462 
F-testb    1920.97 (2) 435.64 (2)  
Overid. testc    
11.46 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.65)  
Unobserved 
effectsd   
194.10 
(0.00)   
119.80 
(0.00) 
Women (20–59) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.072*** 0.009 0.013** 0.059*** -0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) 
Experience 0.012*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.003 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Experience2 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.230***   0.231***   
 (0.013)   (0.013)   
ISCED 5-6 0.659***   0.663***   
 (0.014)   (0.014)   
Observations 22954 22954 22954 22954 22954 22954 
F-testb    1673.08 (2) 387.73 (2)  
Overid. testc    8.43 (0.00) 
0.82 
(0.36)  
Unobserved 
effectsd   
194.06 
(0.00)   
119.88 
(0.00) 
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health limitations (Chronic 
and GALI) have no joint impact on SRH. 
c Overidentification test statistic with corresponding p-value in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health 
limitations variables (Chronic and GALI) are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation. 
d 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 and 9 variables (vector 
iz ) are reported.  
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Heterogeneous effects across age groups 
The impact of health on labor market outcomes is likely to increase with age (Currie 
and Madrian, 1999). To explore this possibility we re-estimate the six previous 
econometric models for young (20–34), middle-aged (35–49), and older male (50–64) 
and female (50–59) workers. Because our main interest is concerning the impact of 
health on wages, we again discuss only the results from the wage equations, which are 
shown in Table 2.4 for men and in Table 2.5 for women.  
As shown in Columns 1 and 3 in Table 2.4 for men, the parameter estimates obtained 
when using the pooled OLS and 2SLS estimators increase (slightly) with age, but 
remain significant when accounting for individual unobserved heterogeneity and sample 
selection for older workers only. For the latter, the health coefficient ranges from 0.021 
(FE model) to 0.164 (SemWool10). Table 2.5 contains the estimation results for 
women. Only the pooled OLS estimator yields a significant effect of health on wages 
for all age groups, which, again, slightly increases with age. Moreover, this effect is 
only robust to individual unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection for middle-
aged women. However, the FE-2SLS and SemWool10 estimators yield an insignificant 
effect of health on wages for all female age groups. 
In sum, in accordance with Jäckle and Himmler (2010) we find that once considered the 
potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection and measurement 
error in SRH, health has a significant impact on wages for men but not for women in 
Europe. In addition to their study, our results show that the positive impact of health on 
wages for men is driven by older workers, which is in line with the expectation of health 
having an increasing impact on labor market outcomes with age (Currie and Madrian, 
1999).  
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Table 2.4: Wage equations by age groups, 2005–2007 (Men)a
 OLS FE Wool95 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10
Age 20–34 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.051*** 0.004 0.006 0.097*** 0.036 0.070
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.033) (0.041) (0.049)
Experience 0.034*** 0.014** 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.014** 0.020***
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Experience2 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001**
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ISCED 3-4 0.200***  0.195***  
 (0.023)  (0.022)  
ISCED 5-6 0.499***  0.492***  
 (0.030)  (0.029)  
Observations 7545 7545 7545 7545 7545 7545
F-testb   296.18 (2) 82.36 (2)  
Overid. testc   3.52 (0.06) 0.07 (0.80)  
Unobs. effectsd   61.01 (0.00) 49.12 (0.00)
Age 35–49 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.067*** 0.013* 0.010 0.108*** 0.045* 0.037
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027)
Experience 0.007* 0.000 0.004 0.006* -0.000 0.004
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Experience2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ISCED 3-4 0.246***  0.242***  
 (0.019)  (0.019)  
ISCED 5-6 0.664***  0.655***  
 (0.024)  (0.024)  
Observations 10821 10821 10821 10821 10821 10821
F-testb   802.99 (2) 206.22 (2)  
Overid. testc   3.91 (0.05) 0.06 (0.80)  
Unobs. effectsd   68.6 (0.00) 41.24 (0.00)
Age 50–64 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.079*** 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.164***
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.033) (0.039)
Experience 0.006* 0.004 0.007 0.006* 0.003 0.006
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Experience2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ISCED 3-4 0.200***  0.197***  
 (0.026)  (0.026)  
ISCED 5-6 0.657***  0.647***  
 (0.031)  (0.032)  
Observations 5896 5896 5896 5896 5896 5896
F-testb   606.68 (2) 105.09 (2)  
Overid. testc   2.97 (0.08) 0.32 (0.57)  
Unobs. effectsd   45.27(0.00) 17.84 (0.00)
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health limitations (Chronic 
and GALI) have no joint impact on SRH. 
c Overidentification test statistic with corresponding p-value in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health 
limitations variables (Chronic and GALI) are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation. 
d 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 and 9 variables (vector 
iz ) are reported.
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Table 2.5: Wage equations by age groups, 2005–2007 (Women)a
  OLS FE Wool95 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10
 Age 20–34 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.054*** -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 -0.018 -0.079* 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.030) (0.040) (0.046) 
Experience 0.020*** 0.007 0.020** 0.020*** 0.007 0.020** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Experience2 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ISCED 3-4 0.182***   0.188***   
 (0.027)   (0.027)   
ISCED 5-6 0.571***   0.585***   
 (0.030)   (0.031)   
Observations 5809 5809 5809 5809 5809 5809 
F-testb    249.11(2) 75.33 (2)  
Overid. testc.    1.16 (0.28) 0.02 (0.88)  
Unobs effectsd   40.15 (0.00)   27.98 (0.00)
Age 35–49 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.065*** 0.016** 0.024*** 0.055*** -0.000 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.028) (0.032) 
Experience 0.012*** 0.005 0.009** 0.012*** 0.005 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Experience2 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.228***   0.230***   
 (0.020)   (0.020)   
ISCED 5-6 0.686***   0.689***   
 (0.022)   (0.022)   
Observations 10166 10166 10166 10166 10166 10166 
F-test dfb    743.71 (2) 196.31 (2)  
Overid. testc    0.75 (0.39) 0.22 (0.64)  
Unobs effectsd   93.98 (0.00)   51.13 (0.00)
 Age 50–59 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.097*** 0.021** 0.018 0.120*** 0.014 0.039 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) (0.035) (0.037) 
Experience 0.011*** 0.008** 0.003 0.011*** 0.008** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Experience2 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.248***   0.246***   
 (0.026)   (0.026)   
ISCED 5-6 0.713***   0.707***   
 (0.032)   (0.032)   
Observations 4078 4078 4078 4078 4078 4078 
F-test dfb    485.56 (2) 79.65 (2)  
Overid. testc    8.64 (0.00) 6.60 (0.01)  
Unobs effectsd    45.91 (0.00)   19.54 (0.00)
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10.  
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health limitations (Chronic 
and GALI) have no joint impact on SRH.  
c Overidentification test statistic with corresponding p-value in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health 
limitations variables (Chronic and GALI) are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation.  
d 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 and 9 variables are 
reported.  
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2.4.2. During the Great Recession (2008–2011) 
Wage equations 
The top and bottom panels in Table 2.6 contain the estimation results of the wage 
equation during the GR period for men and women, respectively. As shown in the top 
panel for men, and similar to the period prior to the GR, the parameter of the health 
variable using the pooled OLS and 2SLS estimators (0.081 and 0.092, respectively) are 
larger than the coefficients in the FE and FE-2SLS estimators (0.008 and 0.033, 
respectively); all these estimated effects are significantly different from zero at the five 
percent level. However, contrary to the period prior to the GR, accounting for sample 
selection in the SemWool10 and Wool95 estimators reduces the health effects further, 
which become insignificant at any sensible level. 
The estimation results using the female sample are presented in the bottom panel of the 
table and are very similar to the ones using the sample period prior to the GR. Only the 
pooled OLS and 2SLS estimators yield a significant and rather similar effect of health 
on wages (0.068 and 0.061, respectively), which becomes insignificant once individual 
unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (FE and FE-2SLS), and remains insignificant 
when further controlling for sample selection (Wool95 and SemWool10). 
Heterogeneous effects across age groups 
As done previously, we re-estimate the six econometric models for young (20–34), 
middle-aged (35–49), and older male (50–64) and female (50–59) workers and discuss 
the results obtained from the wage equations, which are given in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for 
men and women, respectively.   
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Table 2.6: Wage equations, 2008–2011a
 OLS FE Wool95 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10
 Men (20–64) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.081*** 0.008** -0.001 0.092*** 0.033** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) 
Experience 0.015*** 0.104*** 0.029 0.015*** 0.103*** -0.039 
 (0.003) (0.025) (0.050) (0.003) (0.026) (0.051) 
Experience2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.234***   0.232***   
 (0.013)   (0.013)   
ISCED 5-6 0.618***   0.615***   
 (0.015)   (0.015)   
Observations 26040 26040 26040 26040 26040 26040 
F-testb    1561.36 (2) 377.05 (2)  
Overid. testc    15.3 (0.00) 1.71 (0.19)  
Unobserved effectsd    283.33 (0.00)   209.2 (0.00)
 Women (20–59) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health (+1) 0.068*** 0.007 0.006 0.061*** 0.018 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) 
Experience 0.014*** 0.043*** 0.206*** 0.014*** 0.043*** 0.194*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.023) (0.003) (0.012) (0.024) 
Experience2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.230***   0.231***   
 (0.014)   (0.014)   
ISCED 5-6 0.670***   0.672***   
 (0.015)   (0.015)   
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 
F-testb    1488.42 (2) 447.7 (2)  
Overid. testc    6.92 (0.01) 2.98 (0.08)  
Unobserved effectsd    140.34 (0.00)   76.35 (0.00)
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health limitations (Chronic 
and GALI) have no joint impact on SRH. 
c Overidentification test statistic with corresponding p-value in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health 
limitations variables (Chronic and GALI) are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation. 
d 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 and 9 variables (vector 
iz ) are reported 
As Columns 1 and 3 in Table 2.7 show, for men only the pooled OLS and to some 
extent the 2SLS estimators yield a significant effect of health on wages across age 
groups. Once individual unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (FE or FE-2SLS 
estimators) the parameter estimate of the health variables becomes insignificant (at the 
five percent level). Notably, the positive effect of health on wages for older workers 
found in the period prior to the GR disappears when controlling for individual 
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unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection (Wool95 and SemWool10 estimators)29 
and, in general, we no longer find evidence of an increasing effect of health on wages 
with age. The estimation results by age groups for women are shown in Table 2.8. The 
pooled OLS and 2SLS estimators in Columns 1 and 3 show a positive association 
between health and wages. In the youngest age group, the health effect becomes 
insignificant once individual unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (FE and FE-
2SLS estimators). On the contrary, in middle-aged women, Columns 1 to 5 yield a 
significant positive impact of health on wages, which becomes insignificant when using 
only the SemWool10 estimator. Nevertheless, since we do not reject the null hypothesis 
of no (contemporaneous) selection bias (see Table 2.2), our preferred estimation results 
for these women are those from the FE-2SLS estimator. In older female workers the 
significant positive effect of health on wages in Columns 1 and 3 (OLS and 2SLS 
estimators) reverses its sign from positive to negative when controlling for individual 
fixed effects and sample selection, and moreover increases in significance in the 2SLS 
models (FE-2SLS and SemWool10 estimators). Here we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no (contemporaneous) selection bias either and, therefore, we take the FE-
2SLS estimator as our preferred specification. This negative effect of health on hourly 
wages, we find, is due to a dominating effect on hours of work.30  
To summarize, during the GR the effect of health on wages in the working-age 
population becomes insignificant for men and remains insignificant for women. 
However, across age groups we find some evidence of a positive effect of health on 
wages (FE-2SLS estimator) for middle-aged female workers, which is only marginally 
significant for older male workers. We also find a significant negative effect of health 
on wages for older female workers that is due to a dominating effect of health on hours 
of work.  

29 However, health yields a marginally significant, positive impact on wages in the FE-2SLS estimator, 
which is the one we should consider, as we find no evidence of (contemporaneous) selection bias for 
older male workers (see Table 2.2). 
30 More specifically, the effect of health on wage earnings is positive and statistically significant in the 
OLS and 2SLS models only. Instead, the effect of health on hours of work is always positive and 
statistically significant (results not shown). 
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Table 2.7: Wage equations by age groups, 2008–2011 (Men)a
 OLS FE Wool95 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10 
20–34 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.066*** 0.006 0.003 0.048 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.030) (0.037) (0.048) 
Experience 0.051*** 0.093 0.190* 0.051*** 0.093 0.175* 
 (0.009) (0.069) (0.108) (0.009) (0.069) (0.101) 
Experience2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.159***   0.161***   
 (0.023)   (0.024)   
ISCED 5-6 0.452***   0.456***   
 (0.032)   (0.033)   
Observations 5580 5580 5580 5580 5580 5580 
F-testb    152.39 (2) 69.94 (2)  
Overid. testc    1.76 (0.18) 0.54 (0.46)  
Unobs. effectsd   75.5(0.00)   63.14 (0.00) 
35–49 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.092*** 0.007 -0.002 0.100*** 0.042 -0.019 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) 
Experience 0.014** 0.112*** 0.081 0.014** 0.112*** -0.041 
 (0.007) (0.040) (0.084) (0.007) (0.040) (0.083) 
Experience2 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.275***   0.274***   
 (0.021)   (0.022)   
ISCED 5-6 0.659***   0.657***   
 (0.025)   (0.026)   
Observations 9881 9881 9881 9881 9881 9881 
F-testb    573.76 (2) 114.44 (2)  
Overid. testc    6.56 (0.01) 0.59 (0.44)  
Unobs. effectsd   118.5 (0.00)   77.32 (0.00) 
 50–64 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.084*** 0.005 -0.004 0.102*** 0.051* 0.036 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.026) (0.029) (0.037) 
Experience 0.005 0.111** 0.003 0.005 0.109** -0.103 
 (0.010) (0.047) (0.103) (0.009) (0.047) (0.102) 
Experience2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.205***   0.201***   
 (0.029)   (0.029)   
ISCED 5-6 0.632***   0.626***   
 (0.034)   (0.035)   
Observations 5696 5696 5696 5696 5696 5696 
F-testb    523.23 (2) 131.97 (2)  
Overid. testc    6.28 (0.01) 0.00 (0.97)  
Unobs. effectsd   58.85 ( (0.00)   40.86 (0.00) 
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health limitations (Chronic 
and GALI) have no joint impact on SRH. 
c Overidentification test statistic with corresponding p-value in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health 
limitations variables (Chronic and GALI) are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation. 
d 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 and 9 variables (vector 
iz ) are reported. 
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Table 2.8: Wage equations by age groups, 2008–2011 (Women)a
OLS FE Wool95 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10 
20–34 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.054*** 0.012 -0.001 0.090** 0.055 0.030 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.042) (0.059) (0.062) 
Experience 0.046*** 0.091*** 0.327*** 0.046*** 0.091*** 0.283*** 
 (0.009) (0.034) (0.070) (0.009) (0.034) (0.069) 
Experience2 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002* -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ISCED 3-4 0.195***   0.192***   
 (0.034)   (0.033)   
ISCED 5-6 0.570***   0.563***   
 (0.035)   (0.035)   
Obser 4840 4840 4840 4840 4840 4840 
F-testb    137.05 (2) 63.66 (2)  
Overid. testc    0.49 (0.49) 0.44 (0.51)  
Unobs. effectsd   28.32 (0.00)   20.37 (0.00) 
35–49 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.077*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.064*** 0.049** 0.025 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) 
Experience 0.017*** 0.027 0.183*** 0.017*** 0.028 0.174*** 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.033) (0.005) (0.017) (0.034) 
Experience2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.238***   0.241***   
 (0.022)   (0.023)   
ISCED 5-6 0.680***   0.685***   
 (0.024)   (0.025)   
Obser 9996 9996 9996 9996 9996 9996 
F-testb    632.84 (2) 209.17 (2)  
Overid. testc    8.18 (0.00) 2.7 (0.10)  
Unobs. effectsd   70.78 (0.00)   41.14 (0.00) 
 50–64 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.064*** -0.021* -0.020* 0.045* -0.069** -0.101** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) 
Experience 0.023** 0.011 0.082** 0.022** 0.011 0.052 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.040) (0.010) (0.028) (0.044) 
Experience2 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.214***   0.217***   
 (0.029)   (0.029)   
ISCED 5-6 0.679***   0.685***   
 (0.033)   (0.033)   
Obser 4484 4484 4484 4484 4484 4484 
F-testb    456.45 (2) 81.66 (2)  
Overid. testc    2.42 (0.12) 1.54 (0.21)  
Unobs. effectsd   32.37 (0.00)   16.01 (0.00) 
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health limitations (Chronic 
and GALI) have no joint impact on SRH. 
c Overidentification test statistic with corresponding p-value in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that the health 
limitations variables (Chronic and GALI) are orthogonal to the error term in the wage equation. 
d 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 and 9 variables (vector 
iz ) are reported.  
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Sensitivity analyses 2.5.
We performed several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our results. For 
instance, one possible concern in our findings is that the significant effect of health on 
the wages of (older) male workers disappears during the crisis because (unhealthy) 
workers (early-) retire from the labor market and, hence, are dropped from our sample 
(see Section 2.2). Therefore, we re-estimated all models keeping the (early-) retirees in 
our sample, and it does not change our main results for men and women, neither before 
(2005–2007) nor during (2008–2011) the GR (these results are available upon request).  
We also investigated our (implicit) model assumption of no reverse impacts of wages on 
health limitations (i.e., the assumption of strict exogeneity of the health limitation 
variables conditional on the individual fixed effect) by re-estimating the two-stage 
models with health limitations restricted to only chronic conditions. These limitations 
are those unlikely to be directly affected by current wages (and employment). Recent 
work by Westerlund et al. (2010) provides indirect support for these methodological 
choices. First, it shows that in France, retirement does not change the risk of major 
chronic diseases, which supports the inclusion of chronic diseases in the (first-stage) 
health equation. Secondly, it demonstrates that retirement is associated with a reduction 
in mental and physical fatigue and depression symptoms, which justifies the omission of 
GALI from the (first-stage) health equation. The estimation results using only chronic 
illnesses as an instrument for SRH are given for both men and women in Table 2.9, 
respectively. These results show that using only chronic conditions to correct for 
measurement error in SRH does not change our main empirical findings in either 
period, lending support to the assumption of no reverse impact of current wages on 
health limitations.31  

31The estimation results by age groups (and in both periods before and during the GR) also remain much 
unchanged when using only chronic conditions as an instrument for SRH (these results are available upon 
on request). 
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Table 2.9: Wage equations. Sensitivity analysis using only Chronic conditions to instrument for 
SRH.a
 2005–2007   2008–2011   
 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10 2SLS FE-2SLS SemWool10
 Men (20–64) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.086*** 0.049** 0.061** 0.067*** 0.020 -0.006 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.025) 
Experience 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.104*** -0.053 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.025) (0.052) 
Experience2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.213***   0.237***   
 (0.012)   (0.013)   
ISCED 5-6 0.610***   0.623***   
 (0.014)   (0.016)   
Observations 27462 27462 27462 26040 26040 26040 
F-testb 2653.65 (1) 530.60 (1)  2088.86 (1) 547.19 (1)  
Unobserved effectsc    125.83 (0.00)   228.1 (0.00)
Women (20–59) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) 
Health 0.042*** -0.018 0.003 0.045*** -0.001 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.027) (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) 
Experience 0.012*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.043*** 0.200*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.024) 
Experience2 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISCED 3-4 0.233***   0.234***   
 (0.013)   (0.014)   
ISCED 5-6 0.667***   0.677***   
 (0.015)   (0.015)   
Observations 22954 22954 22954 23859 23859 23859 
F-testb 2450.56 (1) 604.93 (1)  2130.59 (1) 636.57 (1)  
Unobserved effectsc    121.85 (0.00)   85.16 (0.00)
a The dependent variable is the PPP-adjusted hourly gross wage rate (in logs). All estimates include country- and 
gender-specific employment and unemployment rates and dummy variables for survey year. Columns (1) and (4) also 
include dummy variables for age year and country. Columns (3) and (6) also include interactions of the IMR with the 
survey year dummy variables. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
The standard errors in Columns (3) and (6) are also corrected for the probit first-stage estimation. Significance levels: 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
b F-test statistic with degrees of freedom in parentheses. The null hypothesis is that Chronic conditions has no impact 
on SRH. 
c 2F  test statistics with corresponding p-value in parentheses for the joint significance of 8 variables (vector iz ) are 
reported. 
Summary and discussion 2.6.
Theoretical economic models predict, based on productivity arguments, that an 
individual’s health affects his or her wage rate. However, econometric problems such as 
unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection and measurement error are likely to bias the 
estimate of health in a wage equation. In this paper, we add to this empirical literature 
by expanding on the findings of Jäckle and Himmler (2010) for Germany to Europe and 
across age groups, based on the idea of health having an increased effect on wages with 
age. Moreover, by using data from before and during the Great Recession (GR) we gain 
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insights into whether, and how, the current crisis has altered the relationship between 
health and wages.  
Our results provide empirical evidence of measurement error in the SRH variable when 
estimating its impact on wages and of selectivity bias in wages for men mainly. Our 
findings for Europe also show that the positive impact of health on wages for (older) 
male workers in the period prior to the GR largely disappears during the GR. Moreover, 
although overall for women we do not find evidence of an impact of health on wages 
both before and during the GR, for middle-aged (35–49) and older female workers (50–
59) we find a (significant) positive and negative impact of health on (hourly) wages 
during the GR, respectively.  
These latter results might be related to the “added-worker effect” shown in Table 2.1 
and appendix Tables A2.2–A2.4. There is some evidence that suggests that such women 
(who manage to get a job in a tight labor market) have rather higher levels of education 
and, hence, also relatively higher wages (see Landivar, 2012, and Tables A2.3–A2.4). 
The negative effect of health on hourly wages that we find for older female workers is 
due to a dominating effect on working hours, and might be related to the fact that for 
these women the increase in employment probability during the GR (i.e. the “added-
worker effect”) is largest. Still, further research should also consider information on 
their partners in order to better understand personal circumstances that motivate such 
women to re-enter into the labor market.  
With regard to our findings in the working-age population, although during the GR 
overall welfare generosity (e.g., access to health care) across countries in Europe has 
declined, which we would expect to result in an increase in the impact of health on 
wages, presenteeism (i.e. attending work even though being sick) has become more 
common among workers. For instance, a recent survey by CareerBuilder (2011) in the 
U.S finds that more than 70 percent of workers typically go to work when they are sick. 
There is also some evidence during the GR of a reduction in the variable component of 
wages, which is likely to be more responsive to productivity-related components such as 
health, for instance, through cuts in bonuses and other rewards (Vandekerckhove et al., 
2012). Both the increase in presenteeism and the reduction in the variable component of 
wages could explain why health has become less responsive to wages in the working-
age (male) population during the GR.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table A2.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition
Dependent variable 
Log hourly (gross) wage Hourly gross wages are measured in PPP-adjusted 2005 €. They are 
defined for paid job workers and obtained from dividing the amount of 
gross wage-earnings by the number of hours (usually) worked. Both 
variables are available for the main job. We treat extreme values in 
hourly gross wages such as those below 1 and above 300 PPP-€ as 
missing. It does not include reimbursements made by an employer for 
work-related expenses (e.g. business travel), severance and termination 
pay to compensate employees for employment ending before the 
employee has reached the normal retirement age for that job and 
redundancy payments, allowances for purely work-related expenses 
such as those for travel and subsistence or for protective clothes, lump 
sum payments at the normal retirement date, and union strike pay. 
Participation Participation (i.e. selection) is equal to 1 if a respondent reports 
working a positive number of hours per week in his/her main job, 0 
otherwise. 
Respondent’s Health 
Self-reported health (SRH) Includes five SRH categories, from 1 to 5: very bad, bad, fair, good, 
and very good. 
Chronic Chronic refers to chronic diseases; it is equal to 1 if a respondent has 
one or more conditions, 0 if none. Conditions are defined as 
hypertension, high blood cholesterol, diabetes, asthma, arthritis, 
osteoporosis, stomach condition, cataracts, and other conditions. 
GALI GALI refers to the global activity limitation indicator. The question for 
this index is the following: “For the past six months at least, to what 
extent have you been limited because of a health problem in activities 
people usually do. It is equal to 1 if the respondent is “not limited”, 2 if 
“limited but not severely,” and 3 if “severely limited.” 
Respondent’s Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Experience Includes the actual number of years worked by the respondent. 
Education Includes three levels of education defined from the ISCED Code 1997: 
no education, primary education, or lower secondary education (ISCED 
0–2), upper secondary and postsecondary nontertiary education 
(ISCED 3–4), and tertiary education (ISCED 5–6). 
Annual nonlabor income Annual nonlabor income is measured in PPP-adjusted 2005 €. It is 
defined as total income received by all household members in the 
previous year minus  individual income from employment in the 
previous year. 
Log household size Includes the logarithm of the number of household members. 
Single Single is equal to 1 if single, 0 otherwise (married or cohabiting). 
Age Includes dummy variables for each age year. 
Time Survey year dummies. 
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Table A2.5: Participation equations, Men aged 20-64 (Wool95) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Experience -0.109*** 0.120*** 0.141*** -2.498*** -4.310*** 3.653*** 2.055*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.142) (0.269) (0.240) (0.118) 
Experience2 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.006* -0.015** -0.007 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
SRH 0.059 -0.070 0.143*** 0.195** -0.076 0.116* 0.097 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.047) (0.076) (0.074) (0.062) (0.068) 
Single 0.096 -0.135 -0.470** -0.626** 0.162 -0.098 -0.266 
 (0.178) (0.244) (0.190) (0.260) (0.329) (0.295) (0.250) 
Household size -0.219*** 0.244*** 0.111* -0.035 -0.015 0.041 0.120* 
 (0.056) (0.092) (0.065) (0.080) (0.104) (0.083) (0.072) 
ln nonlaborincome 0.006 -0.060** -0.087*** -0.019 -0.067** -0.104*** -0.036 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.023) 
Employment rate 0.161*** -0.056 -0.046 0.054 0.942*** 0.399*** -0.141* 
 (0.039) (0.121) (0.047) (0.069) (0.118) (0.131) (0.073) 
Unemployment rate 0.259*** -0.052 -0.184*** 0.029 0.785*** 0.322** -0.352*** 
 (0.039) (0.141) (0.042) (0.068) (0.115) (0.125) (0.086) 
mexperience 0.168*** -0.080*** -0.103*** 2.462*** 4.309*** -3.645*** -2.048*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.149) (0.273) (0.237) (0.115) 
mexperience2 -0.001*** 0.002** -0.001 0.006* 0.015** 0.007 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
msrh 0.500*** 0.665*** 0.434*** -0.124 0.276*** 0.188** 0.052 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.055) (0.096) (0.090) (0.077) (0.084) 
msingle -0.451** -0.308 0.040 0.116 -0.550 -0.403 0.028 
 (0.183) (0.253) (0.199) (0.272) (0.342) (0.306) (0.259) 
mhousehold_size 0.266*** -0.146 -0.045 -0.016 -0.024 -0.070 -0.120 
 (0.059) (0.093) (0.067) (0.085) (0.108) (0.086) (0.074) 
mln_nonlaborincome -0.077*** -0.053* 0.015 -0.011 0.053 0.065** 0.044 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.022) (0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.028) 
memployment_rate -0.110*** 0.071 0.071 -0.015 -0.942*** -0.340*** 0.161** 
 (0.037) (0.123) (0.050) (0.081) (0.121) (0.121) (0.067) 
munemployment_rate -0.329*** -0.014 0.089** -0.020 -0.808*** -0.337*** 0.358*** 
 (0.050) (0.142) (0.039) (0.068) (0.117) (0.122) (0.094) 
Constant -4.349*** -1.071* -2.103*** -3.739*** -0.470 -4.656*** -2.779*** 
 (0.608) (0.591) (0.581) (1.201) (0.641) (0.947) (0.872) 
Observations 9914 9914 9914 7128 7128 7128 7128 
a Probit coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * 
p<0.10.  
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Table A2.6: Participation equations, Men aged 20-64 (SemWool10) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Experience -0.099*** 0.121*** 0.126*** -2.505*** -4.394*** 3.770*** 2.090*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.141) (0.268) (0.237) (0.118) 
Experience2 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.006* -0.015** -0.008 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
Chronic 0.117 0.009 -0.119 0.019 0.031 -0.003 -0.026 
 (0.089) (0.101) (0.094) (0.153) (0.138) (0.121) (0.130) 
GALI 0.039 0.057 0.129* 0.349*** 0.154 0.028 0.072 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.066) (0.120) (0.116) (0.096) (0.107) 
Single 0.114 -0.106 -0.482*** -0.612** 0.159 -0.088 -0.280 
 (0.174) (0.237) (0.185) (0.260) (0.330) (0.291) (0.250) 
Household size -0.215*** 0.209** 0.109* -0.027 -0.029 0.047 0.115 
 (0.056) (0.090) (0.064) (0.080) (0.104) (0.083) (0.072) 
ln nonlaborincome 0.008 -0.055** -0.079*** -0.018 -0.066** -0.100*** -0.035 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.023) 
Employment rate 0.185*** -0.058 -0.086* 0.053 0.933*** 0.400*** -0.150** 
 (0.038) (0.121) (0.046) (0.070) (0.118) (0.131) (0.073) 
Unemployment rate 0.226*** 0.094 -0.183*** 0.030 0.767*** 0.304** -0.354*** 
 (0.038) (0.143) (0.042) (0.068) (0.114) (0.125) (0.085) 
mexperience 0.146*** -0.093*** -0.098*** 2.470*** 4.392*** -3.763*** -2.084*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.147) (0.272) (0.235) (0.114) 
mexperience2 -0.001** 0.002*** -0.001 0.006* 0.015** 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
mchronic -0.042 0.027 0.178 0.086 0.014 -0.056 0.137 
 (0.115) (0.131) (0.121) (0.208) (0.194) (0.166) (0.169) 
mgali 0.645*** 0.747*** 0.580*** -0.279 0.093 0.389*** 0.004 
 (0.094) (0.101) (0.093) (0.188) (0.171) (0.141) (0.156) 
msingle -0.476*** -0.334 0.051 0.103 -0.532 -0.391 0.054 
 (0.179) (0.245) (0.194) (0.272) (0.343) (0.303) (0.259) 
mhousehold_size 0.261*** -0.112 -0.048 -0.020 -0.012 -0.075 -0.116 
 (0.059) (0.092) (0.065) (0.085) (0.109) (0.086) (0.075) 
mln_nonlaborincome -0.072*** -0.047* 0.016 -0.012 0.055 0.065** 0.044 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.036) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) 
memployment_rate -0.117*** 0.092 0.126*** -0.011 -0.926*** -0.332*** 0.174*** 
 (0.036) (0.123) (0.048) (0.082) (0.121) (0.120) (0.067) 
munemployment_rate -0.279*** -0.159 0.097** -0.021 -0.785*** -0.311** 0.362*** 
 (0.049) (0.144) (0.038) (0.068) (0.117) (0.121) (0.093) 
Constant -5.272*** -2.340*** -2.914*** -4.047*** -1.067 -5.268*** -2.930*** 
 (0.619) (0.602) (0.593) (1.220) (0.673) (0.953) (0.896) 
Observations 9914 9914 9914 7128 7128 7128 7128 
a Probit coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * 
p<0.10.  
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Table A2.7: Participation equations, Women aged 20-59 (Wool95) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Experience -0.151*** 0.151*** 0.210*** -3.175*** -5.134*** 4.287*** 2.003*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.103) (0.188) (0.152) (0.073) 
Experience2 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.004 -0.013** -0.009** 0.005** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
SRH 0.098*** 0.004 -0.057 -0.005 -0.047 0.012 0.013 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.062) (0.056) (0.050) (0.050) 
Single 0.652*** 0.286 -0.421*** 0.216 -0.158 0.243 0.253 
 (0.144) (0.197) (0.142) (0.230) (0.273) (0.249) (0.189) 
Household size -0.039 -0.129* -0.117** -0.165** -0.085 -0.372*** -0.207*** 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.049) (0.071) (0.079) (0.071) (0.057) 
ln nonlaborincome 0.000 0.054** -0.120*** -0.063* -0.038 0.023 -0.064** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.024) (0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) 
Employment rate 0.110*** -0.065 -0.155*** -0.368*** 1.370*** -0.087 0.362*** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.031) (0.067) (0.083) (0.091) (0.079) 
Unemployment rate 0.079*** 0.211** -0.105*** 0.145*** 1.213*** -0.220*** -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.088) (0.018) (0.054) (0.093) (0.062) (0.062) 
mexperience 0.283*** -0.021 -0.074*** 3.198*** 5.173*** -4.219*** -1.959*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.106) (0.190) (0.151) (0.073) 
mexperience2 -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.012** 0.008* -0.006** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
msrh 0.379*** 0.478*** 0.540*** 0.039 0.243*** 0.278*** 0.158** 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.043) (0.076) (0.068) (0.061) (0.062) 
msingle -0.239 0.188 0.913*** -0.420* 0.248 -0.188 -0.240 
 (0.150) (0.204) (0.148) (0.241) (0.286) (0.258) (0.197) 
mhousehold_size -0.034 0.093 0.067 0.112 -0.010 0.311*** 0.106* 
 (0.051) (0.070) (0.051) (0.075) (0.082) (0.074) (0.061) 
mln_nonlaborincome -0.097*** -0.209*** 0.011 0.023 0.080** -0.004 0.178*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.024) (0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) 
memployment_rate -0.065** 0.110 0.210*** 0.474*** -1.430*** 0.068 -0.370*** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.032) (0.073) (0.085) (0.085) (0.075) 
munemployment_rate -0.051** -0.188** 0.135*** 0.020 -1.265*** 0.164** -0.054 
 (0.025) (0.088) (0.015) (0.043) (0.093) (0.065) (0.074) 
Constant -4.384*** -3.792*** -4.882*** -8.891*** 2.338*** -0.146 -1.370*** 
 (0.327) (0.324) (0.333) (0.685) (0.381) (0.481) (0.471) 
Observations 10443 10443 10443 8004 8004 8004 8004 
a Probit coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * 
p<0.10.  
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Table A2.8: Participation equations, Women aged 20-59 (SemWool10) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Experience -0.147*** 0.149*** 0.202*** -3.175*** -5.154*** 4.334*** 2.024*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.103) (0.188) (0.151) (0.073) 
Experience2 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.004 -0.014** -0.009** 0.005** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
Chronic 0.139** -0.011 0.030 0.058 0.124 0.021 -0.018 
 (0.068) (0.075) (0.072) (0.116) (0.103) (0.090) (0.096) 
GALI -0.012 0.067 -0.077 -0.051 0.016 0.096 0.135* 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.055) (0.095) (0.089) (0.073) (0.081) 
Single 0.729*** 0.222 -0.482*** 0.223 -0.151 0.197 0.235 
 (0.142) (0.193) (0.140) (0.229) (0.273) (0.248) (0.188) 
Household size -0.054 -0.128* -0.095* -0.164** -0.090 -0.365*** -0.204*** 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.049) (0.071) (0.079) (0.071) (0.058) 
ln nonlaborincome 0.004 0.049** -0.112*** -0.064* -0.034 0.020 -0.063** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) 
Employment rate 0.088*** -0.097 -0.111*** -0.368*** 1.345*** -0.086 0.377*** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.031) (0.067) (0.083) (0.090) (0.080) 
Unemployment rate 0.052*** 0.285*** -0.074*** 0.150*** 1.233*** -0.262*** -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.090) (0.018) (0.054) (0.093) (0.062) (0.061) 
mexperience 0.277*** -0.021 -0.068*** 3.197*** 5.193*** -4.267*** -1.981*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.106) (0.190) (0.151) (0.073) 
mexperience2 -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.013** 0.008* -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
mchronic 0.207** 0.303*** 0.257*** -0.130 0.107 0.301** 0.303** 
 (0.088) (0.096) (0.095) (0.161) (0.142) (0.125) (0.132) 
mgali 0.394*** 0.449*** 0.559*** 0.227 0.042 0.040 -0.269** 
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.141) (0.129) (0.109) (0.120) 
msingle -0.283* 0.291 1.009*** -0.426* 0.252 -0.139 -0.227 
 (0.147) (0.200) (0.145) (0.241) (0.285) (0.258) (0.197) 
mhousehold_size -0.028 0.078 0.036 0.109 -0.007 0.303*** 0.101* 
 (0.050) (0.069) (0.050) (0.075) (0.082) (0.074) (0.061) 
mln_nonlaborincome -0.076*** -0.167*** 0.029 0.025 0.083** 0.002 0.180*** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.041) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) 
memployment_rate -0.037 0.148** 0.171*** 0.475*** -1.402*** 0.076 -0.381*** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.032) (0.073) (0.085) (0.085) (0.076) 
munemployment_rate -0.027 -0.271*** 0.096*** 0.016 -1.284*** 0.216*** -0.053 
 (0.025) (0.089) (0.015) (0.043) (0.093) (0.064) (0.073) 
Constant -4.613*** -4.440*** -5.204*** -9.185*** 2.211*** -0.506 -1.132** 
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.337) (0.715) (0.411) (0.506) (0.491) 
Observations 10443 10443 10443 8004 8004 8004 8004 
a Probit coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * 
p<0.10. 
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Introduction 3.1.
A positive association between health and socioeconomic status (SES) in adulthood, 
often referred to as the SES-health gradient, is widely documented in the literature (e.g., 
Adler et al., 1994; Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999; Pappas et al., 1993; Smith, 1999). To 
identify the origins of this gradient, earlier studies for the U.S. (e.g. Case et al., 2002) 
and Canada (e.g. Currie and Stabile, 2003) focus on childhood circumstances. 
Specifically, they pinpoint SES and health in early lifeʊthe latter mainly in terms of 
chronic conditions during childhoodʊas contributors to this positive association. This 
approach is supported by the extant literature that offers several theories for a 
relationship between early life events and (health) outcomes in later life. For instance, 
the fetal-origins hypothesis (e.g. Barker, 1995; Almond and Currie, 2011a) suggests a 
direct link from the prenatal period to adult health that may be independent of social 
class in adult life, life course models assume that illness and deprivation during 
childhood may have long-term consequences for health during adulthood, either directly 
through the illness itself or indirectly by restricting educational achievement and life 
opportunities (e.g. Kuh and Wadsworth, 1993) and pathways models suggest that the 
observed SES-health gradient in adulthood is only indirectly attributable to early life 
events through later life events (e.g. Marmot et al., 2001). More recent studies for the 
U.K. (Case et al., 2005) and the U.S. (Case and Paxson, 2008a) also present evidence in 
line with the theoretical predictions and show that having good health during childhood 
and growing up in a more comfortable environment result in a higher level of education, 
and good health and higher economic status later in life. Similarly, the literature on 
intergenerational mobility in class positions provides empirical evidence on the 
association between parental SES and those of their children (e.g. Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 2002). Recent evidence for continental Europe also shows that childhood 
SES is positively associated with economic status and cognitive abilities in later life 
(Guven and Lee, 2011) and negatively correlated with cognitive decline (dal Bianco et 
al., 2013). All these findings are important to policymakers because they may suggest 
that policies aimed at improving children’s health and SES have long-lasting benefits 
for both the individual and society because of increased human capital accumulation, 
hence better employment opportunities, and better later life health (see also Marmot et 
al., 2012). 
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Although caution is warranted for policy recommendations based on these estimated 
associations, support for such recommendations is provided by several recent studies 
that find causal impacts of very specific exogenous early life events on later life 
outcomes. For instance, using the 1918 influenza pandemic as measure of a health 
shock around birth is shown to relate to later life outcomes such as education, health 
and SES (e.g. Almond, 2006; Nelson, 2010; Almond and Mazumder, 2005). Chen and 
Zhou (2007) show that the 1959–1961 famine in China adversely affected height, 
earnings and labor supply, and Barreca (2010) shows that malaria exposure adversely 
affects educational attainment and increases poverty risk. Painter et al. (2005) and 
Roseboom et al. (2001, 2006) provide evidence on long-term effects on later life health 
of prenatal undernutrition during the Dutch famine of 1944/1945. In addition, van den 
Berg et al. (2006) show that economic conditions around birth—measured by the 
business cycle—affect mortality later in life. 
Our contribution to the literature on the relationships between early life circumstances 
and later life health and employment is twofold. First, we expand the findings of the 
studies discussed above, and present empirical evidence for thirteen European countries 
on the extent to which an individual’s early life circumstances are associated with 
educational attainment and, once this latter is controlled for, with their later life health 
(at ages 50–64). Second, and not done in earlier studies, we examine the associations 
between early life circumstances and later life employment (at ages 50–64) once we 
control for education and later life health, which can be potential mediators of the 
associations between early life circumstances and later life employment. If we find that 
an association with later life employment is still present once education and health are 
controlled for then this could be interpreted as empirical evidence in favor of a (direct) 
transmission of early life circumstances to employment opportunities. 
For our empirical analysis we use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and measure two dimensions of early life 
circumstances, namely childhood health and childhood socioeconomic status (SES). 
The countries in our sample cover Northern, Central, Southern and Eastern Europe and 
we analyze them separately because of the large differences in the levels of 
development over the period the individuals in our sample were born and raised (1940–
1972). To illustrate the differences between, e.g., Northern and Southern Europe over 
TheassociationsbetweenearlylifecircumstancesandlaterlifehealthandemploymentinEurope
83 
this period, the Netherlands has about one third of the infant mortality rate and about 
twice the income per capita compared to Spain (United Nations, 2010; Maddison, 
2010). These large differences in economic resources and access to medical treatments 
may affect the associations between early life circumstances and later life outcomes as a 
more favorable environment in this respect may dampen the consequences of adverse 
health shocks early in life (Bengtsson and Mineau, 2009). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and 
the main variables for analysis. Section 3.3 presents estimates of the associations of 
early life circumstances with educational attainment, and later life health and 
employment. Section 3.4 analyzes joint significance tests of these associations and 
looks at possible pathways through which early life circumstances may affect later life 
health and employment. Section 3.5 summarizes the main findings and concludes the 
paper. 
Data and descriptive statistics 3.2.
We use individual-level data from the first four waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing, 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a multidisciplinary and representative cross-
national panel of the European population aged 50 and over. The first, second and 
fourth waves belong to the regular panel of SHARE and were conducted in 2004/2005, 
2006/2007, and 2010/2012,33 respectively. These waves include information on 
socioeconomic background characteristics as well as current employment and health 
status. The third wave, carried out in 2008/2009 and referred to as SHARELIFE, 
contains retrospective information on the early life circumstances of about 75% of the 
individuals who participated in waves one or two. Additionally, about 78% of the 
individuals who participated in SHARELIFE did so also in wave four. 
Our empirical analysis is based on data for respondents aged 50–64 from the first, 
second or fourth wave who also participated in SHARELIFE. This selection yields 
27,204 observations for 14,767 respondents from the following thirteen countries: 
Sweden (SE), Denmark (DK), the Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (CH), Austria (AT), 
Germany (DE), France (FR), Belgium (BE), Spain (ES), Italy (IT), Greece (GR), Czech 

33 Almost 94 percent of the respondents in the 2010/12 wave were interviewed in 2011. 
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Republic (CZ), and Poland (PL). The sample is reduced by seven percent due to missing 
values on the variables included in the analysis. The result is an unbalanced panel 
comprising 25,296 total observations for 5,999 male and 7,614 female respondents. 
Table 3.1 reports the number of observations and individuals (i.e. respondents) by 
country and gender. Finally, in all tables we sort the countries in the following order: 
Northern (Sweden, Denmark), Central (Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, 
France, Belgium), Southern (Spain, Italy, Greece) and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, 
Poland). 
Details on the definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis are in Table 
A3.1 of the appendix. Following most previous literature, we use Self-Reported Health 
(SRH) status as a measure for health. Because of the low frequencies in the extreme 
categories for some countries we follow, e.g., Idler and Kasl (1991) and Thong et al. 
(2008) and combine the five SRH categories (from 1 to 5: poor, fair, good, very good, 
and excellent) into three (from 1 to 3: poor or fair, good, very good or excellent). 
Employment status is equal to one if the respondent is employed or self-employed, and 
zero otherwise.  
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Table 3.1: Number of individuals and observations (for all waves), and health and employment 
status by gender and country at ages 50-64. a)
      Health status (SRH) Employment status 
 
Number of 
individuals 
Number of 
observations Poor or fair Good 
Very good 
or 
excellent Work 
Men     % % % % 
Sweden 418 822 13 31 56 85 
Denmark 567 1,065 16 24 60 81 
Netherlands 555 1,080 20 45 35 72 
Switzerland 282 537 10 33 57 87 
Austria 171 343 32 31 37 50 
Germany 444 841 33 40 27 69 
France 528 1,079 21 47 32 61 
Belgium 657 1,464 18 44 38 57 
Spain 358 644 27 46 27 66 
Italy 529 994 24 44 32 54 
Greece 703 1,055 13 31 56 77 
Czech Rep. 391 555 33 41 26 66 
Poland 396 616 48 41 11 48 
Women             
Sweden 554 1,082 18 30 52 78 
Denmark 655 1,224 18 20 62 76 
Netherlands 701 1,393 23 46 31 50 
Switzerland 385 728 13 37 50 73 
Austria 226 451 26 37 37 29 
Germany 556 1,099 29 46 25 62 
France 663 1,313 24 48 28 57 
Belgium 760 1,679 22 43 35 43 
Spain 460 875 39 42 19 34 
Italy 757 1,483 36 40 24 29 
Greece 797 1,196 16 41 43 34 
Czech Rep. 552 819 31 46 23 46 
Poland 548 859 50 40 10 29 
a) More details on the definitions of the variables are in the text and in the appendix. The percentage calculations are 
based on the number of observations. 
As Table 3.1 shows, there is substantial variation in later life health (SRH) and 
employment rates across countries. For example, the proportion of men aged 50–64 
who report being in very good or excellent health ranges from almost 60 percent in 
Northern Europe and in Switzerland to 11 percent in Poland. Also the employment rates 
of the same-aged men are highest and above 80 percent in Northern Europe and in 
Switzerland, and lowest and below 50 percent in Poland. Similar patterns are present for 
same-aged women, except that their employment rates are lower than those of their 
male peers at the country level. Concerning educational attainment across countries, 
Table 3.2 shows that men and women aged 50–64 from Northern and Central Europe 
are on average more educated than those from Southern and Eastern Europe. 
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Table 3.2: Educational attainment and household composition by gender and country. a)
  Educational attainment Household composition 
 
Low 
(ISCED 
0-2) 
Medium 
(ISCED 
3-4) 
High 
(ISCED 
5-6) 
Married No children 
One 
child 
Two 
children 
Three 
or more 
children 
Men % % % % % % % % 
Sweden 39 34 27 85 15 12 45 28 
Denmark 11 50 39 85 15 15 46 24 
Netherlands 36 31 33 90 18 9 47 26 
Switzerland 21 63 16 85 16 11 44 29 
Austria 15 53 32 88 17 22 33 28 
Germany 4 58 38 87 16 26 40 18 
France 31 40 29 86 10 14 39 37 
Belgium 38 30 33 85 12 22 39 27 
Spain 72 14 15 91 13 12 37 38 
Italy 60 30 10 93 12 19 46 23 
Greece 40 35 25 88 16 12 55 17 
Czech Rep. 58 29 13 88 9 17 49 25 
Poland 22 66 12 86 10 13 40 37 
Women         
Sweden 35 32 33 82 9 16 46 29 
Denmark 15 35 50 81 10 14 51 25 
Netherlands 51 24 25 86 14 11 45 30 
Switzerland 31 59 10 75 18 13 43 26 
Austria 34 52 14 66 10 23 37 30 
Germany 14 58 28 86 12 21 42 25 
France 40 35 25 77 10 17 39 34 
Belgium 40 32 28 81 10 23 40 27 
Spain 77 13 10 89 11 10 37 42 
Italy 67 26 7 89 11 17 46 26 
Greece 50 34 16 77 14 15 53 18 
Czech Rep. 49 44 7 77 4 17 55 24 
Poland 34 59 7 82 7 11 39 43 
a) More details on the definitions of the variables are in the text and in the appendix. The percentage calculations for 
the educational attainment and household composition variables are based on the number of individuals and 
observations, respectively (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.3 reports statistics on the early life circumstances by country which, to conform 
to the studies cited in the introduction, are classified into two categories: those related to 
childhood SES and those that measure childhood health. As in earlier research (e.g. 
Dutton and Levine, 1989), we treat childhood SES as a composite measure that 
typically includes parental economic status, social status, and work status, measured by 
income, education, and occupation, respectively. We thus measure childhood SES based 
on three variables that refer to the respondent’s circumstances at age 10. The first is the 
number of rooms per person in the household (rooms), which proxies for the parents’ 
financial status (see Cavapozzi et al., 2011).34 The second is an indicator for whether 
there were enough (26+) books in the parental home to fill one bookcase (bookcase) and 
is meant to capture the parents’ cultural background or education (see Cavapozzi et al., 

34 Our variable rooms is sometimes also considered a proxy for physical and social environment-related 
variables like crowding (see Stokols, 1992). 
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2011), and perhaps also their cognitive and socio-emotional skills (see Brunello et al., 
2012). The third indicates whether the primary breadwinner for the household worked 
as a farmer or in an elementary occupation (breadwinner), thereby capturing the 
household’s work status. The variables that measure childhood health refer to health 
conditions that respondents experienced before the age of 16. These are indicators for 
whether respondents suffered from chronic conditions during childhood and whether 
they spent one month or more in bed during childhood because of illness (bed).35 A 
further indicator for childhood health that we use is height at the time of interview, 
which arguably also serves as a proxy for childhood SES (Case and Paxson 2008a; 
Batty et al., 2009).  
Concerning the variable bookcase, Table 3.3 shows, for instance, that the proportion of 
men and women who at age 10 lived in households with more than 25 books is 
substantially higher in Northern Europe and in Switzerland than in Southern Europe. 
For example, for men (women) this proportion ranges from 67 (66) percent in Sweden 
to only 12 (14) percent in Italy. This finding suggests a higher parental cultural 
background for these Northern European and Swiss respondents. Likewise, the 
proportion of parents who worked as farmers or in elementary occupations is much 
higher in Southern Europe than in Northern and Central Europe, whereas the opposite is 
true for the rooms per person (rooms). Both the variables breadwinner and rooms point 
to a higher work status and income in (the average) households in Northern and Central 
Europe when the respondents were 10 years old. 

35 We do not use self-reported childhood health as it may suffer from coloring problems (Havari and 
Mazzonna, 2011). 
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Table 3.3: Early life circumstances by gender and country. a)
  Socioeconomic status (SES) at age 10 Childhood health (0-15 years)    
 Bookcase Breadwinner Rooms Chronic conditions 
One month 
or more  in 
bed 
Height 
(in cm) 
Men % % average % % average 
Sweden 67 28 0.84 9 8 179 
Denmark 61 46 0.95 12 7 179 
Netherlands 49 23 0.83 12 15 179 
Switzerland 59 23 0.88 10 10 176 
Austria 29 39 0.73 12 16 176 
Germany 48 21 0.79 12 14 177 
France 38 41 0.84 9 12 174 
Belgium 38 44 1.00 11 13 175 
Spain 21 58 0.62 6 8 170 
Italy 12 60 0.61 6 5 172 
Greece 16 60 0.54 2 3 174 
Czech Rep. 52 20 0.59 7 13 177 
Poland 26 47 0.44 8 9 173 
Women             
Sweden 66 28 0.80 10 8 166 
Denmark 64 46 0.93 12 8 166 
Netherlands 51 25 0.81 14 17 167 
Switzerland 57 24 0.92 13 11 164 
Austria 34 37 0.72 14 15 164 
Germany 48 21 0.79 16 15 165 
France 40 38 0.82 17 14 161 
Belgium 41 44 1.00 16 15 163 
Spain 20 56 0.63 12 6 160 
Italy 14 65 0.58 6 7 161 
Greece 17 55 0.56 2 3 163 
Czech Rep. 63 21 0.56 14 20 165 
Poland 26 52 0.40 12 10 162 
a) More details on the definitions of the variables are in the text and in the appendix. The percentage calculations are 
based on the number of individuals (see Table 3.1). 
With regard to the childhood health-related variables, and in line with previous studies 
such as Cavelaars et al. (2000), the height variable unfolds important country 
differences and shows that men and women are on average tallest in Northern Europe 
and in the Netherlands and shortest in Southern Europe (in particular in Spain and 
Italy). Chronic conditions show a larger incidence among women than men in most 
countries, except, for instance, in Italy and Greece, where their incidence is also lowest. 
Individuals from Southern Europe report also a lower incidence of spending one month 
or more in bed during childhood because of a health condition. This incidence is similar 
to that in Northern Europe, but most probably for very different reasons. One possible 
explanation for these perhaps counterintuitive findings is that although such negative 
health shocks might seem more likely for children from poorer households, who are 
more likely to be located in Southern and Eastern Europe over the time period our 
respondents were born and raised, a household’s SES, and in particular parental cultural 
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background, may in fact contribute not only to the ability to treat and prevent but also to 
detect a negative health shock (Currie and Stabile, 2003). Also, because high educated 
parents invest more time in child care than low educated parents (Guryan et al., 2008) 
and may be more likely to screen their children and take preventive health care 
(Brunello et al., 2012). In line with this explanation is the relatively high incidence of 
spending one month or more in bed during childhood because of a health condition for 
women (and to a lesser extent also men) from the Czech Republic, whose parental 
cultural background ranges among the highest in our sample.  
Empirical results 3.3.
This section examines the associations of early life circumstances with educational 
attainment, later life health (SRH) and employment. For this purpose we estimate 
(ordered) probit models by Maximum Likelihood (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) and 
report the (average) marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of 
having the highest level of education (ISCED 5 or 6) in Table 3.4, on the probability of 
being in very good or excellent health in Table 3.5, and on the employment probability 
in Table 3.6. In all models, we merge for Germany the categories low and medium 
educational attainment in the estimations as there are very few individuals with low 
educational attainment (see Table 3.2). We also include dummies for every age and 
survey year, and, thereby, control for (birth) cohort effects.36  
Previous studies such as Almond and Currie (2011b) and Doblhammer et al. (2011) 
have shown that the effects of early life circumstances on health differ between men and 
women and we therefore estimate the models separately for men and women (see also 
Marmot et al., 2012). In addition, and as discussed in the introduction, we analyze the 
thirteen countries in our sample separately. Earlier studies in, e.g., Börsch-Supan et al. 
(2011), Brunello et al. (2012) and Guven and Lee (2011) often pool the data from the 
countries included in SHARE. For each model, and by gender, we tested for pooling of 

36 These three variables are linearly dependent (age=year-cohort). In the education equation we control 
only for a linear time trend because we use the sample of individuals (see footnote to Table 3.4) and there 
are very few new respondents in the fourth wave for some countries (for instance in Switzerland, there is 
only one new male respondent in wave four). For completeness, we note that the reference age category is 
age 50–51, except for men in Austria where it is 50–53 because there were no men of age 53 and only one 
of age 52 in the category “no work” in our sample. 
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data and rejected it in each case at a 1% level of significance.37 This finding indicates, 
and as will also become clear from the discussion of the results below, that there are 
important differences across countries in the strength of the associations between the 
various childhood health and SES variables and later life outcomes.  
We refer to the estimated effects of early life circumstances on later life outcomes as 
associations because of the widely recognized difficulties in identifying causal 
relationships between the childhood SES and health variables and later life outcomes. 
The first difficulty is that SES (or factors correlated with it) is likely to affect health 
during childhood. For instance, Case et al. (2002) and Currie and Stabile (2003) show 
that income buffers children from the negative effects of chronic conditions, which are 
also more common among low-SES children. In the same vein, and as discussed in 
Section 3.2, Case and Paxson (2008) and Batty et al. (2009) argue that adult height may 
be an indicator for a healthier but also a financially more comfortable early life 
environment among others. The second, and most important difficulty, is that, as these 
authors and others (e.g. Case et al., 2005; Smith, 2009) suggest, unobserved “third or 
confounding factors” may be driving the correlations between early life variables and 
later life outcomes. Hence, in our analysis, we consider the childhood SES and health 
variables to be proxies for early life circumstances. 
Sample selection because of (early) mortality of relatively unhealthy individuals, due to 
for instance high infant mortality rates, is unlikely to invalidate our estimated 
associations between early life circumstances and later life outcomes. For instance, 
Bozzoli et al. (2009) show that infant mortality rates need to be extremely high for this. 
Moreover, for Spain, where these rates were highestʊwith the possible exception of 
Poland (United Nations, 2010), these authors and others such as Spijker et al. (2012) do 
not find evidence for the typical positive relationship between infant mortality rates and 
average adult height by birth cohort that shows up when selection dominates scarring, 

37 We test the null-hypothesis that the associations are equal for all countries and country specific 
intercepts are included in the model when pooling data. The test statistics with the degrees of freedom in 
parentheses and p-values in the second parentheses are as follows. Educational attainment equation 
(Table 3.4): For men, Ȥ2(225) = 881.32 (0.000); for women, Ȥ2(228) = 1148.66 (0.000). SRH equation 
(Table 3.5): For men, Ȥ2(307) = 588.28 (0.000); for women, Ȥ2(309) = 706.12 (0.000). Employment 
equation (Table 3.6): For men, Ȥ2(331) = 764.10 (0.000); for women, Ȥ2(333) = 836.78 (0.000).  
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and report instead a negative one for the period our respondents were born.38 Similarly, 
and of relevance for the Netherlands, Painter et al. (2005) and Roseboom et al. (2001, 
2006) provide evidence on negative, and not positive, long-term effects on later life 
health of prenatal undernutrition during the Dutch famine of 1944/45.  
Furthermore, it is likely that our childhood health and SES variables are measured with 
error and this most probably attenuates the estimated associations towards zero (Bound 
et al., 2001). A validation study of Havari and Mazzonna (2011), however, finds no 
evidence of recall error in the childhood variables in SHARELIFE, which show a good 
level of internal and external consistency. In particular, these authors do not find 
evidence that memory capacityʊmeasured by two cognitive ability tests consisting of a 
verbal registration and recall of a list of ten itemsʊis significantly associated with the 
reported number of childhood illnesses. 
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, we examine the role of education and later life 
health as potential mediators of the associations between early life circumstances and 
later life employment and, once controlled for these two mediators, if there still is a 
(direct) transmission of early life circumstances to employment opportunities. As we 
cannot control for all individual characteristics, one has to bear in mind that there might 
be other variables such as (lifetime) income that can act as mediators, and also possibly 
mitigate any (in)direct transmissions we find between early life circumstances and later 
life employment. The same can be argued for any (in)direct transmissions we find 
between early life circumstances and later life health.  
3.3.1. Educational attainment 
In Table 3.4, we examine the relationship between early life circumstances and 
educational attainment and identify the same significant and positive associations found 
in previous investigations. Like, for instance, Case et al. (2005) for the U.K., and Case 
and Paxson (2008) for the U.S., we find that height is strongly associated with 
educational attainment for men (except in Austria and Belgium). Unlike Case et al. 

38 Still, environmental disease or nutritional burden in early life—as measured by infant mortality rates—
could have an effect beyond diminishing adult height, which may become evident later in life as the fetal-
origins hypothesis and life course models suggest. We find, however, only evidence of a negative (or no) 
relationship between adverse childhood health and later life health (see Table 3.5) which suggests that if 
there is a selection effect, it does not dominate the scarring effect of childhood disease. 
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(2005), however, we do not find such an association for women (except in the 
Netherlands, Spain and Greece). When significant, a 10 cm increase in height is 
associated with a 3–8 (4–7) percentage point increase in the probability that men 
(women) have the highest educational level. Childhood SES variables show a 
remarkably strong association with educational attainment: for both men and women, 
education levels are significantly higher among individuals whose parents had a 
bookcase in all countries and are positively associated with rooms per person for most 
countries in our sample. For individuals whose parents had a bookcase, the associated 
rise in the probability of having the highest educational level ranges for men from 29 in 
Italy to 9 percentage points in Poland and for women from 28 in France to 6 percentage 
points in the Czech Republic. Moreover, for women in all countries and men in most 
countries, educational attainment is significantly lower among individuals raised in 
households whose main breadwinner worked as a farmer or in an elementary 
occupation.  
Among the childhood health variables, other than height, and for both men and women, 
we do not find much evidence of an association with educational attainment. For 
instance, unlike Case et al. (2005), we find no evidence of a negative association 
between chronic conditions in childhood and education, and only find a (significant) 
negative association between having spent one month or more in bed during childhood 
because of illness and education in Denmark and Greece for men and in Germany for 
women.  
In sum, we find that for both men and women in all countries a higher childhood SES, 
and for men in almost all countries also height, is strongly associated with a higher level 
of education. 
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3.3.2. Later life health 
Table 3.5 shows the associations between early life circumstances and later life health, 
which, as discussed in Section 3.2, is Self-Reported Health (SRH) and classified into 
three categories (poor or fair, good, very good or excellent). Here, we condition this 
association on educational attainment, which only reduces the size of the early life 
variables’ coefficients but leaves the levels of significance virtually unchanged in most 
countries and for both men and women (we return to this observation in Section 3.4). 
This outcome stands in contrast to the Case and Paxson (2008) finding that for U.S. 
elderly the association between childhood SES and SRH at older ages becomes 
insignificant once education is controlled for. 
Overall, the table shows positive and significant associations between educational 
attainment and later life health for men in all countries and women in most countries. In 
line with Case and Paxon (2008), we conclude that education appears to be protective of 
health. Based on the variable bookcase, we find mainly for Central Europe a better later 
life health among men and women whose parents had a higher SES. Moreover, for men 
in Denmark and Germany growing up in households whose main breadwinner worked 
as a farmer or in an elementary occupation is significantly associated with worse later 
life health, and for women in Sweden and Germany growing up in households with 
more rooms per person is significantly associated with better later life health. 
Quantitatively, and in particular for women, the differences in later life health 
associated with a different childhood SES are comparable to the differences in health 
between those with the lowest and highest levels of education, which underscores the 
relative importance of childhood SES for later life health.  
Also childhood health is strongly associated with later life health. In most countries, and 
for both men and women, childhood chronic conditions or having spent one month or 
more in bed during childhood because of illness is significantly and negatively 
associated with later life health. When significant, having suffered from chronic 
conditions during childhood is associated with a 7–18 (8–20) percentage point lower 
probability of reporting very good or excellent health for men (women). This evidence 
resembles that offered by Case et al. (2005) for adults aged 33 and 42. Comparing all 
the significant effects of the childhood health variables with the effect of having 
obtained the highest level of education indicates that the magnitude of their association 
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with reporting very good or excellent health is rather similar for men in Northern 
Europe, Switzerland and Greece, and for women in the Netherlands, Austria and in 
Southern Europe. This finding underscores the relative importance of childhood health 
for later life health.  
Overall, the results show that a higher level of education and, in particular for women, 
favorable early life circumstances (i.e. better childhood health and higher childhood 
SES) are significantly associated with better later life health. 
3.3.3. Later life employment 
Table 3.6 shows the marginal effects of early life circumstances and educational 
attainment on later life employment probabilities once also later life health (SRH) is 
controlled for. In this way, we obtain insights into possible direct associations of early 
life circumstances with employment opportunities that do not operate through health.39 
The same associations but without controlling for later life health are analyzed by 
means of joint significance tests. These test results are reported in the bottom part of 
Table 3.6 and discussed in Section 3.4 (the full set of estimation results are available 
upon request). As in the previous section, conditioning on educational attainment 
changes only the size of the early life variables’ coefficients and not their levels of 
significance for men in most countries (except in France, Italy and in the Czech 
Republic), but this is not true for women; and in particular not for women from 
Northern Europe, Austria, Germany and Spain. We do not report these results (available 
upon request) but instead present joint significance tests in the bottom part of the table 
that are discussed in Section 3.4. 
39 As, e.g., argued in Bound (1991), for reasons such as measurement error and reverse causality, SRH is 
likely to be an endogenous explanatory variable in an employment equation. We do not take this into 
account and this may attenuate the estimated associations.  
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As the table shows, there are positive and significant associations between later life 
health (SRH) and employment for men and women in all countries. For instance, the 
associated increase in the employment probability for reporting very good or excellent 
health at older ages ranges for men from 32 in Switzerland to 9 percentage points in 
Italy and for women from 27 in Sweden to 10 percentage points in Greece. Conditional 
on later life health, there are significant associations between educational attainment and 
later life employment for women in all countries (except in Germany) but for men in 
only half of the countries. The associated increase in the employment probability for 
having the highest level of education (relative to the lowest level) is mostly larger 
among women than men, and is largest among Italian women. 
As the table shows, most associations between early life circumstances and later life 
employment are insignificant when later life health is controlled for. There are, 
however, a few notable exceptions. For women, the variables bookcase in Belgium, 
breadwinner in the Netherlands and rooms in Switzerland and in the Czech Republic 
are significantly associated with later life employment (and with the correct sign). For 
men, we find mainly associations with childhood health and only in a few countries. For 
instance, having suffered from chronic conditions during childhood is associated with a 
12 percentage point lower employment probability in Sweden and Austria which 
increases to 19 and 17 percentage point in Spain and Poland, respectively. These 
estimates are somewhat larger than the ones reported in Case et al. (2005) for U.K. men 
at ages 33 and 42. But, as suggested by these authors, this may in part be due to our 
older sample as they find that childhood chronic conditions have an increasing impact 
on employment with age. In addition, we find a positive and significant association 
between height and later life employment for men in Switzerland, Austria, Germany and 
Greece. Relative to the employment differences between those with poor or fair and 
very good or excellent later life health (SRH), the associations with childhood health 
and SES are substantial for men from Spain (the variables rooms and chronic 
conditions), Poland (the variable chronic conditions) and Austria (the variables chronic 
conditions and height).40 For Swedish and French men the variable bed is positively and 
for Austrian women height is negatively associated with employment. We have no 
40 For Polish men the comparison is done with poor or fair versus good health (and not very good or 
excellent health). 
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explanation for these two findings and also do not wish to speculate as the childhood 
variables are jointly insignificant for these cases. Finally, for Italian women the positive 
association between the variable breadwinner and employment appears not to be a 
robust finding as it becomes negative and insignificant when SRH and education are 
excluded from the employment equation (these results are not shown but available upon 
request). 
In sum, for both men and women we find a strong association between later life health 
and employment. For women and to a lesser extent for men, we find that educational 
attainment is positively associated with later life employment. Most associations 
between early life circumstances and later life employment are insignificant, although 
there are notable exceptions such as the association with chronic conditions for men in a 
few countries. All in all, we find only weak empirical evidence in favor of associations 
between early life circumstances and later life employment once later life health and 
education are controlled for. 
Pathways 3.4.
To facilitate an overall interpretation of our empirical results, we discuss the results of 
joint significance tests on all the associations of early life circumstances and education 
variables with later life health and employment in the models on which we have 
reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. More importantly, these test results provide insights into 
the role of education as a pathway through which early life circumstances may affect 
later life health, and education and later life health as pathways through which early life 
circumstances may affect later life employment. These test results are presented in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6.41  
Section 3.3.1 already discussed the associations of educational attainment with early life 
circumstances. Taking into account that childhood SES is likely to influence childhood 
health but not vice versa, these associations occur mainly with the SES-related 
variables, and for men also with height (see Table 3.4, also for the joint significance 
tests). 

41 To perform the tests, we exclude education and/or later life health from the models in Section 3.3 and 
re-estimate them. Excluding, furthermore, the demographic variables marital status and children leaves 
the tests results virtually unchanged. All estimation results are available upon request. 
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 As shown at the bottom part of Table 3.5, after controlling for education, we find 
significant associations between early life circumstances and later life health for men in 
about half of the countries and for women in all countries except in Eastern Europe. 
Overall, for women from Northern and Southern Europe childhood health links early 
life circumstances to later life health; but for women from Central Europe, it is 
childhood SES that does so. For men, we do not find such a pattern. When educational 
attainment is excluded, childhood health and/or SES become jointly significant in 
Denmark, Austria and France for men and women, and for men in Poland and women in 
Belgium, Italy and in the Czech Republic. This finding provides some support for 
education being a pathway through which early life circumstances are associated with 
later life health.  
After controlling for education but not later life health, we find significant associations 
between early life circumstances and later life employment in most countries for men 
and to a lesser extent for women. For women from Northern Europe, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Spain, and for men from Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, France, 
Belgium, Italy, and Eastern Europe the associations between early life 
circumstancesʊand in particular childhood SESʊand later life employment become 
jointly significant once the education variables are excluded from the employment 
equation. These results are in line with Case and Paxson (2008) who report a positive 
association between SES and health during childhood and white collar occupations for 
U.S. individuals above age 50 that becomes insignificant once education is controlled 
for, and underscores the important role of education as a mediator between early life 
circumstances and later life employment. For women in Belgium only and men in 
Switzerland, Austria, Germany and in particular in Spain, also when later life health is 
controlled for, early life circumstances remain jointly significantly associated with later 
life employment. As discussed in Section 3.3, these latter results for men may suggest a 
long-lasting positive impact of early life circumstances on employment opportunities 
that do not only operate through health. One explanation for this difference in findings 
between men and women could be the gender differences in labor market behavior 
attributed to the persistence of the male-breadwinner model in Southern European 
countries such as Spain (e.g. Adam, 1996; de la Rica and Iza, 2005) and to some extent 
also in other European countries where the male-breadwinner model was gradually 
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being replaced by the dual-breadwinner model as the most common form of household 
labor supply (e.g. Gustafsson and Stafford, 1994; Lewis, 2001). 
As also discussed in Section 3.3, with regard to educational effects, and with the 
exception of Switzerland, we find that education is health protective for men in all and 
for women in virtually all countries (see bottom part of Table 3.5). After controlling for 
later life health, we find significant associations between education and later life 
employment in almost all countries for women and in half of the countries for men. For 
example, we find a strong association between educational attainment and later life 
employment among Northern European and Dutch women that is inexistent among their 
male peers (see bottom part of Table 3.6).42  
Summary and discussion 3.5.
We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe and 
(ordered) probit models to examine the associations between individuals’ early life 
circumstances (specifically, childhood SES and childhood health) and later life health 
and employment in thirteen European countries. Childhood SES is approximated by 
three variables pertaining to the parental home when the respondent was 10 years old: 
enough books to fill one bookcase, a main breadwinner working as a farmer or in an 
elementary occupation, and the number of rooms per person. Childhood health is 
measured based on chronic conditions during childhood (at ages 0–15) and lengthy 
confinement to bed because of illness. We also control for the individual’s height at the 
time of interview as a proxy for both childhood SES and childhood health. 
Although the empirical results show that there are differences across the thirteen 
European countries in the strength of the associations between the various childhood 
health and SES variables and later life outcomes, they also show similarities that enable 
us to draw general conclusions. In all countries and for both men and women, favorable 
early life circumstances, and in particular a higher childhood SES, are associated with a 
higher level of education, which in turn is protective of later life health. Once 
educational attainment is controlled for, we find for most countries and in particular for 
women, strong empirical support that favorable early life circumstances are associated 

42 This may be due to a series of educational reforms in these countries, which eliminated almost the 
educational gender gap (see, e.g., Dronkers, 1993, for the Netherlands). 
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with better later life health. Although, and mainly for men, we find evidence for some 
countries of significant associations between early life circumstances and later life 
employment when later life health is controlled for, most of the association between 
early life circumstances and later life employment appears to be transmitted through 
education and later life health. 
Our empirical findings may suggest that public policies which invest in children’s 
health and parents’ SES can benefit children in terms of better education, (later life) 
health and employment opportunities. Examples of such policies are free health care for 
children and (means tested) income and in-kind support programs which cover the 
domains of parent’s SES and children’s health (e.g., Marmot et al., 2012, pp 1016–7). 
However, it is still an open question what the most effective and cost efficient ways are 
to implement such policies, as well as the optimal timing when to intervene (e.g. 
Almond and Currie, 2011b), even if with regard to the latter point there is an increasing 
consensus on the advantages for intervening as early as possible (e.g. Doyle et al., 
2009). 
As discussed in the introduction, caution is warranted for policy recommendations 
based on these estimated associations. And though the literature provides evidence in 
support of causal relationships between early life circumstances and later life outcomes, 
more research is needed to identify the mechanisms that drive these relationships. 
Nonetheless, concerning this latter issue important advances have been made in this 
area. For instance, van den Berg and Gupta (2011) find a causal effect of economic 
circumstances at birth—measured by the business cycleʊon mortality later in life and 
that operates for Dutch women (but not for men) through marriage, and Maccini and 
Yang (2009) provide suggestive evidence that the causal effect of weather conditions 
early in life—measured by birth year rainfall—on the adult SES of Indonesian women 
is mediated more strongly by improved schooling attainment, and not as importantly by 
adult health.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A3.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Respondent’s Socioeconomic Characteristics  
Health status Self-Reported Health (SRH). The five SRH categories (from 1 to 5: 
poor, fair, good, very good, and excellent) are combined into three 
(from 1 to 3: poor or fair, good, very good or excellent). 
Employment status The categories no work and work. As suggested by Maestas (2010), 
we combine more objective information on hours of work and 
subjective employment status (both self-reported) to construct our 
measure of employment. No work includes those who are retired; 
permanently sick, or disabled; homemakers; the unemployed; and 
other individuals who make a living from owning properties, doing 
voluntary work, and so forth. Work refers to employed or self-
employed individuals who report a positive number of hours of 
work per week in their primary job. 
Education Includes three levels of education defined from the 1997 International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED, 
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_199
7.htm): no education, primary education and lower secondary education 
(ISCED 0–2), upper secondary and postsecondary nontertiary 
education (ISCED 3–4), and tertiary education (ISCED 5–6). 
Marital status Is equal to 1 if living with spouse/partner, 0 if living as a single. Six 
individuals who live alone but report a marital status “other” are 
included as singles. 
Number of children Includes biological children. Four intervals are considered: no 
children, 1 child, 2 children, and 3 or more children.  
Age Includes dummy variables for each age year. 
Time Includes dummy variables for each survey year. 
Respondent’s Early Life Circumstances  
More than 25 books at home 
when 10 years old 
(bookcase) 
Is equal to 1 if there were more than 25 books (at least enough to fill 
one bookcase) in the household when the person was 10 years old, 0 
if less. Magazines, newspapers, and school books are not 
considered. 
Breadwinner farmer or 
elementary occupation 
when respondent was 10 
years old 
(breadwinner) 
Is equal to 1 if the main household breadwinner worked as an 
agricultural-fishery worker or in an elementary occupation when the 
respondent was 10 years old, 0 otherwise. 
Rooms per person when 10 
years old 
(rooms) 
The number of rooms per person in the household when the 
respondent was 10 years old. Includes bedrooms, but excludes 
kitchen, bathrooms, and hallways. 
Chronic conditions during 
childhood (0–15 years) 
Is equal to 1 if a respondent suffered from one or more chronic 
conditions during his childhood (0–15 years), 0 otherwise. Includes 
the following chronic conditions: severe headaches or migraines; 
epilepsy, fits, or seizures; emotional, nervous, or psychiatric 
problem; childhood diabetes or high blood sugar; heart trouble; and 
other serious health conditions. 
One month or more in bed 
during childhood (0–15 
years) 
Is equal to 1 if during childhood (0–15 years) and because of a 
health condition, the respondent was confined to bed or home for 
one month or more, 0 otherwise. 
Height (in centimeters)  Adult self-reported height (in centimeters). 

Chapter 4:  
Early life circumstances and 
life-cycle labor market 
outcomes 
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Introduction 4.1.
There is a growing literature that demonstrates that the widely documented 
socioeconomic status (SES)-health gradient in adulthood (Marmot and Wilkinson, 
1999; Smith, 1999) has its origins in an individual’s early life (Case et al., 2002; Currie 
and Stabile, 2003). Two chapters of the most recent volumes of the Handbook of Labor 
Economics (Almond and Currie, 2011b; Black and Devereux, 2011), for instance, show 
that adverse health events in early life and parental SES have long-lasting effects on 
later life health and SES-related outcomes such as earnings and work effort. But with 
the possible exception of Smith (2009), and to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
empirical study to date that has attempted to quantify how such early life circumstances 
relate to an individual’s earnings and other labor market outcomes over the entire life 
cycle. To investigate this is in particular important as some consequences of adverse 
(health) events early in life may not become apparent until later in adult life as, for 
instance, discussed in Almond and Currie’s (2011a) survey on the economic 
consequences of Barker’s (1995) fetal-origins hypothesis, or if their impacts accumulate 
over the life-cycle as some life course models propose (e.g., Kuh and Wadsworth, 
1993). Likewise, children from parents with a higher SES may face better economic 
opportunities over their life cycle as a result of nepotistic family connections (Bowles, 
1972)43 or because of (inherited) factors that are correlated with family background 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002) and which are rewarded in the labor market such as cognitive 
skills (Case and Paxson, 2008b), social skills (Persico et al., 2004) and other 
noncognitive skills related to personality (Lundborg et al., 2014; Mueller and Plug, 
2006), and beauty and other aspects of physical appearance (Scholz and Sicinski, 2014). 
A study closest to ours is that of Smith (2009). He uses a subsample of U.S. siblings 
from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) aged 25–47 in 1999 to estimate the 
associations of childhood self-reported health (SRH) status and parental income during 
childhood on an individual’s initial level of (annual) earnings at age 25 and its 
subsequent growth. He finds that about 50 percent of their overall impact is already 
present at age 25, while the remaining 50 percent is the consequence of faster individual 
income growth after age 25. Moreover, when unobserved family effects are controlled 

43 This is also consistent with the importance of (social) networks as the literature on intergenerational 
mobility (in occupation) suggests. See Black and Deveraux (2011) for a survey. 
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for (using within-siblings estimates), the estimate of childhood SRH on post-age 25 
individual income growth is substantially larger. When looking at (annual) weeks 
worked, he reports no evidence of an association of childhood health with (annual) 
weeks worked at age 25, but a positive one with the change in weeks worked from age 
25 onward. However, a potential drawback of his analysis is that he focuses on (at most) 
two years of an individual’s work career and that the oldest individuals in his sample are 
still relatively young from a life-cycle perspective (namely, 47 years old). 
Apart from Smith (2009), most of the previous studies that have analyzed the effects of 
early life circumstances on later life earnings have usually focused on a single age later 
in life. For instance, some twin studies that compared to sibling studies additionally 
control for virtually all genetic differences have explored how birth weight—as a 
measure for health in utero—relates to earnings later in life. For example, Black et al. 
(2007) link administrative data to a sample of Norwegian twins and find a positive 
association between birth weight and earnings in early adulthood (at ages 25–35) that is 
similar with or without controlling for twin fixed effects. Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(2004), instead, using an U.S. female sample of monozygotic (MZ) twins, find that the 
(positive) association between birth weight and hourly wages in adulthood (at ages 39–
58) is significant when controlling for (MZ) twin fixed effects only. 
Additional empirical support for these estimated associations is provided by several 
recent studies that find causal impacts of very specific exogenous early life events on 
later life earnings. For instance, Almond (2006) uses the 1918 Influenza Pandemic as 
measure of a health shock around birth (more specifically, as a natural experiment to 
test Barker’s fetal-origins hypothesis), and shows that it reduces annual wage income of 
U.S. men of (about) ages 40, 50 or 60. When using a similar approach to Almond 
(2006), Nelson (2010) does not find a significant effect on hourly wages of relatively 
old (above age 65) individuals (and males) in Brazil. Chen and Zhou (2007) show that 
the 1959–1961 famine in China adversely affected the earnings of the survivors in rural 
areas at ages 24–37, but these effects are only marginally significant. 
However, some studies in the literature on intergenerational earnings mobility suggest 
that the association between (annual) earnings and lifetime earnings is likely to increase 
over an individual’s life cycle and empirical studies that consider only a specific age 
are, therefore, likely to suffer from a so called life-cycle bias (e.g., Haider and Solon, 
EarlylifecircumstancesandlifeͲcyclelabormarketoutcomes
113 
2006). To tackle this issue, Brunello et al. (2012) examine the associations of early life 
circumstances with individual’s total lifetime earnings. They find that the long-term 
association between access to books in the parental home (as a measure for parents’ 
cultural background or education) and lifetime earnings for men in Europe is in part 
mediated through educational attainment, but provide no evidence on how these 
associations with accumulated earnings evolve over a life cycle .44 
Our main contribution to the literature is that we examine in detail how early life 
circumstances in terms of health and parental SES are related to labor market outcomes 
over the entire life cycle. We quantify the associations of individual’s health and 
(parental) SES during childhood at five-year age intervals between the ages 25–65 with 
individuals’ earnings and other labor market outcomes such as average annual earnings 
and number of years worked. For this purpose we use data from the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), and in particular from its third wave called 
SHARELIFE which in addition to information on respondent’s early life circumstances 
contains data on their full work histories.  
Our findings provide valuable insights into some of the previous findings in the 
literature. For instance, we show that the associations between early life circumstances 
and (accumulated) labor market outcomes are not constant over an individual’s life 
cycle. In particular for work effort (working years), we find a strong negative 
association with childhood SES at the beginning of the work career which decreases 
with age as individuals with a higher childhood SES also enter the labor market and 
those with a low childhood SES accumulate more employment gaps. This finding could 
explain Case et al.’s (2005) result for British men of a positive association between 
family income at age 16 and employment probability at age 42, one that is, however, 
insignificant at age 33. In addition, we show that there is an increasing association 
between childhood SES and accumulated earnings over the life cycle, one that for men, 
moreover, has the opposite sign at the beginning of the work career. These findings 
provide evidence on the possible role of the aforementioned life-cycle bias in, for 

44 Also Belfield et al. (2006), who study the effects the Perry Preschool Program—an early life 
intervention targeted to disadvantaged African American children ages 3–4 in the U.S., use retrospective 
interview data at ages 27 and 40 on the work careers of the participants and control group (in total 123 
individuals) to estimate (three) different lifetime earnings profiles (for ages 18–65). They find that treated 
males and females have, respectively, 11 to 34 percent and 19 to 36 percent higher earnings than their 
controls. They do not test, however, if these differences are statistically significant. 
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instance, the estimated associations of intergenerational earnings mobility at different 
ages (Haider and Solon, 2006).45  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
main variables for analysis, for instance, how we construct our measure of lifetime 
earnings. Section 3 contains empirical models that investigate the associations of early 
life circumstances with lifetime earnings, and in particular, with labor market outcomes 
over the life cycle: (accumulated) earnings, (average) annual earnings, number of years 
worked, number of career gaps, and the probability of retiring. We also investigate if 
some of these associations over the life cycle differ between European country-groups. 
Section 4 analyzes the robustness of our main results. Section 5 summarizes the main 
findings and concludes. 
Data and descriptive statistics 4.2.
We use individual-level data from the first three waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing, 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE; http://www.share-project.org/), a multidisciplinary 
and representative cross-national panel of the European population aged 50 and over. 
The first two waves were conducted in 2004/2005 and 2006/2007, respectively. These 
waves include information on sociodemographic background characteristics, current 
health and socioeconomic status (e.g., education, employment, and income), and 
expectations (on, e.g., retirement age). Most of our data, however, stem from the third 
wave, carried out in 2008/2009 and referred to as SHARELIFE. This third wave 
contains retrospective information on the entire life-histories of about 75 percent of the 
individuals who participated in waves one or two, which ranges from early life 
circumstances, to work careers, and to other social, economic and health events 
occurred during life. In our analysis, we combine this information with the one provided 
in the retrospective SHARE Job Episodes Panel Data (Brugiavini et al., 2013). This 
retrospective panel is basically a reshape of the work history section of SHARELIFE 
where each respondent contributes as many observations as there are years of age from 
birth to the age at which the respondent is observed at the time of the SHARELIFE 
interview. This retrospective panel contains (cleaned) information on the start and end 

45 For this, one needs to think of childhood SES as proxy for parental lifetime earnings. This introduces 
right-side measurement error in an OLS regression which is, however, most likely to result in an 
attenuation bias of the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity (cf. Haider and Solon, 2006).  
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dates of all the job spells that respondents had during their working life, plus some job 
characteristics such as job income, and some additional information on year of 
retirement, pension benefits and unemployment spells. 
Our sample consists of 11,015 male and 13,180 female European respondents and 
spouses aged 50 and over in the interview year of SHARELIFE.46 We drop male and 
female respondents who never worked or did not report any wage in SHARELIFE 
(1,388 and 3,900 cases, respectively), as well as those that worked for less than 5 years 
(261 cases) to exclude individuals with very short employment careers. We also exclude 
male and female respondents for whom only one wage point is available (1,379 and 
1,465 cases, respectively). Trimming compounded labor income by 1 percent from 
above and below in each country sets 304 values to missing. After dropping missing 
values in the childhood SES variables (430 cases), childhood health variables (58 cases) 
and height (112 cases), we end up with our final sample of 7,740 male and 7,158 female 
respondents (and spouses) from the following thirteen countries: Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, 
Czech Republic, and Poland. Table 4.1 reports the number of individuals (i.e. 
respondents), N, by country and gender. 
Lifetime earnings 
We construct our measure of lifetime earnings in a similar way to Alessie et al. 
(2013).47 Our measure of compounded labor income at age t  is given by 
0
1
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
 
 ¦ , where r  is a constant real interest rate, and EW  are annual earnings 
from employment at ageW . For each job spell, the retrospective SHARE Job Episodes 
Panel Data (Brugiavini et al., 2013) provides on top of cleaned start and end dates, the 
first net monthly wage or net income in nominal local currencies, depending on whether 
the respondent worked as an employee or as a self-employed during that job spell. If the 
respondent retired already by the time of interview, also the last net monthly wage in 

46 We do not restrict the sample to men as in previous studies such as Brunello et al. (2012). 
47 We do, however, not include pension benefits in our measure of lifetime earnings. The reason for this is 
that we want to avoid a possible problem of double counting as would be the case if some pension 
benefits are funded by savings on net income from employment, as we have in our sample (see also 
Brunello et al., 2012). In any case, Weiss (2012), who uses also SHARELIFE data, reports a correlation 
of 0.95 between lifetime earnings with and without pension benefits. 
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the main job is reported (or instead, for the self-employed, the last net monthly income 
from work). To obtain a complete wage path, we use linear interpolation between the 
first wage on each job and the last wage of the main job. For those still working at the 
time of the SHARELIFE interview, we add the current net monthly wage (or, the 
current net monthly income for the self-employed) in that year from the original 
SHARELIFE wave to the retrospective panel to use it as an additional point on the wage 
path. Similarly, we also add net monthly wages from waves 1 and 2, and for the self-
employed also net monthly income from wave 2 (not available in wave 1) to the 
retrospective job panel if wages or incomes in the corresponding years are missing.48 
During unemployment years, we assign the respondent a wage equal to 80 percent of 
their last earnings. We convert all incomes (irrespective of in which country and in 
which year these amounts were earned) to annual PPP-adjusted German Euros of 2006 
following the procedure explained in Trevisan et al. (2011). Period 1 is taken to be the 
start of the working career, and we compound up to the SHARELIFE interview year for 
the non-retired, and the year before retirement (or the year of retirement if the individual 
reports to work in the year of retirement) for the retired, using an annual real interest 
rate of 2 percent (cf. Brunello et al., 2012; Haider and Solon, 2006). After 
compounding, we have a cross-sectional dataset, with one observation per individual. 
For those individuals that are still working at the time of the SHARELIFE interview, we 
need to calculate also their future labor income, which is given by 1
1
(1 )
R
t
t
t
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
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 ¦ , 
and is computed under the assumption of constant real annual earnings 
 ,  1,...,tE E t RW W   . Retirement R  starts in the year in which the individual 
reaches his or her expected retirement age, obtained from waves 1 and 2 (more 
specifically, the age at which they expect to collect pension benefits), or the statutory 
retirement age (in 2010, usually 65 for men, and 65 or 60 for women, as reported in 
Table A4.1) in case of item non-response to that question. We use country- and gender-
specific 2009 (period) life tables from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/) to 

48 We annualize earnings by multiplying monthly earnings by 12 to obtain annual earnings. Earnings are 
annualized because employment spells are in years. 
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weight all future incomes (that is, those earned after the SHARELIFE interview year) 
by the probability of survival.49 
To sum up, for individuals that are retired at the time of the SHARELIFE interview, 
their lifetime earnings are measured by 0tL , while for individuals that are still working, 
their lifetime earnings are the sum of 0tL  and 1tL . Table 4.1 shows sample statistics for 
average undiscounted annual earnings (computed as the sum of all annualized earnings 
from employment divided by years worked),50 by country and gender. The cross-
country pattern of median earnings, in particular for men, is encouraging for the 
reliability of these retrospective data, we believe. Eastern European countries such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic have considerably lower annual earnings compared to 
Western European countries, while annual earnings are the highest in Switzerland. 
Women’s pattern of median annual earnings is somewhat less clear when compared to 
that of males, but all in all similar: annual earnings are the lowest in Eastern European 
countries and the highest in Switzerland. 
Table 4.1: Annual Lifetime Earnings (Undiscounted, in PPP-adjusted German Euros of 2006)a 
  Men     Women     
  Medians Means N Medians Means N 
Austria 15,919 18,386 184 9,587 11,429 196 
Germany 18,844 21,746 629 10,459 11,630 628 
Sweden 17,505 22,575 626 11,498 14,385 723 
Netherlands 16,870 18,878 747 7,608 9,560 684 
Spain 14,097 22,417 475 8,518 14,611 306 
Italy 12,730 15,847 873 9,410 11,991 626 
France 20,421 35,120 606 12,822 26,729 573 
Denmark 17,396 19,662 738 11,171 12,978 744 
Greece 17,124 26,733 533 13,006 19,436 310 
Switzerland 35,007 41,336 438 16,725 19,456 457 
Belgium 19,719 21,760 854 13,670 14,747 665 
Czech Republic 8,461 9,689 555 6,562 7,311 773 
Poland 6,652 15,589 482 4,843 15,584 473 
a The table shows sample median and mean values for annualized earnings from employment obtained from the 
retrospective survey, as well as sample sizes (N) by country and gender. All amounts are undiscounted and in PPP-
adjusted German Euros of 2006.  

49 We use within period survival probabilities, i.e., between age t and t+1, and allow these to vary across 
country, gender and age. We assume the survival probabilities remain constant after 2009. 
50 This variable is only used for the descriptive analysis. 
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Childhood SES 
For measuring childhood SES we use four variables that capture different dimensions of 
the respondent’s SES at age 10. First, we include the number of rooms per person and 
the number of facilities in the household (including fixed bath, cold and hot running 
water supply, inside toilet and central heating) as those have been shown to be good 
proxies for the parent’s financial status (Cavapozzi et al., 2011). Second, we consider 
the estimated number of books at home, which is meant to capture the parents’ cultural 
background or education (Cavapozzi et al., 2011). Last, we use the main breadwinner's 
occupation (in ISCO-88 skill levels) as a measure of the household’s work status. We 
construct a single index of childhood SES using the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA). We take the first principal component (PC), which explains the largest 
proportion of the total variance, as a measure of an individual’s SES during childhood. 
We estimate the index using the pooled sample of all European countries and men and 
women. The index explains 50.5 percent of the total variance and all the factor loadings 
on the first PC have the expected positive sign (see Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2: Childhood SES indexa
  Pooled sample 
Rooms per person in the household when 10 years old 0.434*** 
 (0.00738) 
Number of books at home when 10 years old 0.569*** 
 (0.00461) 
Main breadwinner's occupation when 10 (in ISCO-88 skill levels) 0.432*** 
 (0.00745) 
Number of facilities in the household when 10 years old (range 0-5) 0.548*** 
 (0.00513) 
Explained variance 0.505 
N 14898 
a The table shows the factor loadings on the first principal component with its explained variance. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Childhood health 
We follow a similar strategy for measuring childhood health where we combine 
subjective with objective health measures referred to when the respondent was less than 
16 years old to generate a childhood health index (HI) for each respondent. As our 
subjective health measure we use childhood SRH, and group the original six categories 
(from 1 to 6: excellent, very good, good, fair, poor, and changing) into four (from 1 to 
4: excellent; very good; good; fair, poor, or changing). Among the objective health 
measures, we consider the number of respiratory problems, infectious diseases, 
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cardiovascular diseases, neurological and psychiatric diseases, disorders of the sense 
organs, and the number of neoplastic diseases and other serious health conditions an 
individual suffers during childhood.51 As for childhood SES, we use the PCA and keep 
the first PC as a measure of an individual’s childhood health (cf. Poterba et al., 2010). 
We estimate the index using the pooled sample of all European countries and men and 
women. The index explains 20.2 percent of the total variance and all the factor loadings 
on the first PC have the expected positive sign (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Childhood Health Index (HI)a
  Pooled sample 
Childhood SRH (1 = excellent, 4 = fair, poor or changing)  0.610*** 
 (0.0111) 
Number of respiratory problems 0.423*** 
 (0.0173) 
Number of infectious diseases 0.264*** 
 (0.0214) 
Number of cardiovascular diseases 0.210*** 
 (0.0221) 
Number of neurological and psychiatric diseases 0.364*** 
 (0.0191) 
Number of disorders of the sense organs 0.347*** 
 (0.0191) 
Number of neoplastic diseases and other serious health condition 0.288*** 
 (0.0222) 
Explained variance 0.202 
N 14898 
a The table shows the factor loadings on the first principal component with its explained variance. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Additional controls 
We include dummies for birth-year in all equations to control for possible secular or 
cohort-specific changes in society, and especially after World War II, that occurred after 
an individual’s childhood and which may have affected both an individual’s labor 
market behavior over the life cycle and lifetime earnings. Moreover, because of the 
well-known differences in institutional settings between European countries, e.g. in 
labor market characteristics and health care systems, we also include country dummies. 

51 These count variables are constructed using the information in questions hs008 and hs009 in the 
SHARELIFE questionnaire where respondents are asked to report on a yes or no basis whether they had 
20 specific childhood diseases between their birth and age 15. In particular, respiratory problems include 
asthma, and other respiratory problems and allergies. Infectious diseases include also polio, severe 
diarrhea, meningitis/encephalitis, and appendicitis. Cardiovascular diseases include diabetes or high blood 
sugar, and heart trouble. Neurological and psychiatric diseases include severe headaches or migraines, 
and epilepsy, fits or seizures, and emotional, nervous or psychiatric problems. Disorders of the sense 
organs include chronic ear problems, speech impairment, and difficulty in seeing even with eyeglasses. 
Finally, other serious health conditions are combined with neoplastic diseases. 
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For instance, with regard to the objective health measures that we use, Havari and 
Mazzonna (2011) find a large variation of response rates to these health measures across 
countries which they attribute to a different access to medical services and to a lack of 
good technology fifty years ago in diagnosing diseases (mainly, in the Mediterranean 
and Eastern European countries). This underscores the need to control for country 
effects when using these variables. In addition, even if Havari and Mazzonna (2011) 
find no evidence of recall error in these conditions,52 they report some evidence of a 
negative association between age and reporting these conditions, which underscores the 
need to control also for birth (or age) effects when using these variables. 
Empirical results 4.3.
4.3.1. Early life circumstances and total lifetime earnings 
We first examine the associations of early life circumstances with (total) lifetime 
earnings. For this purpose we estimate linear regressions on the log lifetime earnings of 
men and women. The childhood HI is turned into an index of good health, and both 
indices are transformed into terciles. All models in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 include both 
country dummies and birth-year dummies. The significance levels are based on robust 
standard errors. 
As shown in columns (1) in Table 4.4, childhood SES is strongly associated with 
lifetime earnings, and most notably for women. For instance, men and women with a 
low childhood SES earn, respectively, up to 28 (exp(í0.243) í 1) and 50 percent less 
income during their working life when compared to individuals who had a high SES 
during childhood. To a lesser extent, we also find a positive association with childhood 
health. Men and women with a low childhood HI earn up to 6 percent less income 
during their working life when compared to those who had a high HI during childhood. 


52 In particular, they do not find evidence that memory capacityʊmeasured by two cognitive ability tests 
consisting of a verbal registration and recall of a list of ten itemsʊis significantly associated with the 
reported number of childhood illnesses. 
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Table 4.4: Log lifetime earnings regressions for men and women in Europea
  Men   Women   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low childhood HI -0.056***  -0.062**  
 (0.019)  (0.027)  
Medium childhood HI -0.042**  -0.034  
 (0.021)  (0.028)  
Low childhood SES -0.243***  -0.406***  
 (0.022)  (0.030)  
Medium childhood SES -0.109***  -0.184***  
 (0.019)  (0.024)  
Low HI * Low SES  -0.308***  -0.461*** 
  (0.035)  (0.047) 
Low HI * Medium SES  -0.179***  -0.253*** 
  (0.030)  (0.041) 
Low HI * High SES  -0.097***  -0.001 
  (0.029)  (0.038) 
Medium HI * Low SES  -0.311***  -0.396*** 
  (0.035)  (0.053) 
Medium HI * Medium SES  -0.169***  -0.174*** 
  (0.033)  (0.043) 
Medium HI * High SES  -0.063*  -0.054 
  (0.034)  (0.041) 
High HI * Low SES  -0.274***  -0.380*** 
  (0.035)  (0.051) 
High HI * Medium SES  -0.141***  -0.141*** 
  (0.031)  (0.046) 
Buffering Hypothesisb  0.908  0.108 
R-squared 0.253 0.253 0.201 0.202 
Observations 7740 7740 7158 7158 
a The OLS regressions include both country dummies and birth-year dummies.  
b The buffering hypothesis in columns (2) shows the resulting p-value when testing ȕLowHI*LowSES - 
ȕLowHI*HighSES < ȕHighHI*LowSES - ȕHighHI*HighSES, where HighHI*HighSES is the reference category. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10.  
According to studies such as Case et al. (2002) and Currie and Stabile (2003), income 
buffers children from the negative effects of chronic conditions (which are also more 
common among low-SES children). To explore this so called buffering hypothesis in 
lifetime earnings and test if childhood health affects lifetime earnings non-linearly 
through the childhood SES distribution, we add interaction terms between the childhood 
health and SES terciles in columns (2). In particular, we want to test if having a higher 
SES during childhood reduces the negative impact on lifetime earnings of having a poor 
health during childhood. If childhood SES has such a protective effect, we would expect 
the effect of the interaction term LowHI*LowSES to be in absolute terms greater than 
the effect of the interaction term LowHI*HighSES, and hence, as a results of the 
negative signs corresponding these interaction terms (a consequence of the reference 
category being HighHI*HighSES), we test ȕLowHI*LowSES - ȕLowHI*HighSES < 0 where the ȕs 
are the corresponding parameters. However, in our sample, childhood SES is driving 
most of these interaction effects (see columns (1)). To be conservative, we argue that 
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there is a buffering effect if the protective effect of childhood SES is larger for those 
individuals who were in relatively poor health during childhood than for those with a 
relatively good health during childhood (i.e., we test ȕLowHI*LowSES - ȕLowHI*HighSES < 
ȕHighHI*LowSES - ȕHighHI*HighSES). However, as the bottom part of the table shows, we do 
not reject the null of no buffering effect of childhood SES (the p-values are 0.908 for 
men and 0.108 for women). 
4.3.2. How does the association between early life circumstances and 
lifetime earnings evolve over the life cycle? 
Smith (2009) finds that the association of childhood health (and parental income) with 
(annual) individual earnings is larger when measured at age 40 than at age 25 which he 
argues is consistent with both the fact that some consequences of poor childhood health 
in terms of earlier life adult onset of disease do not appear until later in adult life and 
also that their impacts might be cumulative. Our main advantage over Smith’s study is 
that while he considers (at most) two years of an individual’s work career, our data 
allows us to explore how these associations evolve over the full work career of an 
individual. Moreover, we also slightly change the focus and look at the accumulated 
results until a certain age in the life cycle rather than at the results at a certain age in 
the life cycle, which is what previous studies (inclusively Smith, 2009)—to the best of 
our knowledge—have done. This approach, we believe, might be more informative of 
the possible cumulative impacts that early life circumstances have on earnings.53 In the 
next section, we also present estimates on an individual’s cumulative (average) annual 
earnings at different ages (which might be more comparable to the results of Smith 
(2009) and other studies discussed in Section 4.1). 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 extend the analysis in columns (1) in Table 4.4 over men and 
women’s work career, respectively. The figures show the estimates for the childhood HI 
and SES terciles obtained when estimating log lifetime earnings equations at different 
ages of men and women’s work career. To perform such a life-cycle analysis, 
throughout the paper, we look at five-year age intervals between the ages 25–65. 
Similarly, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 extend the analysis in columns (2) in Table 4.4 and test 
the “buffering hypothesis” on lifetime earnings over men and women’s work career. 

53 One may also argue that, for survey data in particular, outcomes measured over a longer period of time 
are likely to be less noisy than outcomes measured at a specific point in time. 
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Throughout this section, a full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at 
a 5% level based on robust standard errors (the full estimation results are in tables A4.2 
and A4.3 in the appendix). 
Figure 4.1 shows that, compared to men with a high childhood HI, those with a low and 
medium childhood HI accumulate significantly less earnings over their whole career, 
but that these effects are not dramatic and remain more or less constant (between 5 and 
9 percent). Instead, those with a low childhood SES accumulate more earnings at 
younger ages (around 26 percent (exp(0.231) í 1) more at age 25), most likely because 
they start working earlier (see next section) and have had less education (results not 
shown), but end up with about 27 percent lower lifetime earnings (at the age 65) 
compared to men with a high childhood SES. Individuals with a high childhood SES 
have already caught up in (accumulated) earnings around the ages 30–35. 
Figure 4.1: Estimates from log lifetime earnings regressions over the life cycle I (Men)a
 
a The figure shows OLS estimates for low and medium childhood HI and low and medium childhood SES obtained 
from estimating linear log lifetime earnings equations at different ages over an individual’s working life. The 
reference categories are, respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country 
dummies and birth-year dummies. A full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at a 5% level based 
on robust standard errors.  
Figure 4.2 shows that women with a low childhood HI present a similar pattern than 
that of men, and earn over most of the life cycle about 5–8 percent less income when 
compared to women with a high childhood HI. This association, however, becomes 
most evident at later ages than for men, from age 45 onwards. Instead, women with a 
medium and, in particular, a low SES during childhood start accumulating increasingly 
less earnings over their working life at an earlier age than their male counterparts, at age 
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30 already. Compared to women with a high childhood SES, those with a low childhood 
SES accumulate already 21 percent less earnings at age 30 and end up with 50 percent 
(exp(í0.406) í 1) less lifetime earnings at age 65.  
Figure 4.2: Estimates from log lifetime earnings regressions over the life cycle I (Women)a
 
a The figure shows OLS estimates for low and medium childhood HI and low and medium childhood SES obtained 
from estimating linear log lifetime earnings equations at different ages over an individual’s working life. The 
reference categories are, respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country 
dummies and birth-year dummies. A full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at a 5% level based 
on robust standard errors.  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the same picture for men and women, respectively, but with 
the interaction terms needed for testing the buffering hypothesis ȕLowHI*LowSES - 
ȕLowHI*HighSES < ȕHighHI*LowSES - ȕHighHI*HighSES. As shown in Figure 4.3, men who had a 
low childhood SES have a similar pattern independently of whether they were in the top 
or bottom part of the childhood health distribution. We interpret this as no evidence of a 
buffering effect, which is supported by the formal tests in the appendix table A4.3. 
Figure 4.4, instead, shows that for women the negative effect of having a low SES 
during childhood is larger for those who also had a low childhood HI when compared to 
those with a low childhood SES but a high childhood HI. However, when testing for it, 
we only find very limited evidence of a buffering hypothesis, and at a 10 percent 
significance level.  
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Figure 4.3: Estimates from log lifetime earnings regressions over the life cycle II (Men)a
 
a The figure shows only the interaction terms needed for computing the buffering hypothesis 
(ȕLowHI*LowSES - ȕLowHI*HighSES < ȕHighHI*LowSES - ȕHighHI*HighSES) obtained from estimating linear log 
lifetime earnings equations at different ages over an individual’s working life (the reference category High SES x 
High HI is represented by the black zero line). All models include country dummies and birth-year dummies. A full 
square, diamond and triangle indicate significance at a 5% level based on robust standard errors. The full estimation 
results are in the appendix. 
Figure 4.4: Estimates from log lifetime earnings regressions over the life cycle II (Women)a
 
a The figure shows only the interaction terms needed for computing the buffering hypothesis 
(ȕLowHI*LowSES - ȕLowHI*HighSES < ȕHighHI*LowSES - ȕHighHI*HighSES) obtained from estimating linear log 
lifetime earnings equations at different ages over an individual’s working life (the reference category High SES x 
High HI is represented by the black zero line). All models include country dummies and birth-year dummies. A full 
square, diamond and triangle indicate significance at a 5% level based on robust standard errors. The full estimation 
results are in the appendix.  
In sum, for both men and women we find evidence of a cumulative impact of childhood 
SES on lifetime earnings over the life cycle, although, in particular for men, this 
association is negative at the beginning of the work career. To a lesser extent, also 
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childhood health shows a (positive) long-term association with lifetime earnings over 
the life cycle, and while for men most of this association is already present at age 25, for 
women it kicks in later, at about age 45. Finally, we do not find much evidence that a 
higher parental SES reduces the negative impact on lifetime earnings of poor health 
during childhood. 
4.3.3. What is the implicit labor market behavior in the association 
between early life circumstances and earnings over the life cycle? 
Smith’s (2009) findings suggest that the positive association of childhood health with 
earnings operates in part through a greater adult work effort.54 Similarly, some of the 
studies discussed in the introduction such as Chen and Zhou (2007) and Nelson (2010) 
find that early life circumstances affect, respectively, (annual) working hours in early 
adulthood and employment at older ages. Case et al. (2005), on their side, find, 
respectively, a negative and positive association of chronic conditions and parental 
income at age 16 with employment probability in mid adulthood. Instead, Black et al. 
(2007) show that the positive association between birth weight and the probability of 
working full time in early adulthood disappears after controlling for twin fixed effects. 
In the previous section we have shown how the associations of childhood health and 
SES with (accumulated) earnings vary over an individual’s life cycle. To better 
understand the implicit labor market behavior that may cause this association, we 
further distinguish the importance of working years and annual earnings in it as the 
logarithm of lifetime earnings is equal to the logarithm of annual earnings  plus the 
logarithm of years worked. This might shed light on whether the (cumulative) impact of 
early life circumstances on accumulated lifetime earnings operates through work effort 
(years worked) or through variations in human capital investment, and hence, also in 
labor market productivity (average annual earnings) (cf. Smith, 2009). 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show for men and women, respectively, estimates for the bottom 
childhood health and SES terciles obtained from the estimation of linear regressions at 
different ages over an individual’s work career on the log of (accumulated) years 
worked and on the log of (average) annual earning. As shown, men and women with a 

54 Instead, the one-year level association (in 1999) of parental income (and parental educational levels) 
with (annual) weeks worked in adulthood is insignificant. 
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low childhood SES start working earlier, but during their work career individuals with a 
high childhood SES catch up, and women with a low childhood SES actually end up 
working less years than those with a high childhood SES. Men and women with a low 
childhood SES also have, respectively, about 23 (exp(í0.205) í 1) and 39 percent lower 
annual earnings at age 25. But while for women this difference remains constant over 
their working life, for men it increases until more than 30 percent in the first ten years of 
their work career and remains constant afterwards. The figures also show that men and 
women with a low childhood health have lower annual earnings but do not work 
significantly less over the life cycle when compared to individuals with a high 
childhood health. However, we find that men with a medium childhood health work less 
years from age 30 until age 45 compared to men with a high childhood health (results 
not shown). 
Figure 4.5: Estimates from regressions on log average annual earnings and log years worked over 
men's life cyclea
 
a The figure shows OLS estimates for low childhood HI and low childhood SES in linear regressions on the log 
(average) annual earnings and log years worked at different ages over an individual’s working life. The reference 
categories are, respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country dummies and 
birth-year dummies. A full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at a 5% level based on robust 
standard errors.  
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Figure 4.6: Estimates from regressions on log average annual earnings and log working year over 
women's life cyclea
 
a The figure shows OLS estimates for low childhood HI and low childhood SES in linear regressions on the log 
(average) annual earnings and log years worked at different ages over an individual’s working life. The reference 
categories are, respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country dummies and 
birth-year dummies. A full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at a 5% level based on robust 
standard errors.  
The previous findings for the number of years worked suggest that individuals with a 
low childhood SES may have more gaps during their work careers or perhaps are also 
more likely to leave the labor market earlier than individuals with a high childhood 
SES. This is analyzed in Figures 4.7 and 4.8, respectively, and for both men and 
women. Because of the many zero values in the number of career gaps we estimate 
Tobit models and present marginal effects in Figure 4.7. The figure confirms that 
individuals, and most notably women, with a low childhood SES accumulate more gaps 
almost from the beginning of their work careers (the difference diminishes after age 50 
for males and after age 55 for females), which can explain why the negative association 
between childhood SES and working years diminishes over the life cycle. The estimates 
from simple linear probability models in Figure 4.8 show that women with a low 
childhood health are slightly more likely to retire until age 50 than women with a high 
childhood health, and that men and women with a low childhood SES are more likely to 
retire early, at ages 55–60, than individuals with a high childhood SES.  
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Figure 4.7: Marginal effects on the number of gaps over men and women's life cyclea
 
a The figure shows marginal effects for low childhood HI and low childhood SES obtained after the estimation of 
Tobit models on the (accumulated) number of gaps over men and women’s work career. The reference categories are, 
respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country dummies and birth-year 
dummies. A full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at a 5% level based on robust standard errors. 
Figure 4.8: Estimates on the probability of leaving the labor market over men and women's life 
cyclea
 
a The figure shows estimates for low childhood HI and low childhood SES obtained from the estimation of linear 
(probability) models on the probability of leaving the labor market over men and women’s life cycle. The reference 
categories are, respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country dummies and 
birth-year dummies. A full square, diamond, triangle and dot indicate significance at a 5% level based on robust 
standard errors.  
To summarize, both our results for total earnings and (average) annual earnings over the 
life cycle suggest a strong cumulative impact of childhood SES, but in general a much 
smaller one for childhood health. Moreover, our results for work effort might give us a 
different picture to that of Smith (2009). Individuals with a lower SES background start 
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working earlier and have, in the case of men, actually longer work careers (although not 
for women). But they also retire earlier and accumulate more gaps over their work 
career. In addition, for women who had a poorer childhood health their probability of 
retiring is increasing until the age of 50 years, and men with a medium childhood health 
work actually less years during their mid-adulthood compared to men with a high 
childhood health (results not shown). These latter two findings together may explain 
Smith’s result of a positive effect on annual weeks worked at a certain age in adulthood 
for those with better childhood health, although overall, their work effort during their 
career might be actually similar to that of individuals who had a poorer childhood 
health. 
4.3.4. Are there heterogeneous life-cycle profiles between country-
groups? 
Up to this point in the discussion, labor market responses over the life cycle to 
childhood health and SES have been assumed homogeneous across our sample of 
European countries. However, large differences in the levels of development over the 
period the individuals in our sample were born and raised exist between the countries in 
our sample. These large differences in economic resources and access to medical 
treatments may affect associations between early life circumstances and later life 
outcomes as a more favorable environment in this respect may dampen the 
consequences of adverse health shocks early in life (Bengtsson and Mineau, 2009). To 
investigate this conjecture more closely, we classify the countries into Nordic (Sweden, 
Denmark), Continental (Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium), 
Mediterranean (Spain, Italy, Greece) and Transitional (Czech Republic, Poland), and re-
estimate the models in section 4.3.2 and the main models in section 4.3.3. Moreover, to 
ensure that the terciles of childhood SES and health are equally distributed with respect 
to country-groups, we use the country-group-specific distributions of childhood SES 
and health (instead of the distribution from the pooled sample) to create the terciles of 
childhood SES and health. Otherwise, for instance, the top (bottom) tercile of childhood 
SES would be composed mainly by Nordic (Mediterranean) respondents as these are 
better (worse) off in terms of childhood SES. 
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Figures 4.9 to 4.11 show estimates for low childhood HI and low childhood SES 
obtained from estimating linear regressions on, respectively, log lifetime earnings, log 
average annual earnings and log years worked at different ages over an individual’s 
working life in the different country-groups and for men and women. These figures 
basically extend the results in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6. The reference categories are, 
respectively, high childhood HI and high childhood SES. All models include country 
dummies and birth-year dummies. 
As shown in the top panels in Figure 4.9, it is mostly in the Mediterranean countries 
where individuals with a low childhood health accumulate less earnings during their 
work career and to some extent also for men in Nordic and Continental countries, for 
whom having a medium childhood health is actually somewhat stronger associated with 
earnings over the life cycle (results not shown). Moreover, while for these men, most of 
this association is already present at the beginning of their work careers, for 
Mediterranean women this association kicks in a bit later, but is also larger and slightly 
increasing with age. To illustrate this, Mediterranean women with a lower childhood 
health accumulate 19 percent (exp(í0.171) í 1) less lifetime earnings at age 35 which 
increases to about 27 percent at age 65. For Mediterranean men, these differences at age 
35 and 65 are about the same (17 and 16 percent, respectively). The bottom panels show 
that although for men the profiles of the association between low childhood SES and 
earnings over the life cycle are similar in all country-groups, only in Continental and 
Mediterranean countries those with a low childhood SES accumulate (significantly) 
more earnings at younger ages (28 and 20 percent at age 25, respectively). Hence, only 
in these countries the association between low childhood SES and (accumulated) 
earnings reverses sign from positive to negative over the life cycle. At age 65, 
individuals with a low childhood SES have almost 30 percent lower lifetime earnings in 
all country-groups, except in the Mediterranean countries, where this difference 
amounts to 19 percent. For women instead, these profiles are more heterogeneous 
across country-groups, especially during the first part of the work career until 
approximately age 45. From that age onwards, Continental and Mediterranean women 
with a low childhood SES accumulate less earnings that their counterparts from Nordic 
and Transitional countries. For instance at age 65, the former have about 57 percent 
(exp(í0.450) í 1) less lifetime earnings than their female peers with a high childhood 
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SES; for women from Nordic and Transitional countries this difference is of 24 and 33 
percent, respectively. 
The top panels in Figure 4.10 show that mostly in the Mediterranean countries 
individuals with a low childhood health have lower (average) annual earnings during 
their work career, and that most of this association is already present at the beginning of 
their work careers. For instance, average annual earnings up to age 30 are, respectively, 
already 18 and 23 percent lower for, respectively these men and women when compared 
to their counterparts with a high childhood health. These differences reduce, however, 
to, respectively, 13 and 16 percent at age 65. The bottom panels show that in all 
country-groups men and women with a low childhood SES accumulate lower annual 
earnings during their work career (especially women from Continental countries), and 
also that the profiles over the work career are rather flat with some notable exceptions, 
however, such as men from Continental countries for whom this associations increase at 
the beginning of the work career. 
Finally, the top panels in Figure 4.11 show that for women mostly, and in particular 
from Mediterranean and Transitional countries, there is some evidence of a negative 
association between having had a low childhood health and accumulated work effort 
(working years) during the life cycle. Moreover, this association is not apparent at the 
beginning of the career. Also, in all country-groups men and women with a low 
childhood SES start working earlier, but during their work career individuals with a 
high childhood SES catch up, and women with a low childhood SES from Continental, 
and in particular from Mediterranean countries end up working less years than those 
with a high childhood SES. This latter difference in working years for Continental and 
Mediterranean women with a low and a high childhood SES becomes insignificant 
already at age 35. 
In sum, concerning the differences between European countries, the relatively small and 
positive long-term association between childhood health and earnings over the life 
cycle, which appears to operate through skills (annual earnings) rather than through 
work effort (working years), is mainly localized in the Mediterranean countries. Instead, 
the relatively strong, cumulative impact of childhood SES on earnings over the life 
cycle operates in all country-groups and for men and women through both skills (annual 
earnings) and work effort (working years). However, it is mostly for men from 
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Continental and Mediterranean countries for whom the association between low 
childhood SES and (accumulated) earnings reverses sign from positive to negative over 
the life cycle. Finally, for women, we find that most of these associations (for instance, 
those with accumulated earnings) are larger in the Mediterranean and/or Continental 
countries when compared to Nordic and Transitional countries. 
Sensitivity analysis 4.4.
We performed several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our results. For 
instance, to take a better count of the discrete nature of the variables used to measure 
childhood SES (in particular, the variables number of facilities, number of books, and 
the main breadwinner's occupation) and childhood health (the variables childhood SRH 
and the number of different objective health conditions), we used the polychoric 
correlation matrix to perform the PCA. Doing so increases somewhat the explained 
variance by the first PC, but does not affect our estimation results for Europe. This 
finding is supported by Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), who show the relevance of 
using the polychoric correlation matrix when performing the PCA on dichotomous 
variables rather than on ordinal (and continuous) variables. Furthermore, we used the 
country- and gender-specific distributions to construct the terciles of childhood SES and 
childhood HI, but also this does not affect our main estimation results for Europe. To 
make our results more comparable to the ones of Brunello et al. (2012), we excluded 
those individuals that have been self-employed at any stage during their career, and 
obtained similar results. Finally, because median lifetime earnings seem more reliable 
than the mean values (see Table 4.1), we used median regression to estimate the log 
lifetime earnings equations. Also this did not change the main results and conclusions of 
our paper. The results from all these sensitivity analyses are available upon request. 
Conclusions 4.5.
This study is arguably the first to investigate how early life circumstances—as 
measured by two indices of childhood health and socioeconomic status (SES)—are 
associated with labor market outcomes over the entire life cycle. In particular, we focus 
on (accumulated) earnings, average annual earnings, number of years worked, number 
of career gaps, and the probability of retiring over the life cycle. The analysis is 
conducted using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
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which on top of information on respondent’s early life circumstances contains 
retrospective data on their full work histories. 
Our results show that childhood SES (or factors correlated with it) has in general a 
larger impact on an individual’s life-cycle labor market outcomes than childhood health, 
and most notably for women. For instance, men and women with a low childhood SES 
earn, respectively, up to 28 and 50 percent less income during their working life when 
compared to individuals with a high SES during childhood. These differences reduce to 
6 percent when comparing men and women with a low and high childhood health. But, 
our results also show that these associations, and especially those with childhood SES, 
are not constant over the life cycle. While women with a low childhood SES accumulate 
increasingly less earnings (almost) from the beginning of their work career (already 21 
percent less at age 30), men with a low childhood SES accumulate significantly more 
earnings until that age (still about 9 percent more at age 30). These associations, we 
find, operate through skills (annual earnings), which show a persistent, rather constant 
effect during working life that favor individuals with a high childhood SES, but also 
through work effort (working years). This latter effect, instead, favors at the beginning 
of the life cycle individuals with a low childhood SES (which start working earlier), but 
as those with a high childhood SES enter the labor market and those with a low 
childhood SES accumulate more career gaps, its importance diminishes over the life 
cycle, and for women it actually reverses sign around the end of their work careers 
(from age 55 onwards) favoring women with a high childhood SES. With regard to 
childhood health, its smaller, rather persistent (positive) long-term association with 
lifetime earnings appears to operate rather through skills (annual earnings) than through 
work effort (working years). However, while for men most of this association with 
lifetime earnings is already present at the beginning of the life cycle (at age 25), for 
women it kicks in rather later (at age 45).  
One possible explanation for the larger impacts of childhood SES that we find is that 
children might be exposed during a longer period to their parents’ SES than to a specific 
health condition. Still, although some validation studies have tested the internal validity 
of the childhood health measures in SHARELIFE and find no evidence of recall bias 
related to memory capacity in reporting on these health conditions that we include in 
our index of childhood health, they also point to important age/cohort and country 
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differences in reporting on these health conditions which might not be captured with a 
simple dummy variables approach. Hence, some caution is warranted as we cannot rule 
out the possibility that measurement error is more severe in our measure of childhood 
health which we would expect to result in an attenuation bias.  
All in all, our empirical findings show that following a life-cycle approach like ours is 
important because, as some theoretical models stipulate and our results confirm, some 
consequences of adverse (health) events early in life may not become apparent until 
later in adult life and because some of their impacts, in particular those related to 
childhood SES, may change and accumulate over the life cycle.   
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table A4.1: Official age of retirementa
Men Women 
Sweden 65 65
Denmark 65 65
Switzerland 65 64
Netherlands 65 65
Germany 65 65
Belgiumb 65 65
Franceb 60 60
Austria 65 60
Spain 65 65
Italyb 65 60
Greeceb 65 60
Czech Republic 62,2 59,3 
Poland 65 60
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance (www.oecd.org/els/social/pensions/PAG). a The official age of retirement is 
shown for 2010 and corresponds to the age at which a pension can be received irrespective of whether a worker has a 
long insurance record of years of contributions. b For Belgium and France, workers can retire at age 60 with 40 years 
of contributions; for Greece, at age 58 with 35 years of contributions; and for Italy, at 57 (56 for manual workers) 
with 35 years of contributions.
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The aim of this thesis has been to contribute in two ways to the knowledge of the widely 
documented positive association between health and socioeconomic status (SES) in 
adulthood, also known as the SES-health gradient in the literature (Marmot and 
Wilkinson, 1999; Smith, 1999). In the first two chapters, I have chosen to study the 
impact that (adult) health has on (adult) labor market outcomes such as wages and 
employment, as these are key components of an individual’s (adult) SES. Moreover, 
because the effect of health on labor market outcomes increases with age (Currie and 
Madrian, 1999), an understanding of these effects is especially important in regions 
with aging populations, as is the case across Europe (United Nations, 2009). On the 
other hand, there is a recent and growing literature that shows that the SES-health 
gradient in adulthood has its origins in an individual’s early life (Case et al., 2002; 
Currie and Stabile, 2003). Therefore, the last two chapters of this dissertation have 
explored the relationship between early life circumstances and later life outcomes such 
as health and employment at ages 50–64 and lifetime earnings. 
The major role of health in determining employment among workers aged 50–64 years 
is already well documented in the literature on the health-employment nexus (Kalwij 
and Vermeulen, 2008; Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2009; Currie and Madrian, 1999, and 
references therein), for this reason the main contribution of Chapter 1 has been to 
disentangle health’s direct effect on employment from its indirect effect through wages, 
something that although previously highlighted by Cai (2009, 2010) has received 
virtually no attention in the empirical literature. Yet quantifying the mediating role of 
older worker’s wage rates in the health-employment nexus is important for both 
understanding individual’s labor market behavior and designing policies aimed at 
keeping older workers with health limitations employed. The main empirical findings 
from this chapter showed that for European country groups (as well as for Europe as a 
whole) the mediating role of wages in the health-employment nexus is relatively small 
while the direct impact of health on employment is relatively large and rather similar 
across country-groups. This similarity may imply the existence of comparable schemes 
across these country groups that allow unhealthy workers to exit the labor market 
(Wise, 2012). Overall, and from a policy perspective, these findings suggest only a 
minor role for disability income policies likes wage subsidies to encourage the 
employment of (older) workers with health limitations, but an instrumental role for 
policy aimed at helping employers accommodate these workers on the job and keep 
Essaysonearlylifecircumstances,healthandlabormarketoutcomesinEurope
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them employed at older ages. Such an inference is very much in line with recent calls in 
the U.S. by Autor and Duggan (2010) and Burkhauser and Daly (2011, 2012) for 
supported work over cash benefits for people with disabilities and, in particular, 
increased employer incentives to accommodate work-limited employees. 
The purpose of Chapter 2 was twofold. One one hand, to add to the empirical literature 
of health as a potential endogenous explanatory variable in wage equations by 
addressing problems such as unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection and 
measurement error (in the health variable) in one comprehensive framework. On the 
other hand, to gain insights into whether, and how, the Great Recession (GR) has altered 
the relationship between health and wages, an issue not yet addressed in the literature. 
The primary empirical findings showed that in Europe the positive impact of health on 
wages for (older) male workers in the period prior to the GR largely disappears during 
the GR, while for working-age women, there is rather no evidence of an effect of health 
on wages, both before and during the GR.  
Although budget cuts during the GR have restricted (overall) access to health care 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013), which we would expect to result in an increase in the impact 
of health on wages, presenteeism (i.e. attending work even though being sick) has 
become more common among workers (CareerBuilder, 2011). Also, there is some 
evidence of a reduction in the variable component of wages during the GR 
(Vandekerckhove et al., 2012), the one that is likely to be more responsive to 
productivity-related components such as health. The latter two findings may explain 
why health has become less responsive to wages in the working-age (male) population 
during the GR. 
Chapter 3 examined for thirteen European countries the associations of early life 
circumstances—measured by childhood health and SES—with educational attainment, 
and later life health and employment (at ages 50–64). In all countries and for men and 
women, favorable early life circumstances, and in particular a higher childhood SES, 
are associated with a higher level of education. And in most countries and in particular 
for women, favorable early life circumstances are associated with better later life health, 
also when education is controlled for. However, one of the main results in this chapter 
was that although for some countries, and mainly for men, there is evidence of 
significant associations between early life circumstances and later life employment 
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when later life health is controlled for, most of the association between early life 
circumstances and later life employment appears to be transmitted through education 
and later life health. 
However, as some theoretical models (e.g., fetal-origins hypothesis and life course 
models) suggest, some of these associations may change over the life-cycle. Therefore, 
Chapter 4 took a life-cycle approach to provide insights not only into which labor 
market outcomes are associated with adverse childhood events but also into if these 
associations are already present early or appear only later in adult life and if these are 
reduced or reinforced with age. All in all, the empirical findings from this chapter 
showed that following such a life-cycle approach is important because, as these 
theoretical models stipulate and the results confirm, some consequences of adverse 
(health) events early in life may not become apparent until later in adult life and because 
some of their impacts, in particular those related to childhood SES, may change and 
accumulate over the life cycle 
The findings from Chapters 3 and 4 are important to policymakers because they may 
suggest that policies aimed at improving children’s health and SES have long-lasting 
benefits for both the individual and society because of increased human capital 
accumulation, hence better employment opportunities, and better later life health (see 
also Marmot et al., 2012). Examples of such policies are free health care for children 
and (means tested) income and in-kind support programs which cover the domains of 
parent’s SES and children’s health. 
The previous paragraphs highlight the main results and implications of this thesis. 
Below, I would like to point out some possible extensions and future lines of research. 
A possibly restrictive assumption in the analyses in Chapters 1 and 2 is that there are no 
reverse impacts of wages and employment on health. Although finding credible 
exclusion restrictions in these instances is rather difficult (see, e.g., Currie and Madrian, 
1999, pp. 3320, 3331), given the theoretical importance that simultaneity between 
health and employment, and between health and wages has in Grossman’s 1972 model 
of health demand (see, Grossman, 2001, for a survey), this is an issue that deserves 
more attention in the current analysis. With regard to the interpretation of the findings in 
Chapter 2, I argue that presenteeism (i.e. attending work despite being ill) may reduce 
the impact of (poor) health on wages. But of course these are most likely short-run 
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effects, and actually raises concern on the potentially negative long-run effects for these 
workers and on the negative impacts on public health, e.g., by affecting co-workers’ 
health. For example, U.S. employees who attended work while infected with H1N1 are 
estimated to have caused the infection of as many as seven million co-workers (15 
percent of the 44 million infected with H1N1) over just three months during the height 
of the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 (Drago and Miller, 2010). These long-run and contagion 
effects are very relevant questions for further research. Also with respect to Chapter 2, it 
has already been mentioned that EU-SILC is a four-year rotational panel (except for 
France and Luxemburg). However, the empirical techniques used in this chapter are 
expected to yield useful results when applied to longer longitudinal data sources such as 
the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics or the British Household Panel Survey. 
Overall, the empirical findings from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that public policies which 
invest in children’s health and parents’ SES may benefit children in terms of better 
education, (later life) health and employment opportunities. However, it is still an open 
question what the most effective and cost efficient ways are to implement such policies, 
as well as the optimal timing when to intervene (e.g., Almond and Currie, 2011b), even 
if with regard to the latter point there is an increasing consensus on the advantages for 
intervening as early as possible (e.g., Doyle et al., 2009). The importance of intervening 
early in childhood is also highlighted in the new health policy framework for Europe 
“Health 2020” which calls for action on the so-called ”social determinants of health” 
and emphasizes investments in an individual’s early years as a basic pillar of this 
strategy (Marmot et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2013). Within SHARELIFE, it is in 
principle possible to test if, for instance, childhood health at age 0–5 is more relevant 
than childhood health at ages 5–10 or 10–15 for later life outcomes such as health and 
lifetime earnings. Some caution, however, is warranted when performing such an 
analysis as there is some evidence that the (self-reported) childhood health conditions, 
and in particular those in the 0–5 age interval, may suffer from systematic (age-related) 
recall bias (van den Berg et al., 2011) 
Keeping this problem in mind, one possible line of future research could be to extend 
the analysis in Chapter 4 to obtain insights into the causal effects that early life 
circumstances have on an individual’s life-cycle labor market behavior. One concern 
into the analysis in Chapter 4 (and Chapter 3) was that unobserved “third or 
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confounding factors” may be driving the correlations between early life variables and 
later life outcomes. Some of the studies discussed in these two chapters usually use a 
temporary state of the macro environment into which the child is born as an exogenous 
variation in an individual’s early life conditions. Therefore, and in a similar way to van 
den Berg et al. (2011), I could select the three SHARELIFE countries whose birth 
cohorts were exposed to a famine during the 1940s, namely, the Netherlands, Germany 
and Greece to estimate the average causal effect of a nutritional shortage early in life on 
an individual’s life-cycle labor market behavior. These authors use the occurrence of a 
famine as an instrumental variable (IV) for the self-reported hunger periods during 
childhood that is asked in SHARELIFE. Moreover, to deal with the systematic age-
related recall bias in the hunger periods variable, they suggest using two-sample IV 
estimation. 
Also within this literature, more research is needed to identify the mechanisms that 
drive the relationships between early life circumstances and later life outcomes. A 
potentially important mediating factor is education. Some previous studies exploit the 
differences in institutions both across countries and within countries over time to 
control for the endogeneity of education. For instance, changes in the level of 
compulsory education have been shown to provide exogenous variation in the number 
of years of schooling (Brunello et al., 2009). Hence, using the number of years of 
compulsory education an individual faced during schooling age to instrument his or her 
number of schooling years will shed light on the causal effect of education and on its 
mediating role between early life circumstances and, e.g., an individual’s life-cycle 
labor market behavior. 
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Esta tesis se compone de cuatro capítulos que investigan la asociación positiva que hay 
entre la salud y el estatus socioeconómico (SES) en la edad adulta, a menudo referida 
como el gradiente social en salud en la literatura (Marmot y Wilkinson, 1999; Smith, 
1999); y lo hacen de dos maneras. En primer lugar, como argumentan Currie y Madrian 
(1999) en su capítulo del Handbook of Labor Economics, la salud (en la edad adulta) es 
un factor determinante de los resultados en el mercado laboral (en la edad adulta) tales 
como los salarios, las horas trabajadas y el empleo, que por su parte son componentes 
clave del SES (en la edad adulta). Según algunos modelos económicos teóricos, la 
salud, como componente del capital humano, afecta al empleo no sólo de manera 
directa, sino también de forma indirecta a través del salario. Por lo tanto, una persona 
con mala salud no solo tendrá una menor productividad—y por ende un salario menor 
(véase, por ejemplo, Becker, 1962, 1964; Mushkin, 1962), sino que también, y quizás de 
forma más importante, tendrá un salario de reserva mayor. Este último efecto puede ser 
el resultado de factores tales como una mayor valoración del tiempo de ocio para cuidar 
la salud (Brown et al., 2010;. Cai, 2009), el acceso a prestaciones de incapacidad 
(Layard et al., 1994), o un aumento de la desutilidad del trabajo (Gordon y Blinder, 
1980). Si el salario cae por debajo del salario de reserva ya sea debido a que un 
empeoramiento de la salud reduce la productividad y/o aumenta el salario de reserva, el 
resultado será el abandono del mercado de trabajo. Sin embargo, a pesar de que la salud, 
los salarios y el empleo están relacionadas entre sí, la mayoría de los estudios previos 
analizan las relaciones salud-empleo y salud-salarios por separado. El Capítulo 1, 
“What do wages add to the health-employment nexus? Evidence from older 
European workers”, pretende contribuir a esta literatura a través de la cuantificación 
de la importancia que tienen los salarios en el nexo empleo-salud, un asunto que a pesar 
de haber sido destacado previamente por Cai (2009, 2010), no ha recibido atención en la 
literatura empírica con la posible excepción de Haveman et al. (1994). En particular, lo 
que se propone es medir el efecto directo de la salud, así como su efecto indirecto a 
través de los salarios en el empleo. Cuantificar el papel mediador que tienen los salarios 
en el nexo empleo-salud para los trabajadores de más edad es importante tanto para 
entender mejor el comportamiento en el mercado laboral de estos trabajadores como 
para diseñar políticas de empleo dirigidas a mantener a los trabajadores de más edad con 
problemas de salud empleados. El Capítulo 2, “The impact of health on wages: 
Evidence from Europe before and during the Great Recession”, en cambio, analiza 
más en profundidad el efecto directo de la salud en los salarios y contribuye a la 
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literatura que trata la salud como una variable endógena en una ecuación de salarios. 
Para ello se utiliza un método de estimación reciente propuesto por Semykina y 
Wooldridge (2010) que permite controlar simultáneamente la heterogeneidad no 
observada, el sesgo de selección y el error de medida (en la variable de salud). Por otra 
parte, al usar datos correspondientes y previos al periodo de la Gran Recesión—que se 
inicia en Europa en el año 2008 (Arpaia y Curci, 2010)—se busca comprender cómo la 
actual crisis ha alterado la relación entre la salud y los salarios. Al margen de esto, 
entender los efectos que la salud tiene en el mercado laboral es especialmente 
importante en regiones donde la población está envejeciendo, como es el caso para 
Europa (United Nations, 2009), ya que con el tiempo en estas regiones un mayor 
número de personas alcanzarán la edad en la que la salud tiene un mayor impacto en las 
variables relacionadas con el mercado laboral (Currie y Madrian, 1999). En el Capítulo 
1 se utilizan microdatos de panel para trabajadores de más edad de la Survey of Health, 
Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) y en el Capítulo 2 se utilizan microdatos 
de panel de la European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
para estimar el efecto de la salud en los salarios para la población en edad de trabajar, 
pero también se investiga si el efecto de la salud en los salarios es distinto entre grupos 
de edad. 
En segundo lugar, hay una creciente literatura que establece que el gradiente social en 
salud que se observa en la edad adulta tiene sus orígenes en la vida temprana de un 
individuo (Case et al., 2002; Currie y Stabile, 2003). Dos capítulos del último 
Handbook of Labor Economics (Almond y Currie, 2011b; Black y Devereux, 2011) 
también muestran que los eventos adversos de salud en la vida temprana y el SES de los 
padres tienen efectos de largo plazo sobre la salud y las variables relacionadas con el 
SES en la edad adulta tales como los ingresos y la oferta de trabajo de un individuo. 
Dentro de esta literatura se ofrecen varias teorías para explicar una posible relación 
entre las condiciones en la infancia y (la salud) en la edad adulta que dan soporte teórico 
a los hallazgos de estos estudios. Por una parte, la hipótesis de los orígenes fetales 
(Barker, 1995) propone que la exposición a estrés o malnutrición durante los periodos 
críticos de la etapa prenatal está ligada a un mayor riesgo de enfermedad coronaria, 
ictus, diabetes tipo II e hipertensión en edades adultas. Por otra parte, los modelos de 
ciclo vital indican que la enfermedad y las privaciones en la infancia pueden tener 
consecuencias de largo plazo para la salud, ya sea de forma directa a través de la propia 
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enfermedad o de forma indirecta restringiendo los logros educativos y las oportunidades 
a lo largo de la vida (Kuh y Wadsworth, 1993). Por último y de manera alternativa, los 
modelos de senda sostienen que el gradiente social en salud que se observa en la edad 
adulta no es directamente atribuible a las condiciones en la infancia, y que los vínculos 
entre los primeros años de vida y la salud en la edad adulta se debilitan e incluso 
desaparece su efecto directo cuando se tiene en cuenta su efecto indirecto a través del 
SES finalmente alcanzado en la edad adulta y a través de los hábitos de salud (Marmot 
et al., 2001). Los dos últimos capítulos de esta tesis utilizan microdatos de SHARE, y 
en particular de su tercera ola SHARELIFE, para estudiar los posibles efectos de largo 
plazo que las condiciones en la infancia tienen a lo largo de la vida de un individuo. En 
el Capítulo 3, “The associations between early life circumstances and later life 
health and employment in Europe”, se estiman las asociaciones de la salud y del SES 
en la infancia con el nivel educativo, y con la salud y el empleo a los 50–64 años. 
Además de presentar nueva evidencia empírica para trece países europeos, se analizan 
las asociaciones entre las condiciones en la infancia y el empleo a los 50–64 años 
controlando por diferencia en educación y salud, que son potenciales mediadores de las 
asociaciones entre estas condiciones en la infancia y el empleo en edades avanzadas. 
Por último, el Capítulo 4, “Early life circumstances and life-cycle labor market 
outcomes”, investiga cómo estas condiciones en la infancia—medidas a través de dos 
índices de salud y SES en la infancia—se asocian con los resultados del mercado laboral 
a lo largo de todo el ciclo vital de un individuo. Adoptar un enfoque de este tipo es 
importante porque no solo nos informa sobre qué resultados del mercado laboral se 
asocian con qué eventos adversos de la infancia, sino también sobre si estas 
asociaciones están ya presentes al inicio de la vida laboral o sobre si aparecen más tarde 
en la vida adulta y si se reducen o refuerzan con la edad. 
A continuación se detallan los resultados y las implicaciones para la política económica 
de cada capítulo. Dentro de la primera parte de esta tesis, en el Capítulo 1 se encuentra 
que en Europa los hombres (mujeres) de entre 50 y 64 años que tienen mejor salud 
(medido a través de un incremento de una unidad o de 0.8 desviaciones estándar en un 
índice de salud) tienen, en promedio, un salario-hora un 8 por ciento más alto, que a su 
vez se traduce en una probabilidad de empleo 2 (4) puntos porcentuales más alta. 
También se muestra que la salud tiene un impacto directo considerable en el empleo: los 
hombres (mujeres) que tienen mejor salud tienen una probabilidad de empleo 16 (12) 
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puntos porcentuales más alta. Sin embargo, las relaciones que hay entre la salud, los 
salarios y el empleo no tienen por qué ser homogéneas entre países europeos. Parece 
plausible que estas relaciones estén condicionadas, entre otros aspectos, por las 
diferencias institucionales relacionadas con el mercado laboral entre estos países. Por 
ejemplo, es probable que el empleo responda en mayor o menor medida a los salarios 
según se trate de un mercado laboral más o menos flexible. Para explorar esta 
posibilidad, se clasifica a los países de la muestra en diferentes "modelos sociales" 
(Sapir, 2006), a saber, el modelo Nórdico, Continental, Mediterráneo y de Transición. 
Pese a que los resultados muestran algunas diferencias entre estos grupos de países 
europeos, también indican que para todos los grupos de países la importancia que tienen 
los salarios en el nexo empleo-salud es relativamente pequeña, mientras que el efecto 
directo de la salud en el empleo es relativamente grande y bastante parecido entre estos 
grupos de países. Esta similitud podría implicar la existencia de regímenes de bienestar 
comparables entre estos grupos de países que permiten a los trabajadores con peor salud 
abandonar el mercado laboral (Wise, 2012). En conjunto, los hallazgos de este capítulo 
sugieren un papel menor para las políticas de discapacidad que pretendan fomentar el 
empleo de los trabajadores (mayores) con problemas de salud mediante subsidios 
salariales hacia estos trabajadores. En cambio, indican un papel clave para las políticas 
que ayuden a los empresarios a adaptar y acomodar a estos trabajadores con problemas 
de salud en sus puestos de trabajo con el fin de mantenerlos empleados en edades más 
avanzadas. Tales recomendaciones están muy en línea con algunas propuestas 
realizadas recientemente para los EE.UU. por Autor y Duggan (2010) y Burkhauser y 
Daly (2011, 2012) a favor de políticas de soporte en el empleo, más que de incentivos 
económicos, para las personas con alguna discapacidad, y sobre todo, a favor de las 
políticas que aumentan los incentivos de los empleadores para acomodar a los 
trabajadores con alguna discapacidad en su puesto de trabajo. 
El Capítulo 2 muestra que en el período anterior a la Gran Recesión, los hombres en 
edad de trabajar (de entre 20 y 64 años) que tienen una mejor salud (medido a través de 
un incremento de una unidad en un índice de salud) tienen, en promedio, un salario-hora 
un 9 por ciento más alto. Este efecto se concentra (y es mayor) entre los trabajadores de 
más edad (de entre 50 y 64 años). En cambio, durante la Gran Recesión, este impacto 
positivo de la salud en los salarios desaparece. Una posible explicación a estos 
resultados es que el presentismo (es decir, asistir al trabajo pese a estar enfermo) se ha 
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vuelto más común durante la crisis actual. Por ejemplo, un estudio reciente realizado 
por CareerBuilder (2011) en los EE.UU. encuentra que más del 70 por ciento de los 
trabajadores suelen ir a trabajar cuando están enfermos. Al menos en el corto plazo, este 
fenómeno podría reducir el impacto de la (mala) salud en los salarios. Por otra parte, 
hay cierta evidencia que apunta a que durante el periodo de la Gran Recesión ha habido 
una reducción de la parte variable de los salarios a través de recortes en las primas y en 
otros beneficios salariales (Vandekerckhove et al., 2012). Esta reducción de la parte 
variable de los salarios (que a priori se esperaría que fuese más sensible a las variables 
relacionados con la productividad como lo es la salud de un trabajador) también podría 
explicar por qué los salarios de los hombres se han vuelto menos sensibles a la salud 
durante la crisis actual. En cambio, para las mujeres en edad de trabajar (de entre 20 y 
59 años) no se encuentra evidencia de un efecto de la salud sobre los salarios, tanto en el 
periodo anterior como en el correspondiente a la Gran Recesión. 
Estos dos primeros capítulos también proporcionan evidencia empírica robusta sobre la 
importancia de corregir el error de medida en la variable de salud autopercibida cuando 
se estima su impacto sobre el empleo y los salarios, que de no tenerse en cuenta 
resultaría (mayoritariamente) en un sesgo de atenuación en el coeficiente de la salud. Y 
en particular el Capítulo 2, también muestra la importancia de controlar la 
heterogeneidad no observada y el sesgo de selección cuando se estima el efecto de la 
salud sobre los salarios. 
En la segunda parte de esta tesis, se analizan las asociaciones que hay entre las 
condiciones en la infancia, en términos de salud y SES, con diversas variables en edades 
posteriores. En el Capítulo 3 se analizan trece países europeos de forma separada y 
aunque los resultados empíricos muestran que existen diferencias entre estos trece 
países en cuanto a la importancia de las asociaciones entre las distintas variables de 
salud y SES en la infancia con las variables en edades posteriores, también muestran 
similitudes que nos permiten sacar conclusiones generales. En todos los países y tanto 
para hombres como para mujeres se encuentra que unas mejores condiciones en la 
infancia, y en particular un mayor SES durante la infancia, se asocian positivamente con 
un mayor nivel educativo. En la mayoría de estos países, y en particular para las 
mujeres, unas mejores condiciones en la infancia se asocian positivamente con una 
mejor salud a los 50–64 años, también cuando se controlan por diferencias en niveles 
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educativos. Por último, y aunque para algunos países (y sobre todo para los hombres) se 
encuentra evidencia de una asociación positiva entre las condiciones en la infancia y el 
empleo a los 50–64 años que se mantiene cuando se controla por diferencias en salud a 
los 50–64 años, la mayor parte de la asociación que hay entre las condiciones en la 
infancia y el empleo en edades avanzadas parece ser transmitida a través de la 
educación y la salud (a los 50–64 años). 
Por último, los resultados del Capítulo 4 demuestran que adoptar un enfoque de ciclo 
vital es importante porque, como algunos modelos teóricos establecen (por ejemplo, 
hipótesis de los orígenes fetales y modelos de ciclo vital) y los resultados de este 
capítulo confirman, algunas consecuencias de eventos adversos (de salud) en la infancia 
pueden no volverse evidentes hasta entrada la vida adulta y porque algunos de sus 
efectos, en particular aquellos relacionados con el SES en la infancia, pueden variar y 
acumularse a lo largo del ciclo vital. Por ejemplo, en Europa, tanto para los hombres 
como para las mujeres en Europa se encuentra una fuerte evidencia de un impacto 
acumulativo del SES en la infancia en los ingresos de una persona a lo largo de su vida 
y que opera tanto a través de un mayor número de años trabajados (que aproxima un 
efecto esfuerzo) como a través de unos mayores ingresos anuales (que aproxima un 
efecto productividad). Por otra parte, para los hombres esta asociación entre SES en la 
infancia e ingresos laborales se invierte de signo pasando de negativa a positiva durante 
la primera etapa de la vida laboral. Los resultados también muestran una asociación 
positiva de largo plazo (aunque de menor importancia) entre la salud en la infancia y los 
ingresos a lo largo del ciclo vital que opera principalmente a través de unos mayores 
ingresos anuales (efecto productividad) y sólo en menor medida también a través de 
unas carreras laborales más largas (efecto esfuerzo). 
Los hallazgos de los Capítulos 3 y 4, creo, deben ser relevantes para los responsables 
políticos, ya que sugieren que las políticas destinadas a mejorar la salud y el SES de los 
niños y niñas pueden tener beneficios duraderos tanto a nivel individual como para la 
sociedad en su conjunto, debido a la mayor acumulación de capital humano, y por lo 
tanto, de mejores oportunidades de empleo y una mejor salud a lo largo de la vida. 
Ejemplos de este tipo de políticas son las políticas universales de salud en la infancia y 
los programas de transferencias monetarias y en especie (con evaluación financiera) que 
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cubren los distintos ámbitos del SES de los padres y la salud de los niños (véase 
Marmot et al., 2012 , pp. 1016-7). 
Para finalizar, me gustaría señalar algunas vías que permitan extender y mejorar los 
trabajos contenidos en esta tesis. Un supuesto que puede resultar algo restrictivo en los 
análisis de los Capítulos 1 y 2 es el de la no causalidad inversa de los salarios y el 
empleo en la salud. Pese a que encontrar restricciones de exclusión creíbles en estos 
casos no es tarea sencilla (véase, por ejemplo, Currie y Madrian, 1999, pp. 3320, 3331), 
dada la importancia teórica que en el modelo de Grossman de 1972 tiene la 
simultaneidad entre la salud y el empleo, y entre la salud y el salario (véase Grossman, 
2001), ésta es una cuestión que merece más atención. Por otra parte, una de las 
limitaciones de los análisis en los Capítulos 3 y 4 es la posibilidad de que existan 
factores de confusión que estén causando las correlaciones que observamos entre las 
variables de salud y SES en la infancia y las variables en edades posteriores. Varios de 
los estudios que se revisan en esos capítulos utilizan variaciones temporales en el 
entorno macro en el que nace un individuo como una fuente de variación exógena en las 
condiciones en la infancia. Estos “experimentos naturales” habitualmente utilizan 
episodios tales como hambrunas o pandemias. Entre los países analizados en los 
Capítulos 3 y 4 hay tres (Alemania, Grecia y los Países Bajos) en los que las cohortes 
que participan en SHARELIFE estuvieron expuestas a hambrunas durante la década de 
1940. Siguiendo la metodología propuesta en van den Berg et al. (2011) se podría 
extender el análisis del Capítulo 4 para obtener una medida del efecto causal promedio 
de un déficit nutricional en la infancia en el comportamiento en el mercado laboral de 
un individuo a lo largo del ciclo vital. 
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